High Court Dismisses Appeal for Procedural Non-Compliance; Orders Counsel to Personally Pay Costs
- Waboga David
- Aug 22
- 6 min read

Introduction
In Uganda, the law on costs is well-settled: costs follow the event, meaning the successful party is ordinarily entitled to recover their costs from the unsuccessful party. This principle is enshrined in section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, and consistently reaffirmed in Ugandan jurisprudence. Costs are not punitive but compensatory, they are intended to indemnify the successful litigant for expenses reasonably incurred in the conduct of the case.
Ordinarily, it is the losing party that pays costs. However, in exceptional circumstances, courts may direct that counsel personally bear costs, especially where professional misconduct, negligence, or abuse of process is established. Such orders emphasise the advocate’s duty of competence, diligence, and candour in the representation of clients.
In appellate proceedings, the Civil Procedure Rules (S.I. 71-1) prescribe strict procedural requirements. An appeal is commenced by filing a memorandum of appeal, which must set out the specific grounds of objection to the lower court’s judgment. Under Order 43 Rules 1 and 2 CPR, only those grounds stated in the memorandum may be argued, unless leave of court is sought to raise new grounds. Appeals are therefore not re-hearings but structured reviews of the lower court’s decision.
In a recent decision from Kabale, the High Court reaffirmed these principles. In Razamba Mauda & Ruzamba Emmanuel v Abomugisha Rogers (Civil Appeal No. 027 of 2024), Hon. Justice Karoli Lwanga Ssemogerere dismissed an appeal for want of prosecution due to counsel’s failure to properly argue the memorandum of appeal, and went further to order that counsel personally bear the respondent’s taxed costs.
Background of the Dispute
The litigation originated from Land Civil Suit No. 88 of 2017 in the Chief Magistrate’s Court of Kabale. The plaintiff, Abomugisha Rogers (now respondent), claimed ownership of land he acquired under a sale agreement dated 7 July 2017 from Katahirwa Elineous Ruzamba and Tumuhimbise Solinah—the son and daughter-in-law of the appellants.
He sought:
A declaration that he was the lawful owner of the land,
A finding that the appellants were trespassers,
A permanent injunction,
General and special damages, and
Costs of the suit.
The appellants, Mauda and Emmanuel Ruzamba, resisted the claim, arguing that the land was family land belonging to them and that their son had no authority to sell it.
They further claimed that they had only gifted the land to their son in 1998, but after learning that he had sold it, they reasserted ownership.
The appellants resisted the sale, claiming the land remained family land and that the respondent was a trespasser.
After hearing the parties, the Chief Magistrate found in favour of the plaintiff (respondent), declaring him owner, granting damages of UGX 12,000,000 in general damages, monthly special damages of UGX 60,000 until judgment, and costs.
Grounds of Appeal
The appellants advanced five grounds,
The trial Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to properly evaluate the evidence, thereby reaching a wrong decision.
The trial Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that the respondent was the rightful owner of the suit land.
The trial Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that the appellants were trespassers on the land.
The trial Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding special damages of UGX 60,000 per month from the date of filing until judgment, without applying the correct legal principles.
The trial Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding general damages of UGX 12,000,000 without any factual basis
Procedural Misstep
The turn in this case arose not from the merits of the grounds, but from how the appeal was prosecuted.
On 16 June 2025, the appellants filed their written submissions. Instead of addressing the five grounds, counsel stated:
“We shall adopt the brief facts as provided in the earlier submissions as filed in the lower court and now part of the record of this honourable court. Grounds of appeal (argued omnibus and the lower court submissions are adopted as part of these submissions accordingly).”
On 26 June 2025, the respondent’s counsel similarly filed a brief adopting their lower court submissions.
This approach, in the Court’s view, rendered the appeal incapable of resolution, since no specific arguments were advanced in support of or against the memorandum of appeal.
Court’s Findings
1. Appeal as a Distinct Process
Justice Ssemogerere emphasized the difference between a trial and an appeal. Citing Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.), he noted:
A trial is the formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of facts in dispute.
