TAYLOR SWIFT–TICKETMASTER: MONOPOLY, ANTITRUST, AND LESSONS FOR UGANDA

By

Calvin Stewart Obita*

1.0  BACKGROUND

In the United States, Ticketmaster (a subsidiary of Live Nation Entertainment) long ago became the dominant platform for live concert tickets. Its near-monopoly status crystallised after a controversial 2010 merger with Live Nation, which the Department of Justice (DOJ) cleared only under strict conditions to preserve competition.[1] Those conditions (requiring Ticketmaster to license software to rivals and barring retaliation against venues) have since been repeatedly violated, and Ticketmaster has remained the “unavoidable choice” for many big venues.[2] 

This market power was brutally exposed in November 2022 when Ticketmaster’s Verified Fan pre-sale for Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour crashed under demand. Over 3.5 million fans tried to register and 2.4 million tickets were sold, but the website failed and many fans were locked out or faced endless queues.[3] 

Fans and artists (and even Congress) decried the debacle as evidence that Ticketmaster, with its stranglehold on venues and software, had little incentive to improve its service or pricing. Because venues and ticket buyers have few alternatives, Ticketmaster had limited incentives to get things right.

Public outrage quickly translated into legal challenges. In late 2022 and early 2023, hundreds of Taylor Swift fans filed class-action lawsuits accusing Live Nation–Ticketmaster of racketeering, fraud, price fixing, and other violations under federal and state antitrust and consumer-protection laws. These complaints argue, for example, that Ticketmaster’s online queue manipulations, opaque fees, and control of resale markets amount to collusion to inflate prices and restrict supply.

In one case in May 2025, a federal court in California permitted 355 Swifties to amend their suit to spell out these allegations, after Ticketmaster sought to dismiss it.[4] U.S. senators held hearings on the fiasco, and even new legislation was drafted in some states banning bots and abusive fees. Under pressure from President Biden, Ticketmaster agreed to eliminate “junk fees” and display all fees upfront,[5] and the Federal Trade Commission moved to ban deceptive charges altogether. These steps show that consumer-protection regulators responded quickly, just as fans demanded greater transparency and fairness in ticketing.

Meanwhile, the DOJ and state attorneys general launched an historic antitrust lawsuit. On May 23, 2024, the U.S. Justice Department (joined by 30 state AGs) sued Live Nation-Ticketmaster, accusing it of “monopolization and other unlawful conduct that thwarts competition in markets across the live entertainment industry”.[6] 

The DOJ’s complaint alleges that Live Nation/Ticketmaster (often called “LYV” in filings) wields monopoly power across the concert supply chain. It notes that LYV promotes roughly 60% of top concerts and controls about 80% of primary ticket sales at major U.S. venues. By using its vast concert-promotion arm (Live Nation) as a “loss leader,” the company allegedly locks in exclusive deals forcing venues to use Ticketmaster, and ties access to stadiums to other contracts.

For example, the DOJ alleges LYV routinely coerces venues into long-term exclusive ticketing contracts by dangling upfront fees and threatening to withhold shows – a practice that over time made Ticketmaster the de facto only platform even without formal bans. Another targeted practice is tying: artists who want to play at Live Nation amphitheaters must use Live Nation for promotion and ticketing, entrenching the loop further. The DOJ says these practices violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by illegally extending LYV’s control and foreclosing rivals.

The lawsuit seeks “structural relief” effectively a breakup of Ticketmaster from Live Nation to restore competition, arguing that fans now pay higher prices for outdated ticketing technology.

Notably, the antitrust suit revisits earlier enforcement efforts. When the Live Nation–Ticketmaster merger was approved in 2010, DOJ officials feared this very outcome. At the time DOJ only allowed it under a consent decree requiring Ticketmaster to license software to Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG) and divest the rival Paciolan system.

But by 2019 the DOJ itself concluded that Live Nation had repeatedly breached the anti-retaliation clauses of that decree. A motion filed by DOJ alleged that since 2012 Live Nation executives had been retaliating against or threatening venues nationwide that refused to use Ticketmaster. “Venues learned that refusing to contract with Ticketmaster will result in... fewer Live Nation concerts”.[7] The American Progress commentary sums up: once a merger creates a vertical monster, “monopolists won’t hesitate to increase their market power” when not checked by competition.

