High Court Dismisses Application for Stay of Execution in Criminal Contempt Proceedings Involving Scandalization of the Court

Waboga David
Oct 16
6 min read

Facts

Following internal disputes within the Uganda Law Society (ULS) after the 2024 elections, the Applicant, Mr. Isaac Kimaze Ssemakadde (then ULS President), issued Executive Order RNB No. 1 of 2024 restructuring the ULS Council. These actions led to multiple suits, including Miscellaneous Cause No. 263 of 2024, where Mr. Mugisha Hashim Mugisha challenged the legality of the Council’s decisions.

While the cause was pending, the Respondent filed Miscellaneous Application No. 0049 of 2025, accusing Mr. Ssemakadde of contempt of court for publishing statements that allegedly scandalised the Court and undermined judicial authority. The Court found Mr. Ssemakadde guilty of contempt and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment.

Aggrieved, the Applicant filed Civil Appeal No. 0102 of 2025 and subsequently lodged the present application seeking:

A stay of execution of the decree and orders in MA No. 0049 of 2025 pending appeal.
A suspension of the two-year imprisonment sentence until the appeal’s disposal.

Issues

Whether the application for stay of execution was competently before the Court.
Whether the Applicant satisfied the requirements for a stay of execution pending appeal.

Legal Representation

For the Applicant, M/s KBW Advocates (Counsel Peter Walubiri, Hannington Mutebi, and Jude Byamukama)
For the Respondent: M/s Neal Advocates (Counsel Kigula Mahiri and Ogwang Joseph)

Submissions

Applicant's Submissions

Counsel for the Applicant argued that the appeal was arguable due to the ex parte nature of the contempt proceedings, where the Applicant was condemned unheard, and the two-year sentence was arbitrary, unjustified, and harsh.

They emphasized the risk of execution via arrest and committal warrants, which would render the appeal nugatory, and noted the appeal was filed without undue delay (four days post-ruling).

Citing Lawrence Musitwa Kyazze v. Eunice Busigye (Supreme Court Civil Application No. 0018 of 1990), they submitted that stays should generally be sought informally from the trial judge, but the online delivery of the ruling precluded this, necessitating a formal application.

Substantial loss, loss of personal liberty, was demonstrated, warranting the Court's discretion to grant the stay.

On the merits, the Applicant contended the trial judge failed to determine a recusal application in the underlying cause, denying a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal (citing longstanding complaints against the judge).

There was no evidence proving authorship of the alleged posts, and even if authored, they did not constitute contempt. Distinguishing civil from criminal contempt, the Applicant argued this was civil contempt (summary in nature, arising from civil proceedings without formal charges or Penal Code references), allowing for stays or suspensions, unlike criminal trials requiring plea-taking.

In rejoinder, they dismissed the Respondent's preliminary points, clarifying no legal requirement exists to file an appeal before swearing an affidavit, and rejected the bail analogy since the Applicant remains at large.

Respondent's Submissions

Counsel raised preliminary points of law, arguing the application stemmed from criminal contempt (scandalizing the Court via posts undermining judicial authority), not civil contempt. Citing Male H. Mabirizi K. Kiwanuka v. Attorney General (Court of Appeal Civil Application No. 549 of 2022), they submitted the two-year sentence was punitive, akin to criminal sanctions, rendering the application a disguised bail request, improper, as the sole remedy post-conviction is bail pending appeal, not a stay.

They further challenged competency, noting the supporting affidavit was sworn on 14 February 2025, before the appeal on 18 February 2025.

On merits, they opposed the stay, arguing the contempt involved public defiance calculated to erode societal respect for the Court.

Court’s Findings

1. On Competence of the Application

The Court analyzed the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, drawing on common law authorities to resolve the competency issue. It found the application incompetent, as the underlying contempt was criminal in nature, leaving the Court functus officio with no jurisdiction to stay or suspend the sentence, the sole remedy being appeal.

Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt:

The Court adopted definitions from Betty Kizito v. Dickson Nsubuga & Anor. (Supreme Court Civil Applications Nos. 25 & 26), quoting Halsbury's Laws of England:

“Contempt of Court may be classified as either (1) Criminal Contempt, consisting of words or acts which impede or interfere with the administration of justice, or which create a substantial risk that the course of justice will be seriously impeded or prejudiced; or (2) contempt in procedure, otherwise known as civil contempt, consisting of disobedience to the judgment, orders or other process of the Court and involving a private injury...”