An appeal is the process of submitting a lower court’s decision to a higher court for review and possible reversal.
Whereas a trial is concerned with establishing facts and law, an appeal reviews whether the lower court erred in its findings or application of law.
By reproducing trial submissions instead of addressing the memorandum of appeal, counsel had confused the nature of an appeal, an error the judge termed professional negligence.
2. Breach of Civil Procedure Rules
The Court relied on Order 43 Rules 1 and 2 CPR, which require:
Appeals to be presented in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or advocate; and
Only grounds stated in the memorandum may be argued, unless leave is granted.
The appellants’ failure to argue their grounds, and their reliance on trial submissions, was found to be a clear violation of these provisions.
3. Precedent: Abwongoto v Atiang Christine
The Court cited Abwongoto & 4 Others v Atiang Christine (HCCA No. 7 of 2023, Soroti), where Justice Henry Adonyo held that an appeal is considered non-prosecuted where appellants fail to argue their memorandum. Submissions—oral or written—are necessary to substantiate the grounds.
Justice Ssemogerere agreed, holding that without such arguments, the appeal cannot be entertained.
4. Application of Order 43 Rule 30 CPR
Under Order 43 Rule 30(2) CPR, where an appellant fails to prosecute an appeal, the Court may dismiss it for want of prosecution or make such other order as it deems just.
Here, the Court dismissed the appeal but, significantly, ordered that costs be borne personally by counsel rather than the appellants.
5. Appellate Jurisdiction is Statutory
The Court reaffirmed that its appellate jurisdiction is derived from the Constitution and statute:
Article 139(1): The High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction and such appellate jurisdiction as conferred by law.
Article 139(2): Decisions of courts lower than the High Court may be appealed to it, subject to law.
Citing Attorney General v Shah (No. 4) [1971] EA 50 and Uganda v Nkalubo (Crim. App. No. 130 of 2021), the Court emphasized that appeals must be conducted strictly within the law.
Holding
The appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution.
The appellants could not rely on trial submissions to prosecute an appeal.
Submissions must address the specific grounds in the memorandum of appeal.
The appellants’ counsel acted negligently in adopting a defective approach.
Costs were awarded to the respondent, payable personally by the appellants’ advocate.
Analysis and Implications
This judgment delivers several key lessons for Ugandan litigation practice:
1. Appeals Are Not Retrials
The Court made clear that appeals are not a second bite at the cherry. They are reviews of specific errors. Counsel who fail to appreciate this distinction risk dismissal of their appeals.
2. Strict Procedural Compliance
Order 43 CPR is mandatory. Grounds of appeal must be argued directly, not by reference to prior submissions. The Court will not infer arguments or conduct its own re-trial.
3. Personal Costs Against Advocates
Perhaps the most striking aspect is the order that counsel personally pay costs. This sends a strong message about professional responsibility:
Advocates must exercise diligence in drafting and arguing appeals.
Negligence that wastes court time and prejudices clients can result in personal financial liability.
The decision reinforces the advocate’s duty under the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations.
4. Deterrence and Professional Standards
This judgment acts as a warning. If advocates treat appeals casually, they risk not only dismissal but also personal sanctions. It raises the bar for appellate practice, compelling advocates to master procedure.
5. Protection of Clients from Counsel’s Negligence
By shifting costs to counsel, the Court protected the appellants from further financial prejudice arising from their lawyer’s incompetence.
Conclusion
The High Court’s decision in Razamba & Anor v Abomugisha Rogers emphasises that appeals are strictly procedural processes governed by statute. Failure to comply renders them nullities. The Court’s readiness to sanction negligent advocates by ordering personal liability for costs signals a robust stance on professional accountability.
⚖️ For litigants, the message is clear: appeals must be diligently prosecuted, with grounds precisely argued. For advocates, the warning is sharper: failure to adhere to procedure may cost not only your client’s case but also your own pocket.
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