High Court at Kabale Dismisses Application for Criminal Revision; Holds That Where a Party Challenges the Trial Court’s Evaluation of Evidence, the Proper Remedy Is an Appeal
Introduction
The High Court at Kabale has reaffirmed the supervisory and limited nature of the High Court’s criminal revision jurisdiction, holding that revision cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal where an accused person merely challenges the trial court’s evaluation of evidence or disagrees with its findings.
The Court considered an application by Twinomuhangi Angello Bagorogoza, an accused person in Criminal Case No. 130 of 2022 before the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Kabale, seeking revision and setting aside of his conviction on allegations that the criminal proceedings and judgment were affected by serious procedural irregularities.
Among the central complaints was an allegation that the complainant had obtained possession of the trial court’s judgment before it was formally delivered, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the authenticity and integrity of the judgment.
The High Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had failed to establish the statutory threshold for criminal revision under Sections 48, 50 and 51 of the Criminal Procedure Code Act. The Court further held that the applicant’s complaints concerning the trial court’s assessment of evidence were properly matters for an appeal, particularly because no appeal had been lodged.
The decision explains the circumstances in which the High Court may exercise its supervisory revisionary jurisdiction and emphasises that revision is supervisory rather than appellate or adjudicative in nature.
Facts of the Case
The Applicant, Twinomuhangi Angello Bagorogoza, was an accused person in Criminal Case No. 130 of 2022 before the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Kabale. He faced charges of theft and obtaining money by false pretences. The complainants were Mr. Turyahikayo Rweihunga Godfrey and Hon. Paula Mary Turyahikayo.
The Applicant stated that between 2020 and 2021 he served as a political assistant and chief campaigner of the second complainant. According to him, one of his responsibilities was supervising construction of the second complainant’s property at Nyabikoni, Kabale Municipality, a project which he valued at approximately UGX 2.5 billion.
The complainants subsequently instituted Civil Suit No. 020 of 2022, alongside the criminal proceedings, with the criminal case alleging that the Applicant had obtained approximately UGX 440 million by false pretences. The Applicant relied on the dismissal of the civil suit, which he contended demonstrated a lack of cause of action and a lack of nexus between the alleged money transfer and the suit land.
The criminal proceedings, however, continued.
During the criminal trial, the trial magistrate, Her Worship Milly Chandiru, reportedly made a finding that the prosecution had established a prima facie case. She subsequently proceeded to Ireland for further studies before delivering judgment.
The case file was subsequently allocated to Her Worship Aziza Nyevu for purposes of delivering the judgment.
Judgment was eventually delivered on 23 February 2026, and the Applicant was convicted. At the time of the revision application, sentencing had not yet been concluded. The Applicant challenged the process on several grounds.
First, he alleged that the judgment was not authentic because it bore the date 18 November 2025, although the magistrate who authored it was already in Ireland for further studies.
Second, he alleged that the complainant had been in possession of the judgment before its formal delivery and had allegedly celebrated his impending conviction on social media.
Third, he challenged aspects of the trial court’s evaluation of evidence, including what he considered an erroneous finding regarding a sum of money deposited on 14 April 2020, which he argued was not the transaction forming the basis of the charge sheet.
Fourth, he complained that judgment was delivered in his absence despite an objection by his advocates.
The Applicant therefore asked the High Court to call for and examine the criminal proceedings, revise them and set aside the conviction.
Issues
The Court, after hearing a preliminary objection from the Respondent, framed a single issue
Whether the application raises grounds for criminal revision?
Legal Representation
The Applicant was represented by M/S Lukwago & Co. Advocates (did not appear at the June 2026 hearing); at the judgment-reading stage, Mr. Solomon Atiba held brief for Ms. Patience Nasiima and Mr. Justus Muhangi.
The Respondent was represented by the Director of Public Prosecutions. At delivery of the ruling, Ms. Julie Najjunju, Senior State Attorney, Kabale, appeared for the Respondent, with Mr. Allan Tumwesigye on watching brief.