Further, quoting Borrie and Lowe's The Law of Contempt (3rd Edn.):

“In broad terms it is easy enough to distinguish criminal contempt from civil contempt. Criminal contempt [is] essentially offences of a public nature comprising publications or acts which interfere with the due course of justice... Civil contempt... are therefore essentially of a private nature since they deprive a party of the benefit for which the order was made. The essence of the court’s jurisdiction in respect of criminal contempt is penal... On the other hand, the court’s jurisdiction in respect of civil contempt is primarily remedial...”

The Court noted blurred lines in borderline cases (e.g., Phonographic Performance Ltd v. Amusement Caterers [1964] Ch 195; Scott v. Scott [1913] AC 417), but emphasized that public defiance of court orders can elevate civil breaches to criminal contempt (Tony Poje v. AG of British Columbia [1953] 2 DLR 785; United Nurses of Alberta v. AG for Alberta [1992] 89 DLR).

Nature of the Underlying Contempt

The Court classified the Applicant's conduct as indirect criminal contempt (scandalizing the Court via tweets and letters outside the courtroom), not requiring formal criminal trial procedures like charge sheets or plea-taking (Lonrho Plc Re [1990] 2 AC 154; Florence Dawaru v. Angumale Albino & Anor. (HCMA No. 0096 of 2016)). Quoting the trial judge's ruling in MA No. 0049 of 2025

“The respondent (Applicant herein) in total defiance has continued to make relentless attacks on the judge and the entire judiciary with the sole purpose of undermining its authority.”

“The respondent’s statement on his twitter handle @ Isaac Ssemakadde and the letters... were contemptuous and intended to scandalise the court........”

“In the present case the respondent Ssemakadde Isaac Kimezze has clearly scandalized the court by his utterances, statements (tweets) and letters. A scurrilous attack on the presiding judge... This was clearly an affront to the impartiality of the judge and to the judiciary as an institution. Such serious and deliberate attacks clearly undermine the dignity and authority of this Court which cannot and must not be condoned.”

Scandalization was deemed a sui generis criminal contempt undermining public confidence (Ahnee & Others v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] UKPC 11; R v. Gray [1990] 2 QB 36), citing Male H. Mabirizi K. Kiwanuka v. Attorney General (CACA No. 549 of 2022):

“We therefore accept the submission of counsel for Attorney General that the contemnor was sentenced to prison for criminal contempt of court because he engaged in conduct that amounted in scandalizing the court.”

Remedies in Criminal Contempt

The court noted that fixed-term imprisonment is final and penal, with no power to suspend or stay (Attorney-General v. James & Others [1962] 1 All ER 255), distinguishing it from remedial civil contempt where contemnors "carry the keys to their prison" (Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt, 4th Edn., Para 3-22).

The Court did not reach the second issue, upholding the preliminary point and dismissing the application.

Holding

The Court dismissed the application for stay of execution and suspension of sentence, holding that:

The Applicant was convicted for criminal contempt, not civil contempt.
A stay of execution is not available in criminal contempt proceedings.
The appropriate procedure was to apply for bail pending appeal.
No order to costs

Key Takeaways

Nature of Contempt Matters
The classification of contempt as civil or criminal determines available remedies. Criminal contempt is penal and cannot be stayed; civil contempt is coercive and may be stayed pending appeal.
Scandalising the Court Constitutes Criminal Contempt
Statements or publications that attack judicial integrity amount to criminal contempt even if made in the context of civil proceedings.
Procedure for Remedy
A contemnor convicted of criminal contempt must seek bail pending appeal, not a stay of execution.
Judicial Protection of Institutional Integrity
The Court emphasized that attacks undermining judicial authority “strike at the very foundations of our society” and warrant immediate punitive response.
Clarification on Competence
The decision distinguishes the jurisprudence in Male Mabirizi v Attorney General and affirms that contempt proceedings, though sui generis, follow a hybrid logic depending on the nature of the conduct.