Lawpoint Uganda

Citing Israel Kabwa vs. Martin Banoba Musiga (supra), where the Supreme Court held that a customary heir can sue on behalf of an estate without Letters of Administration, as they are entitled to a share of the estate under the Succession Act (as amended by Decree No. 22 of 1972). Moreover, Civil Suit No. 11 of 2009 sought revocation of Letters of Administration (filed in the Family Division), while the current suit seeks recovery of land and cancellation of the 4th defendant’

The Court distinguished between licensing (proof of registration and authority to operate) and legal capacity to sue (which rests with a duly constituted Management Committee). Since the applicant failed to produce proof of a legally established Management Committee, it was deemed a non-existent entity in law. The Trustees of Rubaga Miracle Centre v. Mulangira Ssimbwa, MA No. 576 of 2006, a legal action instituted by non-existent entities is incompetent.

The Court emphasized that although locus visits are not always mandatory, they are recommended under Practice Direction No. 1 of 2007, especially in land disputes. The Magistrate’s failure to visit the locus created ambiguity about the exact portion of land awarded and prejudiced Bwire’s case. The Court held that Bwire did not prove customary ownership or any legally enforceable right to the land. Evidence strongly supported Nakirya’s claim that she received the land as a val

The Court observed that, mere filing of a Notice of Appeal does not constitute a competent appeal. By failing to file the memorandum and record of appeal within the statutory 60 days, the appeal was deemed withdrawn under Rule 84. The court described counsel’s conduct as dilatory and inexcusable. Because there was no competent appeal, the court held there was nothing to evaluate for the likelihood of success. The applicants’ intended grounds of appeal, which challenged the se

In defining what amounts to sufficient cause, the Court relied on the authority of Captain Philip Ongom v Catherine Nyero Owota, SCCA No. 14 of 2001, where it was held that sufficient cause may include illness of a party or mistake of counsel, but that failure to instruct an advocate does not constitute sufficient cause. The Court further cited Dhillon & Another v Dhillon [2006] 1 EA 66–67, which reaffirmed that the overriding concern of the Court is to do justice between the

The court reaffirmed that A suit instituted against a deceased person is void ab initio and cannot be cured by amendment, unlike a case where a defendant dies during the suit’s pendency, where legal representatives can be substituted citing Abdala Ramathan v. Agony Swaib MCA No. 0067 of 2016.

The court criticized both parties for deviating from the framed ground of appeal and the trial record. An appeal must be grounded in the record of proceedings, except in cases of clear illegality or procedural defects causing a miscarriage of justice. The appellants’ concession of trespass effectively nullified their appeal, as they failed to demonstrate errors in the trial court’s evaluation or findings.

The Court applied the test in Sibamanyo Estates Ltd v Equity Bank & Others, identifying three requirements for compulsory production: 1) Relevance, materiality, and admissibility of documents; 2) Possession or control of the documents by the opposing party; 3) Prior attempt at voluntary cooperation (notice to produce). the Court ruled that the documents were relevant, within the Attorney General’s control, and must be produced. The respondents were ordered to disclose the doc

The Court observed that the position under section 9(1) (e) of the Local Council Courts Act, cap 18, section 76A of the Land Act, cap227 and section 30 of the Land (Amendment) Act, 2004 which vested power in the local council courts to try and determine all matters relating to land as courts of first instance, as repealed laws. That these laws have now been repealed by section 77(1) (C) of the Land Act Cap 236, which states that the only court that has jurisdiction to determi

The Court of Appeal clarified that lending money to Ugandan entities without a physical address or ongoing business does not amount to carrying on business requiring registration. The trial judge erred in treating the appellant as a “nonentity.” Allowing respondents to sue the appellant in earlier proceedings, but then objecting to its capacity when it counter-sued, amounted to approbating and reprobating—contrary to Article 21(1) of the Constitution (equal protection before

Court citing order 43 (1) and (2) noted that an appeal is a separate trial on judgement of a lower court. An appeal differs from a regular trial or review. Court further made emphasis that the form of a trial and that of an appeal cannot be the same. In a trial, issues are framed for resolution, while on appeal, grounds of appeal or reasons for disagreement with the trial court are framed for resolution. Court further noted that confusing a trial and appeal was a clear act of

A certificate of urgency will not be granted merely because the applicant asserts that the matter is pressing. Courts must independently assess whether there are exceptional and peculiar circumstances justifying deviation from the ordinary court schedule.

The taxing master failed to justify the UGX 20 million award, and such an amount was excessive, punitive, and unsupported by the factual or legal complexity of the matter.

The Court emphasized that affidavits are evidence and do not necessarily require authorization from co-parties. Modern precedent dispels the notion that lack of authorization renders affidavits incurably defective.

As a rule, if the Plaintiff does not take out Summons for Directions, the suit shall abate and can be dismissed. In the present case, the Respondent failed to take out Summons for Directions within the prescribed 28 days from the date of the last reply, contrary to Order 11A Rule 1(2) and (6) of the Civil Procedure Rules

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Silver Byaruhanga v. Fr. Emmanuel Ruvugwaho & Anor, SCCA No. 09 of 2014, the Court reaffirmed that joint administration requires joint action unless the administrators were appointed at different times.

High court dismisses application for leave to appear and defend a summary suit over UGX 82M Debt . Subject Matter Summary procedure –...

The appellate court emphasized that the validity of the mortgage was a mixed issue of law and fact, requiring evidence which had not been adduced.

A consent judgment becomes binding once signed by the parties and endorsed by the court. It may only be set aside on limited grounds such as fraud, collusion, or ignorance of material facts

The court further clarified that Rule 7(3) is two-pronged; the first limb directs a respondent to file any intended affidavit “as soon as practicable.” The second limb, which includes the 56-day timeframe, only applies when the applicant has amended their motion or filed additional affidavits, thereby triggering a reciprocal right for the respondent to reply within that set period.

Citing Order 17 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), the Court emphasized that failure to perform “any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed”, including filing submissions, can result in the Court proceeding without considering the defaulting party’s input.

In the present case, the Court held that a competent notice of appeal is one that bears the endorsement of the Registrar, in accordance with Rule 76(1) of the Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions (SI 13-10), which mandates that a notice of appeal be lodged in duplicate with the Registrar of the High Court. Non-compliance with this procedural requirement renders the application incurably defective and liable to be struck out.

A reinstatement of the suit will not occasion any prejudice to the Respondent… On the other hand, the Applicant has the right to be heard in the main suit, which is protected by Article 28 of the Constitution

While the Court acknowledged Article 41 of the Constitution and section 4 of the Access to Information Act, it emphasized that access to such information is governed by clear procedures set out in the Act. These include submitting a formal written request to the relevant information officer and, where access is denied, appealing first to the Chief Magistrate's Court under section 36 of the Access to Information Act.