In the courtroom and the court of public opinion, Ticketmaster’s defenders have countered that it does not actually set ticket prices (artists do) and that exclusive deals are necessary for efficient operations. But critics respond that even if base prices come from performers, the company controls the only major marketplace and tacks on huge service fees, giving it monopoly rents.

In any case, the U.S. antitrust case (still pending) underscores a key lesson: digital-platform monopolies often underperform on transparency and service when unchecked. And when leading consumer figures like Taylor Swift call attention to these issues, it accelerates enforcement and reform.

2.0  U.S. DEVELOPMENTS AND CONSUMER PROTECTIONS

The Taylor Swift–Ticketmaster saga has already produced some concrete consumer protections in the U.S. Multiple states such as in New York, Texas, Massachusetts, California that swiftly outlawed ticket-bot sales or deceptive pricing models. After intense political pressure, Ticketmaster agreed to an industry-wide ban on “junk fees” and to show all mandatory fees upfront.

The Federal Trade Commission signaled it will crack down on surprise charges nationwide. In Congress, lawmakers grilled Ticketmaster’s CEO and even considered undoing the 2010 merger altogether. These measures aim to make ticketing more transparent and competitive, exactly the consumer remedies that antitrust theory would suggest when platform dominance is abusing the market. In the DOJ’s own words, Live Nation–Ticketmaster’s exclusionary conduct “harms fans, innovation, artists, and venues,” and stripping away its abusive practices should “provide better choices at lower prices”.

Taken together, the U.S. developments show how a high-profile failure can mobilise both private litigation and public enforcement. Taylor Swift herself, though not a plaintiff, urged fans to use their “power as consumers” to demand change.

Within months, fans had filed lawsuits alleging collusion and racketeering, Congress had investigated, and antitrust enforcers had moved to revive long-dormant competition rules. These events have highlighted a broader message for the digital age: platform dominance and opacity often hurt ordinary consumers, and robust oversight whether via antitrust laws or consumer-protection rules is needed to keep markets open and fair.

Even many industry observers now see the Taylor Swift fiasco as proof that “left to their own devices, monopolists won’t hesitate to increase their market power” to the detriment of customers.[8]

3.0  UGANDA’S COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATORY BODIES

Uganda faces some parallel concerns in its own economy. Monopoly control and platform dominance have shown up in sectors like telecommunications, banking, and digital finance. Until recently, Uganda’s framework for tackling such issues was fragmented and often weak. For example, telecom competition was governed by the Uganda Communications Act Cap 106 (as then), now Cap. 103 and its Fair Competition Regulations (2005).

Under these, the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) is explicitly empowered “to promote, develop, and enforce fair competition” among all licensed operators. The UCC can receive complaints, investigate unfair practices, approve or block mergers, fine offenders, and even void anti-competitive agreements. Indeed, in landmark cases like VAS Garage v. MTN Uganda, the UCC (and later courts) used these powers to punish abuse of dominance by telecom operators.

Beyond telecom, general competition oversight in Uganda is only now catching up. In September 2024 the Ministry of Trade highlighted the new Competition Act Cap. 66 as ushering in “a new era of competition regulation”.[9] Signed in February 2024 and effective in April, the Act expressly prohibits anti-competitive agreements, price-fixing, collusion, and “abuse of dominant market positions”.

A Technical Committee in the Ministry of Trade was created as the enforcement authority, with powers to investigate and penalize firms that undermine fair competition (and to review/approve mergers). This represents a major shift toward “best practices” aligning Uganda with East African regional norms and giving regulators teeth they largely lacked before. The Competition Act also explicitly embeds public interest factors (employment, SMEs, stability) into competition reviews, indicating a broad mandate to protect consumer welfare as well as economic efficiency.

In practice, this means Uganda now has institutions and laws closer to what the Taylor Swift saga is invoking in the U.S. The UCC still regulates communications, and now the Competition Ministry can oversee other industries. For example, if a dominant Ugandan company uses exclusive deals or hidden practices that “restrain market access” or “discriminate against competitors” (as the Act warns),[10] it could be challenged under Ugandan law just as Ticketmaster is in the U.S.

