The Court of Appeal affirms that the IGG has constitutional and statutory authority to prosecute corruption and theft of public funds, even against private persons, without DPP consent.

Court Upholds Convictions for Uttering False Documents, Obtaining Execution of Security by False Pretence, and Neglect of Duty

Introduction

Under Uganda’s legal framework, the Penal Code Act (Cap 128) provides that certain offences relating to fraud, misuse of public funds, and official negligence attract significant criminal liability. Among these are the offences of uttering false documents, obtaining or executing a security by false pretence, and neglect of duty.

Uttering False Documents is defined under Section 351 of the Penal Code Act and criminalizes the act of knowingly and fraudulently presenting, using, or uttering a document that is false, with the intent to deceive or defraud. The offence focuses on the act of communication or presentation of the false document, irrespective of whether the underlying document was forged, and requires proof of knowledge, intent, and fraudulent purpose.

Obtaining or Executing a Security by False Pretence falls under Section 306 of the Penal Code Act. This provision penalizes a person who, by misrepresentation or deceit, induces another to issue, execute, endorse, or deliver a security, with intent to defraud. The offence emphasizes the elements of false pretence, inducement, and resulting execution of a legally significant security, making it an instrument to protect financial and contractual integrity.

Neglect of Duty imposes criminal liability on public officers who fail to perform their official responsibilities, resulting in prejudice to the public or an institution. As clarified in Mugisha v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 104 of 2011-2019), neglect of duty is not a strict liability offence; it requires proof that

(i) the accused had an official duty,

(ii) he or she neglected this duty, and

(iii) the neglect caused loss or prejudice.

The Court of Appeal has delivered a consolidated judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 112 of 2018 (Inspectorate of Government v Abraham Byandala & Others) and Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 2018 (Joe Ssemugooma, Apollo Senkeeto, and Wilberforce Senjako v Uganda). The decision, arising from Justice Lawrence Gidudu’s 2018 trial ruling, revisits one of Uganda’s most high-profile corruption cases: the Mukono–Kyetume–Katosi/Kisoga–Nyenga Road contract.

The Court of Appeal emphasised that the prosecution must establish each element of these offences beyond a reasonable doubt, including knowledge, intent, and causation.

Further, the Court clarified the procedural aspect regarding the requirement of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) consent in corruption-related prosecutions.

While generally DPP consent is necessary for criminal proceedings, the Court affirmed that the Inspectorate of Government (IGG) has constitutional and statutory authority under Article 225 of the Constitution and the Inspectorate of Government Act to investigate and prosecute offences of corruption and theft of public funds, even against private individuals, without prior DPP consent. This authority is anchored in the IGG’s mandate to protect public property and ensure accountability in public administration.

Additionally, the Court confirmed that an indictment issued by the IGG need not be personally signed by the IGG; it is valid if signed by an authorized officer within the Inspectorate. This ensures that prosecutorial processes under the IGG’s mandate remain effective and constitutionally grounded.

The appeal required the Court to balance ministerial oversight under the UNRA Act, the principle of due diligence in public procurement, and the criminal responsibility of public officials and private contractors implicated in fraudulent practices.

Facts of the Case

This consolidated appeal arose from a decision by Justice Lawrence Gidudu on August 29, 2018, concerning alleged irregularities in the procurement, award, and payment processes for the upgrading of the Mukono-Kyetume-Katosi/Kisoga-Nyenga Road by the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA).

The respondents were former UNRA officials and private individuals involved in the procurement and execution of a UGX 165 billion contract awarded to Eutaw Construction Company Inc., USA.

The 1st – 4th Respondents, Eng. Abraham Byandala (former Minister for Transport and Works), Eng. Berunado Ssebuga Kimeze, Joe Ssemugooma, and Marvin Baryaruha (UNRA officials) were charged with abuse of office (Section 11, Anti-Corruption Act, 2009) and causing financial loss (Section 20, Anti-Corruption Act). Byandala faced an additional charge of disobeying lawful orders (Section 35(c), Inspectorate of Government Act).