Submissions
Respondent (Director of Public Prosecutions)
The Respondent raised a preliminary objection that the application was barred by Section 50(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code Act, since the grievances raised (particularly the challenge to the court's evaluation of evidence in paragraph 19 of the Applicant's affidavit) were properly appeal matters, not revision matters.
Counsel relied on Semule Joel v Uganda, Criminal Revision Cause No. 20 of 2020, for the proposition that a decision a party merely disagrees with does not become illegal or irregular for that reason, and that where irregularities alleged relate to the trial court's decision rather than its proceedings, the remedy lies in appeal rather than revision.
Applicant
The Applicant did not appear at the hearing on 16 June 2026, nor did his counsel, M/S Lukwago & Co. Advocates. The court proceeded on the basis of written submissions and the record, including the Applicant's affidavit and annexed exhibits (the civil suit decree, the decree striking out related miscellaneous causes, the impugned judgment, an undated WhatsApp message, and a bank statement).
The Applicant alleged that the complainant already possessed the judgment before its formal delivery. According to him, this was not merely an evidentiary complaint but a matter going to the integrity and legality of the judicial process itself.
The Applicant argued that, if proved, prior possession of the judgment by a complainant could justify nullifying the proceedings.
The Applicant questioned the authenticity of the judgment because it was dated 18 November 2025, yet the magistrate who had conducted the trial was allegedly in Ireland by that time.
He therefore contended that the judgment lacked authenticity, legal finality and evidentiary credibility.
The Applicant also challenged the trial magistrate's evaluation of the evidence.
He argued that the trial court had made findings concerning an alleged sum deposited on 14 April 2020, notwithstanding his contention that the transaction was not the one contained in the charge sheet.
He further alleged that there were material discrepancies in the evidence that had not been properly addressed.
The Applicant complained that judgment had been delivered on 23 February 2026 in his absence and despite his counsel's objection. He contended that this violated the requirement that an accused person be present throughout criminal proceedings.
Taken together, the Applicant argued that these matters demonstrated serious procedural irregularities capable of undermining the entire trial and therefore justified the High Court's intervention through revision.
Respondent’s Submissions
The Respondent, represented by the Director of Public Prosecutions, opposed the application. The Respondent characterised the application as frivolous, an abuse of court process and improperly before the High Court. The Respondent argued that the Applicant's complaints concerning the trial court's evaluation of evidence were matters that could properly be addressed through an appeal.
The Respondent relied on Section 50(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code Act, which provides:
“Any person aggrieved by any finding, sentence or order made or imposed by a Magistrate’s Court may petition the High Court to exercise its powers of revision under this section; but no such petition shall be entertained where the petitioner could have appealed against the finding, sentence or order and has not appealed.”
The Respondent argued that because the Applicant was essentially challenging the trial court's findings and assessment of evidence, his proper remedy was an appeal rather than revision.
The Respondent relied on Semule Joel v Uganda, Criminal Revision Cause No. 20 of 2020, where the High Court held:
“the decision of a judicial officer however wrong it might seem does not become illegal or irregular simply because a party does not agree with it.”
The Court in Semule Joel further held that where the alleged irregularities merely attack the decision of the trial magistrate rather than the regularity of the proceedings, the proper remedy lies in appeal and not revision.
The Respondent argued that the judgment was authentic because it was delivered in open court and certified by the Chief Magistrate. The copies attached by both parties were substantially identical.
The Respondent maintained that the Applicant had been notified of the date for delivery of judgment and that his counsel was present when judgment was delivered.
It was therefore argued that the Applicant could not rely on his personal absence to invalidate the judgment.
Court's Findings
The Court observed that Sections 48, 50, and 51 of the Criminal Procedure Code Act, and Section 17(1) of the Judicature Act, read together define the High Court's supervisory (not adjudicatory) revisionary jurisdiction over magistrates' courts.
On the scope of revision, the Court cited Section 48, which empowers the High Court to call for and examine records "for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings." The Court found that, as no sentence had yet been passed, there was nothing to which a revision application could properly attach under this section.