4.0  UGANDAN CASES ON DOMINANCE AND FAIR COMPETITION

Several recent cases show how Ugandan authorities confront platform dominance issues. In VAS Garage Ltd v MTN Uganda Ltd,[11] the High Court upheld a UCC decision that MTN had abused its dominance in mobile value-added services. MTN had unilaterally shut down VAS Garage’s subscriber databases for a service, while keeping its own competing service running. The court found this “undermined fair competition” and that MTN had effectively foreclosed VAS’s entry, forcing it out of the market.  

The judgment cited the Communications Act and Regulations, but noted the Competition Act similarly forbids such abuse, specifically banning conduct that restricts market access or discriminates against rivals. The ruling awarded damages to VAS to deter MTN and others from using network control to squeeze competitors.

An earlier case, EzeeMoney Ltd v MTN Uganda,[12] reached a similar conclusion under the 2000 Communications Act. EzeeMoney was a startup offering mobile money services to the unbanked via kiosks. When EzeeMoney tried to enter MTN’s dominant agent network, MTN terminated its contract with EzeeMoney and pressured its agents to sign exclusive deals.

The court condemned MTN’s tactics as “malicious, egregious, vindictive, oppressive and high-handed” abuse of dominance.[13] Judges noted that the Communications Act prohibits any operator from “unfairly preventing, restricting or distorting competition”. By forcing airtime agents to choose MTN exclusively, MTN caused EzeeMoney’s agents to plummet (from over 52,000 down to about 10,000) and inflicted huge losses.

The High Court ordered MTN to pay roughly $700,000 in damages (later appealed). The judge specifically called out the exclusive agreements as “outside the law” and “coercive” means of shutting out a rival.  

These cases, like the U.S. Ticketmaster controversy, involve a firm using control of its platform (MTN’s network) to block competitors and extract rents. The EzeeMoney judgment, for instance, draws a clear parallel to Ticketmaster’s exclusive venue deals: in both, a dominant operator forced “exclusive” contracts on partners (agents or venues) to exclude competition.

The difference is that in Uganda these practices were challenged under the Communications Act Cap. 103 and emerging competition rules, whereas in the U.S. they fall under federal antitrust law. Nevertheless, the legal principles are similar: the courts recognised that even with the lack of a specific antitrust statute (at the time), the Communications Act’s fair-competition mandate could reach such conduct. Indeed, the High Court in VAS Garage remarked that the soon-to-be Competition Act would similarly prohibit MTN’s behaviour.

5.0  CONSUMER PROTECTION AND DIGITAL MARKETS IN UGANDA

Beyond competition law, the Taylor Swift–Ticketmaster issues also touch on consumer rights and transparency, areas where Uganda is still developing its framework. Uganda does not yet have a dedicated Consumer Protection Act.

There is at present no legislation in Uganda which deals specifically with consumer protection, though some sector laws like the Bank of Uganda Financial Consumer Protection Guidelines 2011 offer piecemeal safeguards.[14] Parliament’s Trade Committee has debated bills to create a Consumer Protection law alongside the Competition Act, reflecting concern that Ugandan consumers currently lack even the basic tools to challenge unfair practices.

This regulatory gap is felt acutely in Uganda’s fast-growing digital economy. Take mobile money and e-commerce: for years, telecom operators charged opaque fees for mobile transactions, often without clear disclosure. Security breaches and fraud were common, and consumers had limited recourse. Uganda’s light-touch “test and learn” approach left telcos free to profit from “unfair and obscure rates and charges” on mobile money.[15] 

Only recently has the Bank of Uganda begun fully regulating mobile money under a new Payments Act Cap. 59, and consumer-protection guidelines (2011) which were largely ignored by providers. Uganda’s digital finance sector has often operated with a cavalier attitude toward customer protection, and consumer protection is sorely lacking.

Similarly, transparency in digital marketplaces is an emerging issue. In sectors like transport, ride-hailing, or online retail, Ugandan consumers have also complained about hidden charges and arbitrary pricing, with few formal complaints channels. The Electronic Transactions Act Cap. 99 contains provisions requiring suppliers to disclose information and forbidding unfair terms in online sales, but these rules are not well-known or enforced.

In telecoms, by contrast, the UCC’s mandate does include protecting end-user rights: the Act explicitly requires UCC to safeguard consumer interests such as service quality, complaint handling in communications. Yet outside sectors like telecom and banking, Ugandan consumers still rely on general competition policies and pending legislation for protection against monopolistic or deceptive practices.