The 5th Respondent (Apollo Senkeeto), Alleged to have falsely represented himself as Eutaw’s country representative, forging performance and advance payment guarantees and stealing UGX 24,790,823,522 in advance payments.

The 6th Respondent (Mugote Isaac), A banker accused of conspiring with Senkeeto to defraud UNRA and abetting financial loss by falsely verifying guarantees.

The 7th Respondent (Wilberforce Senjako), A UNRA staff member jointly charged with Ssemugooma for corruption and causing financial loss.

The trial court acquitted Byandala, Kimeze, Baryaruha, and Mugote of all charges. while Ssemugooma, Senkeeto, and Senjako were acquitted of causing financial loss but convicted on other counts.

The Inspectorate of Government appealed the acquittals of Byandala, Kimeze, Baryaruha, and Mugote, and partial acquittals of Ssemugooma, Senkeeto, and Senjako, seeking convictions and a refund of UGX 24,790,824,544.

The convicted parties, Joe Ssemugooma (UNRA official), Apollo Senkeeto (Eutaw’s purported country representative), and Wilberforce Senjako (UNRA staff), appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing evidentiary errors, weak circumstantial evidence, jurisdictional issues, and disproportionate sentencing.

Grounds of Appeal

Criminal Appeal No. 112 of 2018 (IGG v Respondents) (Against Acquittals and Sentences)

The prosecution appealed the acquittals and sought convictions and compensation, raising the following grounds:

1. Ground 1: The trial judge erred in holding that Respondent 1 was justified in directing UNRA to sign the contract with Eutaw, leading to his acquittal for abuse of office.

2. Ground 2: The judge misinterpreted the principle of due diligence in procurement, resulting in acquittals for Respondents 1, 2, 3, and 4.

3. Ground 3: The judge erred in finding that Respondent 1 did not disobey the Inspector General of Government’s (IGG) order to stop road works.

4. Ground 4: The judge failed to evaluate evidence that Respondent 4 provided wrongful advice on due diligence and contract signing.

5. Ground 5: The judge erred in finding that the prosecution failed to prove causing financial loss, acquitting Respondents 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7.

6. Ground 6: The judge failed to prove conspiracy between Respondents 5 and 6, leading to their acquittal on this charge.

7. Ground 7: The judge failed to order compensation against Respondent 5.

Relief Sought:

1. Convict and sentence Respondents on all relevant counts.

2. Order a refund of UGX 24,790,824,544 by the Respondents.

   
   

Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 2018 (Respondents v IGG)(Against Convictions and Sentences)

The appellants (Joe Ssemugooma, Apollo Senkeeto, and Wilberforce Senjako) challenged their convictions and sentences:

Joe Ssemugooma (Respondent 3)

1. The judge failed to properly evaluate evidence, leading to a wrong decision.

2. The judge considered the prosecution’s case in isolation, ignoring the defense.

3. The conviction relied on weak circumstantial evidence.

4. The judge considered irrelevant aggravating factors, resulting in a five-year sentence per count.

5. The judge misconstrued facts and evidence in sentencing.

   
   

Apollo Senkeeto (Respondent 5)

1. The judge failed to resolve contradictions in evidence, particularly regarding the theft of UGX 24,790,823,522, as some funds were paid to legitimate entities (e.g., UGX 12,000,000 to CICO Uganda, UGX 4,500,000 to Eutaw USA).

2. The judge erred in finding theft when UNRA suffered no financial loss, as evidenced by acquittals of co-accused.

3. The judge wrongly held that money paid to a company’s account could be stolen from the government.

4. The judge relied on uncollaborated circumstantial evidence for fraud, uttering false documents, and obtaining securities by false pretenses.