On the merits of the Application, the Court applied Section 50(1), which permits intervention only where "an error material to the merits of any case or involving a miscarriage of justice has occurred." The Court also noted the fair-hearing safeguards in Sections 50(2) and 51, referencing the Constitutional Court's holding in Adrian Jjuuko v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 1 of 2009, that "the right to a fair hearing is a fundamental right guaranteed by our constitution under Article 28."
On the bar against using revision as a substitute for appeal, the Court relied on Section 50(5) and reaffirmed the reasoning in Semule Joel v Uganda, quoting that "the decision of a judicial officer, however wrong it might seem does not become illegal or irregular simply because a party does not agree with it," and that where the irregularities cited "merely attack the decision of a trial Magistrate," the remedy "does not lie in Revision but rather in an appeal process."
The Court also invoked Uganda v Lule Reagan Alfred, Criminal Revision No. 38 of 2025, for the principle that these provisions, read with the Judicature Act, "establish the High Court's supervisory role, a mechanism for correcting material errors and preventing miscarriages of justice that the ordinary appeal process may not address," underscoring that revision is not a route for re-arguing the merits.
Applying this to the case at hand, the Court made several key factual and legal findings. The Court first observed that Judgment was delivered on 23 February 2026 in the Applicant's absence but in the presence of his counsel; sentencing remains pending, leaving nothing for the Court to enhance or reverse under Section 50(1)(a) or (b).
Furthermore, the Chief Magistrate Kabale had issued certified true copies of the judgment to both parties on 23 February 2026, and the Applicant's and Respondent's exhibited copies showed no discernible differences.
The Court also noted that the Applicant again failed to appear at the June 2026 hearing, claiming to be hospitalised, while related contempt proceedings (In re Ntare Ademis, HCT-11-CR-MC-0021-2026) found that his associate had, in fact, been fully ambulatory and healthy, undermining the credibility of his non-appearance and, by extension, his broader factual narrative.
The Applicant's complaints about the trial court's evaluation of evidence fell squarely within the Semule principle and were not properly before the Court on revision, particularly as no appeal had been filed.
The Court emphasised that "a miscarriage of justice occurs when an accused person is punished for a crime they have not committed," and that no such substantiated illegality, impropriety, or material error had been shown.
The Court held that;
“Lastly, revision is a supervisory not an adjudicating power.”
The Court relied on Uganda v Lule Reagan Alfred, Criminal Revision No. 38 of 2025 [2026] UGHCCRD 33, where the High Court observed:
“Read together with Section 17(1) of the Judicature Act, these provisions establish the High Court’s supervisory role, a mechanism for correcting material errors and preventing miscarriages of justice that the ordinary appeal process may not address.”
The implication is that revision exists primarily to enable the High Court to supervise subordinate courts and correct serious defects in the administration of criminal justice.
It is not intended to provide an alternative appellate route for a party dissatisfied with the outcome of a trial.
The Applicant alleged that the judgment was inauthentic because it was dated 18 November 2025, although the original trial magistrate was on study leave in Ireland.
The High Court rejected this complaint. The Court considered the fact that the Chief Magistrate had certified the judgment and delivered a certified true copy to both parties.
The Court found that;
“I find this complaint self-resolving by the certification of the Chief Magistrate Kabale who delivered a certified true copy of the judgment to both of the parties to this application on February 23, 2026.”
The Court further observed:
“Each of the parties has attached a copy of the same, Applicant and Respondent copies, listed as Exhibit B and G by the two parties don’t have any discernible differences.”
Accordingly, the Court found no sufficient basis to invalidate the judgment merely based on the date appearing on it.
14. No Sentence Had Been Passed
The Court also found that no sentence had yet been imposed.
Consequently, there was no sentence to enhance under Section 50(1)(a).
The Court expressly stated:
“Third, I find that no sentence has been passed to be enhanced under Section 50(1)(a); or any basis to reverse the conviction of the application under Section 50(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code Act.”
