A Reconciliation Agreement or Consent Entered Before an LC1 Court, Being a Court of Competent Jurisdiction, is Binding Under Section 31 (1) of the LCC Act and Unappealable, High Court at Kabale Rules

Waboga David
Dec 3, 2025
6 min read

FACTS

The respondent, Hagen Imana Eric, claimed ownership of the suit land, asserting that he acquired portions from his late parents (Kalaveri Rwigyemere and Nyiramugisha Joselyne) in 1999 and from his late grandmother (Basangwa Rubabazi) in 2001. He merged the parcels into one by removing internal boundaries.

In 2016, the appellant, Kalimundo Festo, allegedly trespassed by removing boundary marks. The appellant countered that he had received the land from his late father, Kalimunda Peter, in 1983, with boundaries marked by eucalyptus trees that the respondent had cut down.

The parties mediated the dispute through Local Council (LC) leaders and residents, resulting in a written reconciliation agreement dated December 28, 2016, which established 12 boundary marks. The appellant claimed the respondent was at fault and apologized, while the respondent maintained the opposite.

In 2023, tensions escalated when the respondent accused the appellant of removing boundaries and destroying a fence, leading the respondent to report the matter to the police, who advised filing a civil suit. The appellant objected, noting the matter was pending before the LC II court following a referral by the Resident District Commissioner (RDC), and argued that the Chief Magistrate's Court lacked original jurisdiction.

The trial in the Chief Magistrate's Court (Land Claim No. 024 of 2023) involved evidence such as the 2016 reconciliation agreement (admitted as PEX1) and testimony from witnesses, including the LC1 Chairman (PW2, Bitwire George), who confirmed the land's location in Kirundo village. A locus in quo visit verified that the appellant's land was in the adjacent Bugina village, separated by a road.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent, declaring him the rightful owner, the appellant a trespasser, and awarding general damages and costs. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the High Court on four grounds, primarily alleging errors in evidence evaluation by the trial court.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The trial court framed three issues for resolution:

(a) Whether the respondent was the rightful owner of the suit land.

(b) Whether the appellant was a trespasser on the suit land.

The trial Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to properly evaluate evidence, leading to an erroneous finding that the respondent was the rightful owner.
The trial Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact by finding that all original boundary marks were removed and missing, causing a miscarriage of justice.
The trial Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact by improperly evaluating evidence from the record and locus in quo, leading to an erroneous finding that the suit land was in Kirundo village, causing a miscarriage of justice.
The trial Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact by finding that the respondent proved possession via the 2016 reconciliation agreement and fence destruction, causing a miscarriage of justice.

Additionally, the respondent raised a preliminary point of law: whether the appeal was competent, as it was filed out of time.

SUBMISSIONS

Respondent

Raised a preliminary objection: the appeal was filed out of time.

Submitted that the 2016 LC1 reconciliation agreement was a consent judgment, which by law cannot be appealed.

Argued that the appellant was attempting to reopen matters conclusively settled nine years earlier.

Appellant

Filed no rejoinder to the preliminary objection.

Submitted that the Trial Magistrate failed to properly evaluate evidence and locus findings.

LEGAL REPRESENTATION

Appellant, M/s Skaar Advocates
Respondent, M/s Marvin & Co. Advocates

COURT’S FINDINGS

Justice Karoli Lwanga Ssemogerere began by addressing the preliminary objection on limitation of time, noting that it went to the root of the appeal’s competence. He proceeded to examine the procedural timelines, the legal framework governing appeals, and the status of the LC1 reconciliation agreement that lay at the centre of the dispute.

Appeal Filed Out of Time

The Court established the following undisputed timeline the Record of proceedings availed on 24 July 2024, and the Memorandum of Appeal filed on 26 August 2024

Under Section 79(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act, an appeal must be lodged within 30 days of the decree or order. Section 79(2) excludes time taken by the court to prepare the record of proceedings, and therefore the 30-day period began to run from 24 July 2024.

The Court applied Section 34(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act, which excludes Sundays and public holidays only when the final day falls on such a date. In this case, the 30th day, 24 August 2024, was neither a Sunday nor a public holiday.

Accordingly, the Court found that the appeal was filed two days out of time.

Justice Ssemogerere stated:

“In any event, the 30th day fell on August 24th, 2024… I make a finding that this appeal was filed out of time.”