5. The judge failed to properly evaluate Eutaw’s true nature and the impact of a resolution signed by Mr. Thomas Elmore.

6. The judge erred in allowing the IGG to prosecute a private person (Senkeeto).

7. The judge wrongly dismissed a motion to arrest judgment and considered irrelevant factors like lifestyle in sentencing.

   
   

Wilberforce Senjako (Respondent 7)

1. The judge misdirected himself on circumstantial evidence regarding Senjako’s duty to verify securities.

2. The judge improperly relied on co-accused Ssemugooma’s evidence to find neglect of duty.

3. The conviction for corruption was based on weak circumstantial evidence.

4. The judge erred in finding financial loss when none was proven.

5. The judge imposed an unfair sentence, equating a junior officer (Senjako) with a senior officer (Ssemugooma).

   
   

Representation

For the Appellant, Ms. Brenda Kimbugwe (Manager, Prosecutions, IG) appeared jointly with Ms. Sylvia Nabirye (Supervisor, Prosecution). The Respondents were represented as follows: Edward Sekamatte (1st), Ivan Engoru (2nd), William Weere (3rd), Ezekiel Mubiru (4th), Mulira Peter (5th), Norah Kaggwa (6th), and Jimmy Muyanja (7th Respondent).

ARGUMENTS

Criminal Appeal No. 112 of 2018 (Prosecution’s Arguments)

Ground 1 (Abuse of Office by Respondent 1): The prosecution argued that Respondent 1, as Minister for Transport and Works, abused his authority by directing UNRA to sign the contract with Eutaw before due diligence was completed. This was arbitrary and prejudicial to UNRA’s interests, violating Section 14(3) of the UNRA Act, which limits the minister’s role to policy guidance, not operational interference.

Ground 2 (Due Diligence): The prosecution contended that the trial judge misinterpreted Regulation 31 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDPA) Regulations, 2014, which allows due diligence at any time but does not justify premature contract signing without verifying the contractor’s identity.

Ground 3 (Disobeying IGG Orders): The prosecution argued that Respondent 1 disobeyed the IGG’s July 17, 2014, order to stop road works by holding meetings to salvage the project and directing continued work through an internal memo (Exhibit D4).

Ground 4 (Wrongful Advice by Respondent 4): The prosecution claimed Respondent 4’s legal advice to sign the contract while continuing due diligence was wrongful and facilitated the premature contract award.

Ground 5 (Causing Financial Loss): The prosecution asserted that Respondents 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7’s actions led to a financial loss of UGX 24,790,823,522, which was not properly evaluated by the trial judge.

Ground 6 (Conspiracy): The prosecution argued that evidence of collaboration between Respondents 5 and 6 in forging guarantees and defrauding UNRA was sufficient to prove conspiracy.

Ground 7 (Compensation): The prosecution sought a refund of UGX 24,790,824,544, arguing that Respondent 5’s theft warranted compensation orders.

Respondents’ Counterarguments

Respondent 1: Denied abuse of office, arguing that Section 5(3) of the UNRA Act grants the minister supervisory authority over UNRA. The directive to sign the contract (Exhibit D3) was lawful, based on advice from technical staff and the Solicitor General, and motivated by public demand for the road. Denied receiving the IGG’s order, stating he was abroad, and no evidence showed he defied it.

Respondents 2 and 4: Argued their actions were part of a lawful procurement process starting in 2010. Respondent 2 followed the minister’s directive, and Respondent 4’s advice aligned with Regulation 31, allowing due diligence post-contract signing.

Respondent 6: Denied conspiracy or abetting financial loss, arguing no evidence linked him to fraudulent actions beyond confirming guarantees, which he believed were authentic.

General Defense: Respondents emphasized that the procurement process was ongoing, and due diligence could legally continue post-contract signing. They argued no financial loss was proven, as funds were partially used for legitimate purposes (e.g., payments to CICO and Eutaw USA).

Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 2018 (Appellants’ Arguments)

Joe Ssemugooma (Respondent 3): Argued the trial judge relied on weak circumstantial evidence and ignored defense evidence, leading to an unfair conviction for abuse of office. The five-year sentence was excessive, influenced by irrelevant factors.

Apollo Senkeeto (Respondent 5): Contended that the trial judge ignored evidence that funds were paid to legitimate entities, negating theft. The conviction relied on uncollaborated circumstantial evidence, and the IGG lacked jurisdiction to prosecute a private person. The judge’s consideration of his lifestyle was prejudicial.

Wilberforce Senjako (Respondent 7): Argued the conviction for corruption was based on flawed circumstantial evidence about his duty to verify securities. The judge wrongly equated his sentence with Ssemugooma’s, despite his junior role.

Prosecution’s Response:

The convictions were supported by evidence of Respondents 3, 5, and 7’s roles in facilitating fraudulent procurement and payments.

The IGG’s jurisdiction to prosecute private persons complicit in public sector corruption is established under the Anti-Corruption Act.

Sentences were proportionate, given the scale of the fraud and public harm.

COURT’S FINDINGS

The appellate court re-evaluated the evidence, guided by principles from Kifamunte Henry v. Uganda (Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1997), Pandya v. R [1957] EA 336, and Bogere Moses v. Uganda (Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1997). These cases mandate a first appellate court to review evidence, draw inferences, and consider the trial court’s observations on witness demeanor, per Rule 30 of the Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions.

Criminal Appeal No. 112 of 2018Ground 1 (Abuse of Office – Respondent 1)

The court upheld the trial judge’s acquittal. Section 5(3) of the UNRA Act places UNRA under the minister’s general supervision, granting Respondent 1 authority to direct contract signing.

The directive (Exhibit D3) was not arbitrary, as it followed legal advice from Respondent 4 and the Solicitor General, and was motivated by public need and available funding.

Regulation 31 of the PPDPA Regulations, 2014, allows due diligence at any stage of the procurement process, including post-contract signing. The prosecution failed to prove the elements of abuse of office under Section 11 of the Anti-Corruption Act (employment in a public body, arbitrary act prejudicial to the employer, and abuse of authority).

“It was not arbitrary for the Minister to have written Exhibit D3 directing the signing of the contract while due diligence proceeded. That is the position of the law.”

Ground 1 failed.

Ground 2 (Due Diligence – Respondents 1, 2, 3, 4)

The court agreed with the trial judge that due diligence could occur at any time during the procurement process, as defined by Section 3 of the PPDPA Act, which includes contract management.

Respondents 2 and 4’s actions (signing the contract and advising on due diligence) were lawful under Regulation 31. The trial judge’s reliance on Eng Samson Bagonza v. Uganda (Cr App 2 of 2010) was apt, as collective decision-making in consultative meetings negates arbitrary action.

Ground 2 failed.

Ground 3 (Disobeying IGG Orders – Respondent 1)

The court found no evidence that Respondent 1 received the IGG’s July 17, 2014, order to stop road works. His testimony that he was abroad and unaware of the order created reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to produce evidence of service (e.g., testimony from Matilda, the alleged recipient) or that Respondent 1’s internal memo (Exhibit D4) was acted upon. The court resolved this doubt in Respondent 1’s favor, as per criminal law standards.

Ground 3 failed.

On Due Diligence

The court observed that although the law allowed flexibility, the Court cautioned that prudence demanded due diligence on a contractor’s legal existence before signing a contract. However, the failure to do so did not amount to criminal liability for the minister or UNRA officials absent evidence of fraudulent intent.

On Theft and Fraud (Apollo Senkeeto)

The Court upheld findings that Senkeeto forged guarantees and fraudulently obtained UGX 24.79 billion, even though part of the money was disbursed to subcontractors. The essential fact was that the securities were false and the advance was obtained by deception.