6.0  CONCLUSION: TOWARD FAIR MARKETS AND INFORMED CONSUMERS

The unfolding Ticketmaster antitrust saga in the U.S. highlights problems familiar to Uganda: when a dominant platform controls an entire market, consumers suffer, and competition withers unless checked by law. The Eras Tour fallout has led to renewed enforcement, greater transparency rules, and scrutiny of exclusive deals, all geared toward breaking up or reining in an entrenched monopoly.

For Uganda, the lesson is clear: robust competition law and vigilant regulators are needed to prevent similar abuses. Recent developments such as Uganda’s Competition Act, high-profile cases against MTN, and discussions of a Consumer Protection law show the country is moving in that direction. By drawing on international experience, Ugandan authorities can better craft rules to ensure that digital-age monopolies (in telecoms, finance, or other platforms) do not exploit consumers. In particular, requiring platform operators to be transparent about fees and forbidding anti-competitive exclusives (as U.S. policymakers have begun) would empower Ugandan consumers.

Ultimately, the goal on both sides of the Atlantic is the same: foster a fair, competitive market where no single company can dictate terms to venues, agents, or customers. As Uganda’s Competition and Consumer Protection policy states, consumers should enjoy rights to safety, information, and value for money. Whether it’s concert tickets in the U.S. or mobile money transactions in Kampala, those principles call for effective legal safeguards. Just as the Taylor Swift–Ticketmaster controversy catalysed U.S. reforms, it serves as a reminder that vigilance and reform are always needed to protect consumers from the hidden costs of monopoly power.

* Editor-in-Chief Lawpointuganda.

The pdf of this paper can be downloaded here.

TAYLOR SWIFT–TICKETMASTER_MONOPOLY^J ANTITRUST^J AND LESSONS FOR UGANDA_OBITA CALVIN STEWA.

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LIST OF REFERENCES

[1] US Department of Justice Sues Live Nation and Ticketmaster (June 5, 2024), <https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2024/2024-06-05-us-department-of-justice-sues-live-nation-and-ticketmaster> [Accessed on July 5 2025].  

[2] 3 Antitrust Lessons From the Taylor Swift Ticketmaster Debacle, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/3-antitrust-lessons-from-the-taylor-swift-ticketmaster-debacle> [Accessed on July 5 2025].  

[3] Todd Spangler, Taylor Swift Fans Crash Ticketmaster Site (November 15, 2022). Available at <https://variety.com/2022/digital/news/taylor-swift-crash-ticketmaster-site-1235433274/> [Accessed on July 5 2025].  

[4] Judge says Taylor Swift fans can amend lawsuit against Live Nation, Ticketmaster, <https://abc7.com/post/taylor-swift-fans-case-live-nation-ticketmaster-ticket-process-back-court> [Accessed on July 5 2025].  

[5] Taylor Swift–Ticketmaster controversy, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor_Swift> [Accessed on July 5 2025].  

[6] Justice Department Sues Live Nation-Ticketmaster for Monopolizing Markets Across the Live Concert Industry, <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-live-nation-ticketmaster-monopolizing-markets-across-live-concert#>  [Accessed on July 5 2025].  

[7] Ibid 3.

[8] Ibid 2.

[9] Uganda: A new era of competition regulation <https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/expert-views/21509-uganda-a-new-era-of-competition-regulation> [Accessed on July 5 2025].  

[10] Uganda: High Court boosts competition in telecommunications sector <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.> [Accessed on July 5 2025].  

[11] VAS Garage Ltd v MTN Uganda Ltd (Civil Suit 689 of 2022) [2025] UGCommC 73 (21 April 2025).

[12] EzeeMoney Ltd v MTN Uganda Civil Suit 330 of 2013.

[13] Ugandan court penalises MTN for malicious business conduct (Friday, November 20, 2015 — updated on July 19, 2020) <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business-tech/ugandan-court-penalises-mtn-for-malicious-business-conduct>  [Accessed on July 5 2025].  

[14] Lincoln Muggaga Mpagi, Comprehensive Consumer Protection Law In Uganda Is Long Overdue.

[15] Mobile Money Regulation: Lessons from Uganda, <https://commsrisk.com/mobile-money-regulation-lessons-from-uganda/> [Accessed on July 5 2025].