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The court agreed with the Respondent that only the court issuing the order (Chief Magistrates Court of Entebbe) had jurisdiction to hear contempt proceedings, citing Florence Dawaru v. Angumale Abino & Anor and Kibeedi Hussein v. Hotel Triangle Ltd. The transfer of the lower court’s file to the High Court for Civil Appeal No. 28 of 2024 did not confer jurisdiction to the High Court to determine contempt of the lower court’s order.

The Court emphasized that, unless there is proof of a system failure or glitch, service through ECCMIS is legally valid and effective, having the same legal effect as personal or physical service.

The court distinguished between suits instituted against a deceased person (void ab initio) and those where a party dies during pendency (which may continue with proper substitution). Citing Ddamba Susan v. John W. Katende & Fredrick Ssempebwa and other precedents, the court held that a suit against a deceased person is a nullity and cannot be cured by amendment. The Notice of Motion was further defective for failing to state grounds and lacking an authorized court official’s

The High Court affirmed its unlimited original jurisdiction to entertain divorce petitions under Article 139(1) of the Constitution, even where both parties are Africans (per Section 3 of the Divorce Act), particularly to avoid procedural delays in cases potentially involving matrimonial assets exceeding UGX 50,000,000. However, the Court emphasized strict adherence to territorial jurisdiction under Section 15(a) of the Civil Procedure Act, transferring the matter to the High

The High Court affirmed the Respondent as the lawful owner of the suit land and upheld the trial court’s award of vacant possession, permanent injunction, and UGX 10,000,000 general damages.

The court held that adverse possession was not pleaded, violating Order 7 Rule 1(e) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which mandates disclosing the cause of action. The claim was introduced belatedly in submissions, constituting trial by ambush. Even on merits, the appellants failed to prove factual possession, continuous 12-year occupation, animus possidendi, or non-permissive use. The respondents’ family maintained possession, and the appellants’ use was fragmented and permissi

Article 26 guarantees the right to own and use property without interference. The court found that the caveat emptor and statutory instrument disrupted the plaintiffs’ development plans, as evidenced by stalled construction observed during the locus visit. The court defined unlawful interference as a violation of proprietary or possessory rights. The notices affected the plaintiffs’ proprietary rights by restricting their ability to deal with the land. This issue was resolved

The Supreme Court observed that Section 26(1) allows courts to vary the rate of interest if it is harsh and unconscionable but does not permit changing the type of interest (e.g., from compound to simple). The High Court erred in citing Section 26(2) and (3) but inadvertently complied with Section 26(1) by reducing the rate to 15% while preserving compound interest. The Court of Appeal erred by substituting compound interest with simple interest, as Section 26(1) limits judic

Citing Israel Kabwa vs. Martin Banoba Musiga (supra), where the Supreme Court held that a customary heir can sue on behalf of an estate without Letters of Administration, as they are entitled to a share of the estate under the Succession Act (as amended by Decree No. 22 of 1972). Moreover, Civil Suit No. 11 of 2009 sought revocation of Letters of Administration (filed in the Family Division), while the current suit seeks recovery of land and cancellation of the 4th defendant’

The Court distinguished between licensing (proof of registration and authority to operate) and legal capacity to sue (which rests with a duly constituted Management Committee). Since the applicant failed to produce proof of a legally established Management Committee, it was deemed a non-existent entity in law. The Trustees of Rubaga Miracle Centre v. Mulangira Ssimbwa, MA No. 576 of 2006, a legal action instituted by non-existent entities is incompetent.