On Corruption (Ssemugooma & Senjako)

The Court upheld their convictions, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that their actions facilitated the fraudulent advance.

On Sentencing

The Court noted that while sentencing must consider mitigating factors and relative roles of co-accused, corruption and theft of public funds attract deterrent punishment.

It rejected arguments that the trial judge had relied excessively on lifestyle evidence, finding the sentences within statutory limits.

Ground 5: Failure to Prove Causing Financial Loss

The IGG argued that the trial judge erred by acquitting several respondents of the offence of causing financial loss under Section 20(1) of the Anti-Corruption Act.

The IGG maintained that:

1. The contract with Eutaw was void ab initio, meaning all payments under it constituted financial loss.

2. UNRA signed a contract with an ineligible company, thereby exposing public funds.

3. Even if some road works were executed, PW4 testified that they were worth only UGX 5.8 billion, leaving a balance that should count as loss.

Respondents countered that:

1. Advance payment was lawfully processed after the project manager confirmed compliance with procedure.

2. Some road works were completed and could not be disregarded.

3. Proof of actual quantifiable loss is an essential ingredient of the offence, which the prosecution failed to establish without an engineering audit report.

Court’s Findings

1. Proof of financial loss required evidence of actual, unrecoverable loss.

2. The prosecution led inconsistent evidence, ranging from UGX 5.8 to 6.1 billion worth of work completed.

3. Without an engineering audit or valuation of completed works, the Court could not ascertain the true extent of loss.

4. Following Kassim Mpanga v Uganda (Cr. App. 30 of 1994), “loss” must be specific, quantifiable, and irrecoverable.

The Court therefore upheld the acquittals, agreeing that financial loss was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Ground 7: Failure to Order Compensation Against Senkeeto

The IGG further argued that the trial judge erred by not ordering compensation against Apollo Senkeeto (the 5th Respondent), despite evidence that he fraudulently obtained UGX 24.7 billion.

Court’s Findings

1. A compensation order under the Anti-Corruption Act must be based on ascertained loss.

2. Evidence showed that UGX 12.2 billion was paid to CICO for actual road works, and UGX 4.6 billion remitted abroad for equipment.

3. Because the prosecution failed to prove the exact loss with an audit report, the court could not rely on speculative figures to order compensation.

4. Consequently, no compensation order could issue.

Ground 6: Failure to Prove Conspiracy to Defraud

The IGG argued that the trial judge wrongly acquitted the 5th and 6th Respondents (Senkeeto and Isaac Mugote) of conspiracy to defraud, relying on email evidence linking Mugote’s Housing Finance Bank letterhead to forged guarantees.

Court’s Findings

Conspiracy under Section 309 of the Penal Code requires proof of an agreement between two or more persons to use fraudulent means.

• The electronic mails tendered (Exhibits P53 and P115) were unreliable:

  • Screenshots were edited in Word format, compromising authenticity.

  • No forensic analysis of UNRA or Housing Finance Bank servers was conducted to verify email origins.

  • Evidence of a banker–client relationship between Mugote and Senkeeto was insufficient to prove conspiracy.

The Court upheld the acquittals, finding the prosecution’s digital evidence inadequate and tainted.

Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9

These grounds, argued together by the Second Appellant (Apollo Senkeeto), challenged his convictions for theft of UGX 24.78 billion and uttering false documents.

Second Appellant’s Submissions

Counsel argued that:

No prosecution witness directly implicated him, and neither UNRA nor Eutaw (Mississippi) lodged a complaint. Instead, the Commissioner for Patriotism raised suspicion to the IGG, making the IGG “complainant, investigator, and prosecutor,” which allegedly contravened Article 28(12) of the Constitution (fair hearing).

The money was paid under a valid contract signed by UNRA and cleared by the Solicitor General; thus, it could not amount to theft of government funds.

Funds were for mobilization, which was completed. Evidence (PW4, Exh. D24) showed UGX 6.5 billion worth of works were executed. He could not be guilty of theft when mobilization and physical works were undertaken.