This reinforced the Court's conclusion that the application was not properly framed within the statutory revisionary jurisdiction.
The Court further explained that because no appeal had been preferred, it would be inappropriate for the High Court to make detailed findings on the merits of those complaints in a revision application.
The Court stated:
“And as no appeal has been preferred, it would be prejudicial to make any detailed commentary on them, as an appeal from the lower court would lie to this court.”
The court observed that a party cannot ordinarily disguise an appeal as a revision application.
Where the complaint is essentially the trial magistrate misunderstood the evidence; the trial magistrate believed the wrong witness; the trial magistrate drew the wrong inference; the trial magistrate misappreciated a transaction; the trial magistrate reached the wrong factual conclusion; or the trial court's decision was simply wrong,
the ordinary remedy is appeal, rather than revision.
The Court nevertheless emphasised that allegations of miscarriage of justice in criminal proceedings must be taken seriously.
The Court stated:
“Before taking leave of this matter, an allegation of miscarriage of justice is not one to be taken lightly especially in criminal matters.”
The Court explained the concept in substantive terms:
“A miscarriage of justice occurs when an accused person is punished for a crime they have not committed.”
The Court further stressed:
“A decision of a trial court must be based on evidence carefully considered before it.”
Thus, while the Court declined to intervene in the present case, it acknowledged that the revision jurisdiction remains an important safeguard against serious injustice.
Holding
The application for criminal revision was dismissed. The Court held that it did not meet the threshold under Section 50(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code Act, as no substantiated allegation of illegality, error material to the merits, impropriety, or miscarriage of justice had been established.
The Court ordered;
The application for criminal revision is dismissed.
All orders of the lower court, including the outstanding warrant of arrest for the Applicant, are maintained.
Criminal Case No. 130 of 2022 (referenced in the order as "130 of 2021") is returned to the Chief Magistrate's Court at Kabale to conclude proceedings, including sentencing.
No order as to costs.
Read the full decision below
Key Takeaways
1. Revision is not a substitute for appeal
The most important principle from the decision is that a party cannot invoke revision simply because they disagree with the trial court's findings. Where the complaint concerns the evaluation of evidence or correctness of factual findings, the appropriate remedy is ordinarily an appeal.
2. Revision is supervisory in nature
The High Court's revision jurisdiction is designed to supervise subordinate courts and correct:
illegality;
material errors;
impropriety;
procedural irregularity; and
miscarriages of justice.
It is not intended to provide a second opportunity to re-argue the merits of a case.
3. Section 50(5) creates an important limitation
A person who could have appealed against a finding, sentence or order but has not appealed will ordinarily be barred from pursuing revision in respect of that same grievance. Litigants should therefore carefully identify the proper procedural remedy before filing an application.
4. Serious procedural irregularities may still justify revision
The Court acknowledged that:
“if true and proved to the satisfaction of court [it] would be basis for nullifying court proceedings.”
Therefore, not every revision application is barred simply because an appeal is available.
A genuine and substantiated allegation of a fundamental procedural irregularity may still trigger the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction.
5. Allegations must be properly substantiated
A serious allegation of judicial impropriety cannot rest on speculation, WhatsApp messages or unsupported assertions. Where an applicant alleges that the integrity of judicial proceedings has been compromised, the allegation must be supported by sufficiently credible evidence capable of satisfying the Court.
6. The distinction between an error of law and disagreement with a decision matters
The ruling reinforces the principle that a wrong decision is not automatically an illegal or irregular decision. The Court relied on Semule Joel v Uganda for the proposition that the fact that a party considers a judicial decision wrong does not, by itself, transform the decision into an illegality or procedural irregularity.
7. The absence of a sentence may affect the scope of revision
The Court noted that the Applicant had been convicted but had not yet been sentenced. Consequently, there was no sentence to consider under Section 50(1)(a).
This demonstrates the importance of carefully identifying the particular finding, order or sentence being challenged and the precise statutory provision under which the High Court is being invited to intervene.
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