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Under Section 123 of the RTA, only persons with a demonstrable legal or equitable interest may lodge a caveat. Mere allegations of interest are insufficient. The court emphasized that bare assertions do not constitute a “caveatable interest.” Citing Rutungo Properties Ltd v Linda Harriet Carrington & Another (Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 61 of 2010), the judge held that a caveat is akin to an interlocutory injunction and cannot subsist indefinitely without active pursuit

The Court observed that although the Defendants did not produce any witness testimony in their defence, this omission did not in itself shift the evidential burden onto them. It reaffirmed the settled legal principle that a defendant’s failure to call witnesses does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to judgment; the plaintiff must still discharge the primary burden of proof through cogent and credible evidence. Citing the reasoning in Tucker Mubiru v Attorney General, C

The Court observed that the respondent's claim for UGX 30,067,542,200 was supported by the unchallenged valuation report of professional surveyor Mr. Obali Godwin, detailing market value for the 1,531.96-hectare suit land in Katikara, it eaffirmed the constitutional imperative under Article 26(2) for full market-value compensation in cases of unlawful deprivation by state agencies like the OPM, citing Attorney General v Henleg Property Developers Ltd (CA No. 421 of 2017, uphe

The High Court affirmed the Respondent as the lawful owner of the suit land and upheld the trial court’s award of vacant possession, permanent injunction, and UGX 10,000,000 general damages.

The Court examined Sections 67 and 70 of the Electricity Act. Section 67(1) permits a licensee to place electric supply lines on private land but requires minimal damage, prompt compensation, and, under Section 67(2) and (4), prior notice and consent of the landowner unless otherwise agreed. ERA’s jurisdiction under Section 70 is limited to compensation disputes where consent was sought and the landowner disagreed with valuation/compensation. Where a licensee enters land with

The court held that adverse possession was not pleaded, violating Order 7 Rule 1(e) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which mandates disclosing the cause of action. The claim was introduced belatedly in submissions, constituting trial by ambush. Even on merits, the appellants failed to prove factual possession, continuous 12-year occupation, animus possidendi, or non-permissive use. The respondents’ family maintained possession, and the appellants’ use was fragmented and permissi

Article 26 guarantees the right to own and use property without interference. The court found that the caveat emptor and statutory instrument disrupted the plaintiffs’ development plans, as evidenced by stalled construction observed during the locus visit. The court defined unlawful interference as a violation of proprietary or possessory rights. The notices affected the plaintiffs’ proprietary rights by restricting their ability to deal with the land. This issue was resolved

The Court emphasized that although locus visits are not always mandatory, they are recommended under Practice Direction No. 1 of 2007, especially in land disputes. The Magistrate’s failure to visit the locus created ambiguity about the exact portion of land awarded and prejudiced Bwire’s case. The Court held that Bwire did not prove customary ownership or any legally enforceable right to the land. Evidence strongly supported Nakirya’s claim that she received the land as a val

It’s trite that in an application of such a nature courts will consider the justice of the case to ascertain whether to vacate the caveat or not, I am of the finding that the justice of this case and the balance of convenience would in my opinion require that the caveat lodged by the 1st respondent vide instrument number KCCA-0015483 be maintained.

The court criticized both parties for deviating from the framed ground of appeal and the trial record. An appeal must be grounded in the record of proceedings, except in cases of clear illegality or procedural defects causing a miscarriage of justice. The appellants’ concession of trespass effectively nullified their appeal, as they failed to demonstrate errors in the trial court’s evaluation or findings.

The Court observed that the position under section 9(1) (e) of the Local Council Courts Act, cap 18, section 76A of the Land Act, cap227 and section 30 of the Land (Amendment) Act, 2004 which vested power in the local council courts to try and determine all matters relating to land as courts of first instance, as repealed laws. That these laws have now been repealed by section 77(1) (C) of the Land Act Cap 236, which states that the only court that has jurisdiction to determi

The Court clarified that oral transfers of customary land are enforceable without a written deed, as long as the gift is perfected by the donor's intent, delivery of the property, acceptance by the donee, and exclusive possession/use during the donor's lifetime. This distinguishes customary land from registered land, where formalities like deeds may apply (citing precedents like Oyet Bosco & Anor v Abwola Vincent [2018] UGHCCD 65)

The court emphaised that constructive notice arises only upon proper registration. A registered caveat or instrument gives constructive notice to the world, whether or not a purchaser has actual knowledge. This principle is central in determining the duty of disclosure: if a claim is not yet registered, it may not constitute an encumbrance binding on the seller

For a gift inter vivos in unregistered land, donor intention and donee acceptance are required. By erroneously finding that the 1st Respondent had authority to sell and that the 2nd Respondent acquired lawful ownership, the trial court deprived the Appellant of her rights in family land.

The Court found that, under Section 46(1) Contracts Act, where time is of the essence and a party fails to perform, the contract becomes voidable at the option of the promisee. Equity will not order specific performance where the claimant is the party in breach (see Nipuni Bhatia v Boutique Shazim Ltd [2015]).

Relying on Justine E.M.N. Lutaya v. Stirling Civil Engineering Co. Ltd, the Court emphasized that trespass occurs where there is unauthorized interference with lawful possession, whether physical or legal. The Plaintiff, as administrator, had legal possession of the land forming part of the estate.

It is a well-established legal principle that when a document containing contractual terms is signed, then in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not. The appellant acknowledged his indebtedness under the agreement and further conceded that in default, the loan would translate into a sale. He testified that he signed the agreement because he was in need of money, which the re

Although negotiations occurred, evidence showed mutual assent through actions: payments, handing over titles, mutation signing, and participation in subdivision. Oral contracts for land can be enforceable if essential terms are clear and intention is proven (Kobaku Associate v. Owusu, Stanley Bainebabo v. Abaho Tumushabe).

Under Section 123(1) of the Registration of Titles Act, a person claiming an interest in registered land, such as a beneficiary of a deceased estate, may lodge a caveat to prevent unauthorized dealings with the property until their claim is resolved.

The Court affirmed that “A mortgage under Section 116 of the Registration of Titles Act is void ab initio where the mortgagor did not have registered title at the time of execution.”

The Court warned that alleged transmissions or bequests of land, particularly within family structures, must be supported by credible and properly admitted documentary evidence. Hence serving as a benchmark for handling inheritance-related land conflicts and reiterates the appellate court's mandate to re-evaluate evidence afresh where trial courts have failed to do so.

The court concluded that, although the exact monetary contributions could not be established with certainty, the evidence showed a shared intention and effort to establish a joint home.

The Court emphasized that “equity will not perfect an imperfect gift,” but in this case, possession and development by the Respondent amounted to effective delivery and acceptance.

The Hermès v. Rothschild case therefore represents trademark law's attempt to re-establish control over the "real" and its signs in a hyperreal economy, asserting that even in the digital ether, the fundamental principles of preventing confusion and dilution must apply to maintain the integrity of established brands against unauthorized "simulacra."