He neither authored nor personally delivered the securities; financial matters were handled by Michael Olvey and other Americans.

He contended that Eutaw Florida acted as a Special Purpose Vehicle SPV for Eutaw Mississippi, legitimately using its experience to win the bid. The trial judge, he argued, misunderstood the role of SPVs and wrongly found fraud.

The IGG lacked jurisdiction to prosecute a private person under the Penal Code without DPP consent. Moreover, the indictment was not signed by the IGG as a corporate body, contrary to Kutesa & Ors v AG (2011/2012).

Respondent’s Submissions

The IGG countered that:

The contract was between UNRA and Eutaw Mississippi, but the Second Appellant had no link to that entity. He fraudulently held out as its representative, opening a Housing Finance Bank account in the name of Eutaw Construction Company (Uganda) and becoming its sole signatory.

• UGX 24.78 billion, belonging to Government, was paid under this deception, and large portions were diverted:

  • UGX 12.2 billion to CICO,

  • UGX 4.6 billion wired abroad for undelivered equipment.

  
  

  The SPV claim was false: PW23 (Thomas Elmore) of Eutaw Mississippi testified that he did not know the directors of Eutaw Florida, confirming no corporate relationship existed.

  
  

  PW15 testified he personally received the securities from the Second Appellant, and PW12 (Housing Finance Bank) denied signing them. This proved uttering of false documents.

  On jurisdiction: under Article 230 of the Constitution and Section 14(5) of the IGG Act, the IGG has powers to prosecute corruption-related offences, including theft of public funds by private actors working with government officials.

Court’s Findings

On Jurisdiction of IGG

The Court affirmed that the IGG has constitutional and statutory authority to prosecute corruption and theft of public funds, even against private persons, without DPP consent.

An indictment need not be signed personally by the IGG, as long as it is signed by an authorized officer of the Inspectorate. The indictment here was valid.

Theft of UGX 24.78 Billion

The Court applied Section 254 of the Penal Code Act and evaluated the four elements:

1. Property capable of being stolen: Money is property under Section 253(1), not disputed.

2. No claim of right: The contract was with Eutaw Mississippi, but funds were paid to Eutaw Florida and later to Eutaw International (Uganda). Evidence from PW23 and UNRA officials showed Eutaw Florida had no authorization. The SPV argument was rejected as fraudulent misrepresentation.

3. Fraudulent intent:

   • The Second Appellant opened the fraudulent account and became sole signatory.

   • He subcontracted CICO, which had been disqualified, to execute works at a lower price.

   • The Court accepted that some mobilization and works occurred, but held that the fraudulent scheme to obtain advance payment using false documents showed intent to deprive the rightful owner (UNRA/Government).

4. Ownership: The funds belonged to Government of Uganda through UNRA.

Holding: Theft was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

On Uttering False Documents

PW15 testified that the Second Appellant personally presented the securities from Housing Finance Bank and KCB.

PW12 denied authoring the Housing Finance Bank guarantees; evidence showed Eutaw did not qualify for such securities.

The Court found the Second Appellant knowingly uttered false documents to UNRA.

Holding: Conviction for uttering false documents upheld.

On Mobilization and Partial Works

The Court acknowledged evidence that CICO mobilized equipment and carried out works worth UGX 5.8–6.5 billion. However, this did not absolve the Second Appellant, since the advance payment was obtained through fraud.

Conclusion on Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9

The Court upheld the trial court’s decision:

1. The SPV defence was false.

2. The IGG had jurisdiction and the indictment was valid.

3. Theft and uttering false documents were proved beyond reasonable doubt.

4. Partial works and mobilization did not negate the fraudulent intent behind obtaining the advance payment.

Result: Convictions and sentences against the Second Appellant were sustained.

