High Court at Kabale Finds Law Graduate Guilty of Direct and Indirect Criminal Contempt for Accepting a Bribe to Falsely Claim an Accused Person Was Hospitalized and Unable to Attend Court.

Jul 24

7 min read

FACTS

On 23 February 2026, the Chief Magistrates Court at Kabale, in a judgment dated 18 November 2025 and authored by Her Worship Milly Chandiru (now on study leave), convicted Mr. Angelo Bagorogoza in Criminal Case No. 130 of 2022 on one count of theft and one count of obtaining money by false pretences, involving a sum of UGX 440,000,000. Mr. Bagorogoza was absent when judgment was delivered, and sentence could not accordingly be passed.

On 15 April 2026, Mr. Bagorogoza (the “applicant”) filed Criminal Revision No. 02 of 2026 in the High Court, alleging that the complainants had obtained a copy of the judgment before it was delivered in court. The application was fixed for hearing on 17 June 2026, with an express direction made in open court, in the presence of counsel for both the applicant and the respondent, that all parties were to attend on the hearing date.

When the matter was called on 17 June 2026, Mr. Ntare Adens (the “accused”/“contemnor”) was present in court. He was unaware that the applicant was by then jointly represented by M/S Ahamark Advocates and M/S Lukwago and Co Advocates, who had filed a notice of joint instructions on 14 May 2026. Mr. Ntare informed court orally that the applicant was confined at Mbarara Community Hospital and could not attend, and then attempted to give evidence from the court gallery. Court directed that his conduct be investigated by the Police, handed him to Detective Cpl. Bazibu Henry of the Kigezi Region, and adjourned the matter to 18 June 2026.

On 18 June 2026, Det. Bazibu reported to court that Mr. Ntare, in his recorded statement, admitted travelling with a person known as “Prosper” to meet the applicant, described as Prosper's uncle, at Mbarara Community Hospital. There, he was handed documents to deliver to the Kabale High Court on the hearing date, for a fee of UGX 500,000, of which he received UGX 200,000 as a down payment, with a further UGX 100,000 payable on completion. In executing this task, he arrived at the High Court accompanied by a woman he had met at Skyline Motel in Kabale, who disappeared once he was referred to the Police for statement recording and whose phone has since remained switched off.

When given an opportunity to address court, Mr. Ntare expressed remorse and admitted that he had met the applicant outside the hospital gates, that both had arrived at the venue fully ambulatory and without any obvious illness, and that he had sought the money to buy a shirt for his graduation from the Law Development Centre at Mbarara. His conduct frustrated the hearing of both Criminal Revision Application No. 002 of 2026 and Civil Suit No. 019 of 2025, which had been fixed for the same day. He was remanded to Ndorwa Government Prison on 17 June 2026 and remained there until the ruling.

LEGAL REPRESENTATION

The ruling was delivered on 15 July 2026 in the presence of Ms. Julie Najjunju, Senior State Attorney, appearing for the Learned Director of Public Prosecutions; Mr. Allan Tumwesigye, who held a watching brief; and ASP Emong Alex of Ndorwa Government Prison, who appeared for Mr. Ntare Adens together with Mr. Kaburura Pidson of Greystone Advocates, counsel for the contemnor.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

Prosecution

Counsel for the prosecution relied on section 94(2) and (3) of the Penal Code Act, Cap 128, submitting that this provision governed sentencing and prescribed either a fine not exceeding 2 currency points or a custodial sentence not exceeding one month. The prosecution urged the court to impose a deterrent sentence, submitting that this was necessary so that no other would-be offender would take the court for granted.

Counsel Holding a Watching Brief

Counsel appearing on a watching brief associated himself with the submissions of the Learned State Attorney and prayed for the same order.

Defence

Counsel for the contemnor submitted that Mr. Ntare had been remorseful in court and had explained to court the circumstances in which he came to appear before it. Counsel submitted that he was a first offender of good character, and that he had already spent close to a month on remand. On this basis, counsel prayed that court impose a custodial sentence limited to time already spent on remand. Counsel had nothing to add in rejoinder.

COURT'S FINDINGS

On the first issue, the court reiterated the Supreme Court's definition of contempt as restated in Kizito v Nsubuga & 6 Others (Civil Application 25 of 2021; Civil Application 26 of 2021) [2022] UGSC 6, itself drawing on In re Ivan Samuel Sebadduka, arising from Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2021, which approved the reasoning in Johnson v Grant [1923] AC 789 at 790

An offence consists in interfering with the administration of the law; in impeding and perverting the course of justice. It is not the dignity of court which is offended, a petty and misleading view of the issues involved, it is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged. Johnson v Grant [1923] AC 789 at 790

The court observed that this passage located the essence of contempt in the interference with, and perversion of, the course of justice, rather than in any affront to judicial dignity. Applying this to the facts, the court found that Mr. Ntare, acting for the applicant, had disrupted the hearing of Criminal Revision No. 002 of 2026 and Civil Suit No. 19 of 2025 after receiving monetary consideration to frustrate the proceedings, and that it was immaterial that he had not received the full sum promised.