The Court emphasized that although locus visits are not always mandatory, they are recommended under Practice Direction No. 1 of 2007, especially in land disputes. The Magistrate’s failure to visit the locus created ambiguity about the exact portion of land awarded and prejudiced Bwire’s case. The Court held that Bwire did not prove customary ownership or any legally enforceable right to the land. Evidence strongly supported Nakirya’s claim that she received the land as a val

The Court observed that, mere filing of a Notice of Appeal does not constitute a competent appeal. By failing to file the memorandum and record of appeal within the statutory 60 days, the appeal was deemed withdrawn under Rule 84. The court described counsel’s conduct as dilatory and inexcusable. Because there was no competent appeal, the court held there was nothing to evaluate for the likelihood of success. The applicants’ intended grounds of appeal, which challenged the se

In defining what amounts to sufficient cause, the Court relied on the authority of Captain Philip Ongom v Catherine Nyero Owota, SCCA No. 14 of 2001, where it was held that sufficient cause may include illness of a party or mistake of counsel, but that failure to instruct an advocate does not constitute sufficient cause. The Court further cited Dhillon & Another v Dhillon [2006] 1 EA 66–67, which reaffirmed that the overriding concern of the Court is to do justice between the

The court reaffirmed that A suit instituted against a deceased person is void ab initio and cannot be cured by amendment, unlike a case where a defendant dies during the suit’s pendency, where legal representatives can be substituted citing Abdala Ramathan v. Agony Swaib MCA No. 0067 of 2016.

The court criticized both parties for deviating from the framed ground of appeal and the trial record. An appeal must be grounded in the record of proceedings, except in cases of clear illegality or procedural defects causing a miscarriage of justice. The appellants’ concession of trespass effectively nullified their appeal, as they failed to demonstrate errors in the trial court’s evaluation or findings.

The Court applied the test in Sibamanyo Estates Ltd v Equity Bank & Others, identifying three requirements for compulsory production: 1) Relevance, materiality, and admissibility of documents; 2) Possession or control of the documents by the opposing party; 3) Prior attempt at voluntary cooperation (notice to produce). the Court ruled that the documents were relevant, within the Attorney General’s control, and must be produced. The respondents were ordered to disclose the doc

The Court observed that the position under section 9(1) (e) of the Local Council Courts Act, cap 18, section 76A of the Land Act, cap227 and section 30 of the Land (Amendment) Act, 2004 which vested power in the local council courts to try and determine all matters relating to land as courts of first instance, as repealed laws. That these laws have now been repealed by section 77(1) (C) of the Land Act Cap 236, which states that the only court that has jurisdiction to determi

The Court of Appeal clarified that lending money to Ugandan entities without a physical address or ongoing business does not amount to carrying on business requiring registration. The trial judge erred in treating the appellant as a “nonentity.” Allowing respondents to sue the appellant in earlier proceedings, but then objecting to its capacity when it counter-sued, amounted to approbating and reprobating—contrary to Article 21(1) of the Constitution (equal protection before

Court citing order 43 (1) and (2) noted that an appeal is a separate trial on judgement of a lower court. An appeal differs from a regular trial or review. Court further made emphasis that the form of a trial and that of an appeal cannot be the same. In a trial, issues are framed for resolution, while on appeal, grounds of appeal or reasons for disagreement with the trial court are framed for resolution. Court further noted that confusing a trial and appeal was a clear act of

A certificate of urgency will not be granted merely because the applicant asserts that the matter is pressing. Courts must independently assess whether there are exceptional and peculiar circumstances justifying deviation from the ordinary court schedule.

The taxing master failed to justify the UGX 20 million award, and such an amount was excessive, punitive, and unsupported by the factual or legal complexity of the matter.

The Court emphasized that affidavits are evidence and do not necessarily require authorization from co-parties. Modern precedent dispels the notion that lack of authorization renders affidavits incurably defective.

As a rule, if the Plaintiff does not take out Summons for Directions, the suit shall abate and can be dismissed. In the present case, the Respondent failed to take out Summons for Directions within the prescribed 28 days from the date of the last reply, contrary to Order 11A Rule 1(2) and (6) of the Civil Procedure Rules

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Silver Byaruhanga v. Fr. Emmanuel Ruvugwaho & Anor, SCCA No. 09 of 2014, the Court reaffirmed that joint administration requires joint action unless the administrators were appointed at different times.