High Court Clarifies LC I Courts, Not LC II, Are the Proper Starting Point (Have Original Jurisdiction) for Determining Land Disputes in Uganda Under Section 9(1)(e) of the Local Council Courts Act.

Waboga David
Aug 27
5 min read

Introduction

When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government came to power in 1986, it introduced a popular justice system as part of its decentralisation agenda. The central idea was to bring justice closer to the people, reduce litigation costs, and ensure that ordinary citizens, particularly in rural areas, could resolve disputes quickly and fairly without the need for formal courts.

Local Council (LC) Courts, then known as Resistance Council (RC) Courts, were vested with powers to handle minor civil and criminal disputes, including land conflicts, which were (and still remain) among the most common causes of litigation in Uganda.

The intention was to provide timely, community-based resolution of disputes in a manner consistent with local norms and practices, while also alleviating pressure on the formal judiciary.

As land became an increasingly contested resource, the 1995 Constitution of Uganda introduced District Land Boards (DLBs) under Article 240. The mandate of these Boards was distinct from the adjudicative functions of LC Courts, they were charged with holding and allocating land in the districts, facilitating land registration, and managing land vested in them in accordance with the Constitution.

This institutional framework created two parallel but interlinked structures:

(i) LC Courts as fora for dispute resolution, and

(ii) Land Boards as administrators and managers of land rights.

Under the Local Council Courts Act, Cap 18, disputes relating to land are to be instituted at the LC I Court, where the defendant resides or where the land is located. Decisions of the LC I Court can be appealed to the LC II Court, then to the LC III Court, and subsequently to the Magistrates Court and higher courts, in accordance with the procedural hierarchy.

However, confusion arose with the Land (Amendment) Act, 2004, which introduced Section 76A to the Land Act, purporting to vest original jurisdiction over land disputes in LC II Courts. This contradicted the Local Council Courts Act, leading to conflicting interpretations in both practice and case law. For years, parties and courts grappled with whether LC I or LC II was the proper forum of first instance for land disputes.

In a recent decision of the High Court sitting at Kabale (Twesigyire Robert v. Tukwasibwe Julius, Civil Appeal No. 014 of 2023, Judgment of 20th August 2025), Hon. Justice Ssemogerere, Karoli Lwanga provided important clarity. The Court held that the governing law is the Local Council Courts Act, Cap 18, which vests original jurisdiction in LC I Courts, and not in LC II Courts. Section 76A of the Land (Amendment) Act, 2004, was confirmed as repealed during the revision of the Land Act.

The decision also reaffirmed that appeals must comply strictly with statutory requirements, including obtaining leave where necessary; otherwise, they are deemed incompetent.

Background

The dispute began in Nyakeine LC I Court (2020), where the appellant (Twesigyire Robert) was declared owner of land with a banana plantation.

On appeal, the LC II Court of Kyabuhangwa Parish overturned the decision, ruling in favor of the respondent (Tukwasibwe Julius).

The LC III Court of Kamwezi Sub-County upheld the LC II decision.

The appellant then challenged the LC II and LC III decisions before the Chief Magistrate of Kabale, arguing lack of jurisdiction since the dispute originated in the LC I Court.

The Chief Magistrate dismissed the application, holding that the LC II Court had properly retried the case.

Grounds of Appeal

The appellant raised four grounds, including:

Error in disregarding the illegality of LC I jurisdiction.
Error in treating LC I and LC II jurisdictional defects as mere “form” rather than substantive.
Error in treating LC II as a court of first instance when it retried the case.
Improper reliance on Article 126(2)(e) of the Constitution to override statutory provisions.

Court’s Analysis

The High Court began by addressing the procedural competence of the appeal. It observed that the appellant had lodged the appeal before obtaining leave of court, contrary to the requirements of Order 44 Rules 2 and 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

The Court emphasized that the right to appeal is not automatic in every case and that where the law prescribes the requirement for leave, such leave is a precondition to jurisdiction. In other words, filing an appeal before leave is granted renders the entire appeal incompetent.

In support of this position, the Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Baku Raphael Obudra & Another v Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2005, where Odoki CJ categorically held that:

“There is no such thing as inherent appellate jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction must be specifically created by law. It cannot be implied.”

By endorsing this principle, the Court reaffirmed the fundamental doctrine that appellate jurisdiction is purely statutory. Unless expressly provided for by legislation, no party may invoke the appellate jurisdiction of a superior court. Consequently, since the appellant’s appeal was filed prematurely, without the requisite leave, it was fatally defective.

Turning to the substantive issue of jurisdiction in land disputes, the Court examined the legal fusion between the Local Council Courts Act, Cap 18, the Land Act (Cap 227 as amended), and the Land (Amendment) Act, 2004.

The appellant had argued that the LC I Court of Nyakeine lacked jurisdiction ab initio, since the Land (Amendment) Act, 2004, through Section 30 introducing Section 76A, had vested original jurisdiction in land disputes in the LC II Courts.

The Court reviewed this legislative history. It noted that while Section 76A of the Land Act (as inserted by the Land (Amendment) Act, 2004) did at one time provide that Parish/Ward Executive Committees (LC II Courts) were the proper courts of first instance in land matters, that provision has since been repealed.

The repeal was effected through the revised Land Act, Cap 236, which incorporated amendments and expressly deleted Section 76A.

The Court further clarified that the operative statutory position today is that:

Section 9(1)(e) of the Local Council Courts Act, Cap 18 vests jurisdiction in LC I Courts to hear and determine land matters as courts of first instance; and
Section 77(1)(c) of the Land Act, Cap 236 provides for the jurisdiction of District Land Tribunals to determine land disputes at first instance where the subject matter does not exceed 2,500 currency points.

This, in effect, means that LC II Courts no longer have original jurisdiction over land disputes, contrary to the earlier regime under the 2004 Land Amendment Act. The Court underscored that any reliance on the repealed provisions of Section 76A is misplaced, as the current law is clear and unequivocal.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that while there had been historical confusion over the proper forum for initiating land disputes, the legal position is now settled: land disputes of a local nature are to be instituted in LC I Courts, while disputes within the pecuniary jurisdiction of District Land Tribunals fall to be heard at that level.