Uttering False Documents (Section 351 Penal Code Act)

Section 351 defines uttering false documents as knowingly and fraudulently presenting a forged document, punishable as if one had forged it.

To secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove:

1. Existence of a false document;

2. Uttering (presentation or use) of the document by the accused;

3. Knowledge that the document was false;

4. Intent to defraud or deceive.

   
   

Court’s Findings

The second appellant (Apollo Senkeeto) presented a forged Housing Finance Bank performance guarantee dated 21 November 2013, although Eutaw Construction Company had not yet opened an account with the bank.

Testimony from PW12 (a Housing Finance official) confirmed she neither signed nor issued the securities.

PW13 (an insurance agent) and PW15 (a UNRA staff member) linked the appellant to the forged documents.

The appellant also presented false guarantees purportedly from Statewide Insurance Company (SWICO) and Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), despite neither he nor his company having qualifying accounts.

The Court held:

“The prosecution has successfully proved that the securities in question were forged, that the second Appellant knowingly presented them to UNRA thereby establishing the element of fraudulent intent.”

The conviction and 3-year sentence for uttering false documents were upheld.

Obtaining Execution of Security by False Pretence (Section 306 Penal Code Act)

Section 306 criminalizes dishonestly inducing another person to execute or deliver a valuable security by false pretence.

Court’s Findings

The second appellant obtained advance payment bonds from UAP Insurance and ICEA despite knowing that the advance payments had already been received and spent.

PW18 (an insurance broker) testified that he helped secure the securities for the appellant but later discovered UAP had withdrawn them upon realizing the misrepresentation.

The trial judge found, and the Court of Appeal affirmed:

“He is guilty of falsely pretending that no advance payment had been made when he sought an advance payment bond from UAP through insurance brokers.”

The conviction and 5-year sentence for obtaining execution of security by false pretence were upheld.

Neglect of Duty (Section 128 Penal Code Act)

The third appellant (Wilberforce Senjako), a regional accountant at UNRA, was charged with neglect of duty.

Legal Test (Mugisha v Uganda, Crim. App. No. 104 of 2011, [2019] UGCA 149)

To convict for neglect of duty, the prosecution must prove:

1. The accused had an official duty;

2. The accused neglected that duty;

3. The neglect caused prejudice to the complainant.

Court’s Findings

Evidence showed that Senjako was responsible for verifying securities before payments were processed.

He authored verification correspondence (Exh. P53) but misdirected it to a junior Housing Finance officer instead of the CEO, resulting in fraudulent securities being validated.

PW16 (a SWICO officer) testified that Senjako presented fake securities to her office, which she confirmed as forgeries.

The Court held that Senjako’s failure to escalate the issue and his mishandling of verification amounted to neglect of duty, leading to financial loss.

The Court upheld his 5-year sentence.

Final Orders

1. Appeal of Joe Ssemugooma (First Appellant) allowed – acquitted of Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Office.

2. Apollo Senkeeto (Second Appellant):

   -Conviction for theft quashed.

   -Convictions for uttering false documents and obtaining execution of security by false pretence upheld.

   -Ordered to serve remaining sentences (2 years 3 months 19 days and 4 years 3 months 11 days, respectively, after credit for time spent on remand).

   -Bail cancelled; immediate arrest ordered.

3. Wilberforce Senjako (Third Appellant): Appeal dismissed; 5-year sentence for neglect of duty confirmed.

   
   

Key Principles

1. A minister exercising statutory supervisory powers does not commit abuse of office unless acting arbitrarily with prejudice.

2. Under Regulation 31 PPDA Regulations, due diligence may occur at any stage of the procurement cycle, though best practice is before contract execution.

3. Convictions may be sustained on circumstantial evidence if it irresistibly points to guilt.

4. Disbursing stolen funds to third parties or on partial project expenses does not negate theft if obtained by deception.

5. IGG’s Prosecutorial Powers Extend to both public officials and private persons implicated in corruption offences.

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