High Court Clarifies That Joint Administrators Must Act Jointly in Representing Estates

Introduction

When letters of administration are granted jointly to multiple individuals, the law requires them to act collectively in all matters concerning the estate. Any legal proceedings brought on behalf of the estate must involve the full participation of all appointed administrators unless a clear legal exception applies, such as where administration is taken out at different times or the grant specifically permits one to act independently.

Acting singly or without the consent or involvement of all co-administrators renders such proceedings incurably defective.

In the present case, the High Court struck out a suit filed by two of the three joint administrators, citing a lack of locus standi due to the absence of their co-administrator, Mr. Kabwa Ibrahim.

The Court reaffirmed the principle that joint administrators must act in unison and that any deviation from this statutory requirement undermines the legal standing to sue on behalf of the estate.

Facts

The suit was initially brought by three plaintiffs, Kabwa Ibrahim, Ganya Florence, and Balinda John, against the Defendant, Twinomujuini Eric. The plaintiffs sought various reliefs, including declarations that the suit land formed part of the estate of the late Mukatayali Cecilia and that the Defendant was a trespasser.

Subsequently, Mr. Kabwa Ibrahim, the first plaintiff, withdrew from the suit by filing a letter dated 19th June 2023, expressing loss of interest. The Court allowed the withdrawal without costs and directed the remaining plaintiffs to amend the plaint. On 19th April 2024, an amended plaint was filed with only the two remaining plaintiffs proceeding as administrators.

At the hearing, the Defendant’s counsel raised preliminary objections to the amended plaint, citing procedural irregularities and lack of joint participation by all administrators.

⚖️ Issues Raised & Submissions

1. Whether the substitution of parties in the amended plaint without leave of the court rendered the suit defective

Counsel for the Defendant argued that the Plaintiffs substituted parties without seeking court leave, violating Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules. They had originally sued as beneficiaries, not as administrators, and now improperly introduced a new capacity.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs’ responded that the case was always about the estate and that their administrative role was acknowledged in pleadings and the Defendant’s own submissions.

They contended no substitution had occurred that would require court leave.

2. Whether the suit is defective for being brought by only two of the three joint administrators

The Defendant argued , citing Section 268 of the Succession Act and the Supreme Court decision in Silver Byaruhanga v. Fr. Emmanuel Ruvugwaho & Anor, SCCA No. 09 of 2014, Counsel argued that joint administrators must act jointly at all times. Proceeding without one of them invalidates the suit.

In response, Counsel for the Plaintiffs invoked Section 268(1) (formerly Section 272), arguing that where there are multiple administrators, any one of them may act in the absence of express contrary directions.

They submitted that this was a continuation of the original suit filed jointly and that the missing co-administrator had withdrawn without reasonable explanation, possibly under suspicious circumstances.

🧾 Court’s Determination

The Court upheld both preliminary objections. It held that:

Substituting parties without leave of court rendered the amended plaint procedurally defective.

The Court firmly rejected the Plaintiffs’ position and emphasized that:

“Section 268(1) of the Succession Act does not allow joint administrators to act singly. Acting without all joint administrators would defeat the purpose for which they were jointly appointed.”

As joint administrators are legal representatives of the deceased and must exercise their powers collectively unless the law or grant provides otherwise.

In reinforcing its position, the Court quoted extensively from  Silver Byaruhanga v. Fr. Emmanuel Ruvugwaho & Anor, SCCA No. 09 of 2014,:

“When there are several executors or administrators, the powers of all may, in the absence of any direction to the contrary, be exercised by any one of them who has proved the will or taken out administration… However, in the case of executors or administrators who have jointly applied… and obtained the grant simultaneously or all together, they must act jointly at all times… Otherwise it would defeat the purpose for appointing joint executors or administrators.”

The Court also invoked the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa decision in Henry De Souza Figueiredo v. George Blacquere Talbot & Anor [1962] EA 167, where a lease transaction carried out by only one joint executor was declared ineffective for lack of joint participation.

Order 31 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules was invoked to underline the procedural requirement that all administrators must be joined in suits brought on behalf of the estate.

The High Court therefore held that the withdrawal of one administrator broke the chain of joint legal representation, and the two remaining administrators lacked locus standi to sustain the claim on behalf of the estate.

📌 Conclusion

The High Court struck out the suit for want of locus standi, affirming that joint administrators cannot unilaterally prosecute or sustain a suit without the active involvement of all co-administrators. However, no costs were awarded as the defect arose from the voluntary withdrawal of one of the administrators.

🔗 Key Takeaway

Joint representation must mean joint action. 

Administrators intending to litigate on behalf of an estate must ensure that all appointed administrators are actively involved or have taken out administration at different times under clear legal direction. Failure to do so may result in fatal procedural defects.

Commentary

❓ Unanswered but Emerging Concern: What if One Administrator Withholds Consent or Frustrates the Suit?

While the Court adopted a strict legal approach in striking out the suit for want of joint action, a critical practical question remains: What happens where one of the joint administrators deliberately withholds consent or frustrates the conduct of a suit on behalf of the estate?

The ruling did not address this head-on, but its implications are far-reaching. It show the vulnerability of estate administration where deadlock among co-administrators can derail the enforcement or protection of estate interests, particularly where no legal mechanism is in place to resolve such disagreement or replace an uncooperative administrator.

The Court rightly relied on Section 268(1) of the Succession Act, which mandates joint action by co-administrators, but the judgment is likely to influence how future grants of letters of administration are structured.

Practitioners and litigants may now be more cautious about applying for joint grants unless the parties involved can genuinely cooperate.

A further legal pathway arises under Section 230(d) of the Succession Act Cap 268, which provides that a grant may be revoked where it has become inoperative. A co-administrator’s withdrawal from legal proceedings, especially if done to frustrate the estate’s interests, could be construed as rendering the grant ineffective.

However, this raises a procedural paradox: if only one or two administrators apply for revocation, do they have the requisite locus standi to bring such an application without the consent of the third? The ruling reinforces that they likely do not.

Although the Court was bound to apply the law as it stands, especially the mandatory joint action requirement under Section 268(1), this judgment is likely to shape future applications for grants of letters of administration.

We may now see more administrators or their counsel seek express court directions, or even apply for severance or revocation of a joint grant where cooperation becomes impossible.

In effect, this decision may catalyse reform in how courts approach contested or dysfunctional estate administration, especially in cases involving land and intergenerational wealth disputes.

Though the law preserves the residual responsibility in such cases with the Administrator General, particularly where disputes among joint administrators render the administration of the estate unworkable.

This reserve role may become increasingly important as such conflicts grow more common.

In light of this, we are likely to see a rise in applications seeking:

1. Court directions to resolve deadlock among administrators;

2. Severance or revocation of joint grants;

3. Substitution by the Administrator General in contentious or abandoned estate matters.

   
   

This ruling is expected to shape both legal strategy and administrative practice in estate litigation moving forward. It might catalyse reforms in how courts handle dysfunctional grants and redefine the role of the Administrator General as a stabilizing force in contested administration.

Read the full case below

Ganya and Another v Twinomujuini 2025 UGHC 445 (19 June 2025).pdf

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