The court further found that he had committed perjury by falsely representing to the court that the applicant was indisposed and hospitalised, a fact he knew to be false, and that his conduct was intended solely to obstruct justice, there being no other demonstrable interest of his own in the underlying matters.

The court also referred to the definition of criminal contempt in Halsbury's Laws of England, as adopted in the same Supreme Court authority

Criminal Contempt, consisting of words or acts which impede or interfere with the administration of justice, or which create a substantial risk that the course of justice will be seriously impeded or prejudiced. Halsbury's Laws of England, cited in Kizito v Nsubuga & 6 Others

On this basis, the court held that the conduct fell within the broader category of obstruction of justice, identifying its principal elements as the presentation of fabricated documents, the provision of false information to court, and the aiding of a fugitive from justice to evade court process. Because these acts occurred in court, the court held that the contempt was criminal rather than civil in character, and found that the accused's conduct amounted to criminal contempt of court.

On the appropriate remedies, the court noted that the Supreme Court in the Sebadduka decision had explained the rationale for contempt proceedings in the following terms:

That the sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give the courts the power to effectively protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented. In re Ivan Samuel Sebadduka

The court also cited the observation of Senoga J. in Kabale University v Rwaganika and Anor (Appeal No. 7 of 2016) [2017] UGHCEBD 11, itself following Wildlife Lodges Ltd v County Council of Narok & Another [2005] EA 344 (HCK):

A court of law never acts in vain and as such, issues touching on contempt take precedence over any other case or invocation of the jurisdiction of court. Kabale University v Rwaganika and Anor (Appeal No. 7 of 2016) [2017] UGHCEBD 11

The court held that this authority established two requirements: first, that contempt proceedings must always be given priority over other matters; and second, that the alleged contemnor must be afforded a right to be heard in those proceedings.

The court found that both requirements were satisfied, noting that it had halted all other proceedings in the related matters to determine the contempt issue first, and that Mr. Ntare had been given the opportunity to address court on 18 June and 1 July 2026.

The court then considered the distinction between direct and indirect contempt, adopting the observation of Kavuma J. in Isaac Kimaze Ssemakadde v Mugisha Hashim Mugisha (Miscellaneous Application No. 137 of 2025) [2025] UGHCCD 178:

Criminal contempt, on the other hand, can either be in the form of direct or indirect contempt of court. Direct contempt is that contempt that is committed in the face of court, that is in the presence or so near the court or judge to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings, while indirect contempt is committed not in the immediate presence of the court and requires formal proceedings for its imposition. Isaac Kimaze Ssemakadde v Mugisha Hashim Mugisha (Misc. Application No. 137 of 2025) [2025] UGHCCD 178

The court linked this distinction to the rationale for punishing contempt set out by Mubiru J. in Florence Dawaru v Angumale Albino and another, HCMA 0096 of 2016, who had stated that contempt of court occurs where a person seeks to interfere with or subvert court process by failing to follow court orders or abusing court process. The court added that the presence of direct and/or indirect contempt should be reflected both in the court's findings and in the sentence imposed.

Applying this distinction, the court found that Mr. Ntare had knowingly made false statements to court in the face of the court and in the presence of the judge, amounting to direct contempt, and had separately demanded and received money to appear in court and present knowingly false information for the purpose of obstructing justice, conduct which had originated outside the immediate presence of the court and so amounted to indirect contempt. The court held that his conduct met the ingredients of both direct and indirect contempt.

HOLDING

The court found Mr. Ntare Adens guilty of both direct and indirect criminal contempt of court.

On sentencing, the court noted that section 94(2) and (3) of the Penal Code Act, Cap 128, prescribe either a fine not exceeding 2 currency points or a custodial sentence not exceeding one month as the guiding principle. Having regard to the contemnor's remorse, his status as a first offender of good character, and the 27 days he had already spent on remand, the court sentenced him to a term equivalent to time served 27 days) and ordered his immediate release.

Read the full decision

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Receiving payment to frustrate court proceedings, misleading the court, or assisting litigants to evade judicial proceedings constitutes criminal contempt.
Knowingly providing false information directly to the court is sufficient to constitute direct contempt, irrespective of whether the intended deception succeeds.
Where conduct begins outside court through planning and payment, but culminates in false representations before the judge, both forms of contempt may arise simultaneously.
The Court reaffirmed that allegations of contempt should ordinarily be determined before substantive proceedings continue, ensuring that the administration of justice is first protected.
Although contempt strikes at the administration of justice, courts will still consider mitigating factors such as remorse, a guilty admission, first-offender status, and time spent on remand when determining sentence.