High Court Upholds Vicarious Liability in Motor Accident Appeal, Reaffirming that Liability May Attach Not Only to the Registered Owner but Also to a Beneficial Owner or Master Where a Driver Operates

Waboga David
Sep 4
7 min read

Introduction

Vicarious liability is a foundational principle of tort law that imposes liability on one person for the wrongful acts of another, based on the relationship between them.

Traditionally, it arises where a master is held liable for the torts committed by a servant in the course of employment, or where a principal bears responsibility for the acts of an agent acting within the scope of authority. The doctrine reflects the policy that the person who benefits from the activities of a servant or agent should also bear the risks of those activities.

The principle was well articulated in Muwonge v Attorney General [1967] EA 17, where the East African Court of Appeal held that a master is liable not only for acts actually authorised but also for acts so connected to authorised duties that they can be regarded as improper modes of performing them. This position was recently affirmed in Security Group Uganda Ltd v Hajjat Zam Zawedde, Civil Appeal No. 160 of 2019, where the Court of Appeal reiterated that what matters is whether the wrongful act was committed in the course of employment, regardless of whether it contravened specific instructions.

The rationale behind vicarious liability lies in considerations of justice, risk distribution, and deterrence. First, it ensures that innocent victims are compensated by someone with the financial means to do so (also known as the deep pocket theory in tort law).

Second, it places the burden of risk on employers or vehicle owners who are in the best position to supervise, control, and insure against such risks.

Third, it discourages careless delegation of responsibilities and incentivises proper oversight.

The question of who qualifies as an “owner” or “employer” in motor accident cases has, however, generated considerable debate. Section 27 of the Traffic and Road Safety Act, Cap 361, creates a rebuttable presumption that the registered owner of a motor vehicle is its legal owner. Yet Ugandan jurisprudence has evolved to recognise that beneficial ownership, where a person, though not formally registered, exercises control, derives benefit, or assumes responsibility over a vehicle, may also attract liability.

In the recent High Court decision of Akampurira Isaac v Biryomumaiso Vian (Civil Appeal No. 002 of 2024), the appellant challenged a finding of vicarious liability on the ground that he was not the registered owner of the accident vehicle. The court, however, upheld the magistrate’s decision, holding that his conduct, visiting the injured respondent in hospital, signing for the vehicle at the police station, and opposing its impoundment, established him as the beneficial owner. Accordingly, he was vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the driver.

Background

The case originated from a motor accident on October 20, 2018, at Sindi, Rwamucucu Sub-County, Rukiga District, involving a Toyota Premio (MV UAG 234R). The vehicle, driven by the third defendant (Friday Damson), an employee of the appellant (Akampurira Isaac), struck the respondent (Biryomumaisho Vian), who was lawfully on the road.

The respondent sustained compound fractures and permanent disability. The accident was investigated by police (TAR 35/2018), and all parties agreed that the third defendant’s reckless and negligent driving caused the accident.

In the lower court, the trial Chief Magistrate found as follows;

The third defendant was negligent, as confirmed by the Police Abstract.
The motor vehicle was registered in the name of the second defendant (Sinamenye John), who was not a party to the appeal.
Evidence, including a statutory declaration by Fred Mugasho Muhummuza, indicated that the second defendant sold the vehicle to Muhummuza in 2013, who subsequently sold it to the appellant.
The appellant’s actions, such as visiting the respondent in the hospital, providing financial assistance, and signing for the vehicle at the police station, suggested he was the beneficial owner of the vehicle.
The appellant was held vicariously liable for the third defendant’s negligence, as the latter was acting in the course of employment.

The trial court awarded the respondent:

UGX 15,000,000 in general damages;
UGX 17,072,000 in special damages;
20% interest on both awards from the date of judgment until payment in full; and
Costs of the suit.

Dissatisfied, the appellant filed an appeal on November 27, 2024, challenging the trial court’s findings on liability, damages, interest, and costs.

Issues

The High Court considered the following issues based on the appellant’s memorandum of appeal:

Whether the appellant could be held liable in absence of registration in his name.
Whether the trial court properly applied principles governing their award.
Whether the imposition of 20% interest and costs was justified.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments

Vicarious Liability and Evidence Evaluation (Grounds 1 and 6)
The appellant argued he was not the owner of the vehicle under Section 2(1) of the Traffic and Road Safety Act, Cap 347, as he was not the registered owner. Ownership, he claimed, could only be established through registration records, which were not adduced.
He denied signing for the vehicle at the police station and disclaimed knowledge of the vehicle, the registered owner (Sinamenye John), or the third defendant (Friday Damson).
The trial court’s reliance on a statutory declaration by Fred Mugasho Muhummuza was improper, as the declarant was not called to testify, and the declaration was not formally admitted as evidence.
The term “beneficial owner” used by the trial court was not supported by law, and the appellant’s actions (e.g., hospital visits) did not establish ownership or liability.
Special Damages (Ground 2)
The appellant argued that the trial court awarded UGX 17,072,000 in special damages without adhering to principles requiring strict proof of such damages. He erroneously claimed the court awarded UGX 35,493,000, contrary to the actual award.
General Damages (Ground 3)
The appellant contended that the award of UGX 15,000,000 in general damages was erroneous, particularly if he was not the vehicle’s owner. This ground was tied to the success of Grounds 1 and 6.
Interest and Costs (Grounds 4 and 5)
The appellant argued that the 20% interest rate on damages was excessive and unsupported by law.
He claimed the award of costs was against the weight of evidence, particularly as he disputed liability.