Crucially, the appellant did not apply for enlargement of time under Section 79(2) of the CPA, despite the existence of judicial precedent allowing such extension upon sufficient cause (e.g., Kwitegese Bernard & Anor v Tumwizere Frank [2025] UGHC 1194).

The Court held that the failure to seek extension was fatal, rendering the appeal incompetent and liable to dismissal.

Finality of the LC1 Consent Reconciliation Agreement

For completeness, the Court proceeded to address the substantive issues and found that the appeal would fail even on its merits.

The key document was the LC1 reconciliation agreement executed on 28 December 2016, admitted as PEX1. The Court found that this agreement constituted a valid consent judgment, binding upon the parties.

Under Section 9(1)(e) of the Local Council Courts Act, the LC1 Court had jurisdiction to determine land disputes within its monetary limits. This jurisdiction was not contested.

Under Section 31(1) of the Local Council Courts Act:

“No appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed or made as a result of the consent of the parties.”

Justice Ssemogerere emphasised that:

Consent judgments are final.
They carry the same force as judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction.
They can only be set aside on fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation—none of which were pleaded or proved.

The Court noted:

“The LC1 court consent was registered before 14 people… On the face of the record, it was unimpeachable.”

The Court also criticised the RDC’s referral of the matter to the LC2 Court, stating that the RDC may not have appreciated the legal finality of consent judgments:

“The appeal effectively sought to reopen matters conclusively settled between the parties. This is an abuse of court process.”

Thus, even if the appeal were competent, it would still fail because the matter had been conclusively settled in 2016.

Alternative Finding on Merits

Justice Ssemogerere further held that the Trial Magistrate had properly evaluated the evidence, including:

Testimony of the LC1 Chairman (PW2), confirming the location of each party’s land;
Findings at the locus, confirming that the land in dispute lay in Kirundo village;
The 2016 agreement which clearly demarcated boundaries and assigned ownership.

The Court concluded that even on the merits, the trial court was correct in holding the respondent to be the rightful owner and the appellant a trespasser.

HOLDING

The preliminary objection was upheld.
The appeal was filed out of time and is therefore incompetent.
The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondent.
The High Court directs that all proceedings relating to this matter in the lower court be closed, restoring the finality of the 2016 LC1 consent agreement.

Final Order:

“Appeal is dismissed. Costs to the respondent.”

KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR PRACTITIONERS & LITIGANTS

1. Appeals Must Strictly Observe Statutory Timelines

The High Court reiterated that under Section 79 of the Civil Procedure Act, an appeal filed outside the 30-day window is incompetent unless the appellant first seeks and obtains an extension of time. Failure to do so is fatal.

2. LC1 Reconciliation Agreements Constitute Final Consent Judgments

Reconciliation agreements recorded before an LC1 Court amount to consent judgments, which are final and unappealable under Section 31(1) of the Local Council Courts Act.They may only be set aside on the narrow grounds of fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation, which must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved.

3. LC1 Courts Possess Jurisdiction Over Low-Value Land Matters

Where a land matter falls within Section 9(1)(e) of the Local Council Courts Act, the LC1 Court is the proper forum. Any challenge to LC1 jurisdiction must be substantiated and raised promptly.

4. RDC Referrals Cannot Reopen Concluded LC1 Decisions

Administrative recommendations or referrals by RDCs have no legal force to revive, vary, or reopen LC1 consent judgments or other decisions that have attained finality.

5. Re-litigation of Settled LC1 Consents Constitutes Abuse of Process

Attempts to circumvent a binding LC1 consent by filing fresh suits or appeals are treated as abuse of court process, and courts will dismiss such efforts to safeguard the integrity of consensual dispute resolution.

Summary Table

Aspect	Implication
Strict Compliance with Limitation	Appeals must be filed within the 30-day period under Section 79 CPA; late appeals are incompetent.
Extension of Time	Any party who misses the deadline must formally apply for enlargement of time and demonstrate sufficient cause.
Finality of LC1 Consents	LC1-recorded reconciliation agreements are binding, final, and unappealable under Section 31(1) of the LCCA.
Setting Aside a Consent	A consent judgment may only be challenged for fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation, grounds that must be pleaded and proved.
Abuse of Process	Filing new proceedings to reopen a concluded LC1 consent is improper and will be rejected by the courts.