Respondent’s Arguments

Vicarious Liability and Evidence Evaluation
The respondent supported the trial court’s finding of vicarious liability, citing the appellant’s conduct (hospital visits, financial assistance, and opposing the vehicle’s impoundment) as evidence of his interest in the vehicle.
The second defendant’s uncontroverted testimony and statutory declaration confirmed the vehicle’s sale to Muhummuza in 2013, who sold it to the appellant, shifting the burden of proof to the appellant to disprove ownership.
The third defendant’s failure to file a defense conceded negligence, reinforcing the appellant’s liability as the employer.
Special Damages
The respondent provided documentary evidence (Exhibits PX1 to PX22) to substantiate the special damages awarded, which were significantly less than the UGX 35,493,000 claimed.
General Damages:
The respondent justified the UGX 15,000,000 award under the principle of restitutio in integrum, aiming to restore the plaintiff to the position they would have been in absent the injury.
Interest and Costs
The respondent argued that the 20% interest rate and costs were within the trial court’s discretion and supported by the evidence of liability and injury.

Court’s Findings

The High Court, as the first appellate court, reappraised the evidence and made the following findings:

Vicarious Liability and Evidence Evaluation (Grounds 1 and 6)
The court relied on Section 27 of the Traffic and Road Safety Act, which establishes a rebuttable presumption of ownership based on registration. The second defendant’s uncontroverted evidence, including the statutory declaration (admitted as DX1 without objection), established that he sold the vehicle to Muhummuza in 2013, who sold it to the appellant.
The appellant’s actions (hospital visits, financial assistance, and signing for the vehicle) and his opposition to impounding the vehicle supported the trial court’s finding of beneficial ownership.
The appellant’s evasive denials in his pleadings and testimony (e.g., denying knowledge of the vehicle or parties) violated Order 6 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires substantive responses to allegations. His failure to disprove ownership or the master-servant relationship with the third defendant upheld the presumption of vicarious liability.

The court applied the doctrine of respondeat superior, as articulated in Muwonge v. Attorney General (1967) and Security Group Uganda Limited v. Hajjat Zam Zawedde (2019), holding that a master is liable for a servant’s actions within the course of employment, even without formal employment.

Special Damages (Ground 2)

The court struck out this ground under Order 43 Rule 2(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, as the appellant’s argument (claiming an award of UGX 35,493,000) deviated from the actual award of UGX 17,072,000, which was supported by documentary evidence (Exhibits PX1 to PX22).

General Damages (Ground 3):

The court upheld the UGX 15,000,000 award, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. It applied the principle of restitutio in integrum (Dharamshi v. Karsan, 1974), noting that general damages are imprecise and that the appellant failed to cite authority to challenge the quantum.

Interest (Ground 4)

The court found no error in the 20% interest rate, as it was within the trial court’s discretion under Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act.

Costs (Ground 5)

This ground was struck out for being abandoned, as the appellant failed to articulate specific arguments. The court affirmed that costs follow the event under Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act.

Overall Evaluation:

The court found that the trial court properly evaluated the evidence, and the appellant’s evasive denials and failure to disprove ownership or the third defendant’s frolic undermined his case.

Holding

The High Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety, affirming the trial court’s judgment. The appellant was ordered to pay:

UGX 15,000,000 in general damages;
UGX 17,072,000 in special damages;
20% interest on both awards from the date of judgment until payment in full; and
Costs of the appeal and the suit below.

The case reinforces several key legal principles

Vicarious Liability (Respondeat Superior)
A master is liable for the negligent acts of a servant committed in the course of employment, even without formal employment, provided the acts are connected to authorized duties (Muwonge v. Attorney General, 1967; Security Group Uganda Limited v. Hajjat Zam Zawedde, 2019).
Presumption of Ownership:
Under Section 27 of the Traffic and Road Safety Act, the registered owner of a vehicle is presumed to be the owner unless contrary evidence is provided. This presumption is rebuttable, and the burden shifts to the alleged owner once credible evidence of a change in ownership is adduced.
Burden of Proof:
Sections 101-102 of the Evidence Act require a party asserting a fact to prove it. Evasive denials in pleadings (Order 6 Rule 10, Civil Procedure Rules) are insufficient to rebut a presumption or discharge the burden of proof.
General Damages:
General damages aim to restore the plaintiff to their pre-injury position (restitutio in integrum), and appellate courts will not disturb such awards absent an abuse of discretion (Dharamshi v. Karsan, 1974).
Costs and Interest:
Costs and interest rates are discretionary under Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act and generally follow the outcome of the suit unless compelling reasons justify otherwise.