Kabale High Court Acquits Six on Murder and Aggravated Robbery Says Motive Alone Cannot Prove Murder and Last Seen Doctrine Fails Where Prosecution Evidence Contradicts Scene of Death.

Facts

On 17 February 2024 at around 0300 hrs in Nyakalembe village, Bukimbiri Sub-county, Kisoro District, the deceased Sunday Callist was allegedly called from his house by A1 (Monday Ezra).

He left with A1, A2 (Arineitwe Thomas alias Butunuzi), and A3 (Bagyenyi Ronald), and was later seen with A4 (Agaba Valentine Bariburuh e alias Binaisa). His body was found three hours later at around 0600 hrs, dumped in the middle of the road about 100 metres from his home, with severe head injuries. A post-mortem (PEX 10) confirmed death by severe head injury.

The prosecution alleged A4 was the mastermind who executed the murder jointly with the other accused. In the aggravated robbery count, it was alleged that the deceased’s Techno mobile phone (with two SIM cards) was robbed from him during the killing.

One SIM (0776594517) was recovered from A7 (Barack Pascal), and another from A8 (who had already pleaded guilty). A6 (a minor) had proceedings discontinued due to illegal detention.

Legal representation

1. For the Prosecution: Mr. Christopher Ainomugisha, State Attorney, Kabale (Director of Public Prosecutions)

2. For A1, A2, A3, A5 & A7: Mr. Rogers Nabaasa

3. For A4: Mr. Mark Mwesigye

The main issue for court's determination was;

Whether sufficient evidence has been made out in court that the accused person committed the above offences.

Submissions of the parties

Prosecution submitted

Counsel argued that the last seen doctrine applied against A1, A2, A3 and A4, relying on Busingye Paul & Ampereza Lawrence v Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 048 of 2022, which holds that the person last seen with the deceased bears full responsibility for his death.

Counsel further cited s. 133 of the Evidence Act to the effect that no minimum number of witnesses is required to prove a particular fact, and argued that voice identification is permissible, referencing Sabwe Abdu v Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2007. Prosecution also argued the doctrine of recent possession against A7. Counsel conceded there were gaps in corroboration of key evidence.

Defence (A1, A2, A3, A5 & A7) submitted

Counsel attacked the quality of identification evidence, arguing the prosecution had relied on voice identification rather than visual identification in light. Counsel further argued that the duty lay on the prosecution to explain how the deceased met his death, where the last seen doctrine was invoked.

Counsel cited Rananlal T. Bhatt v R [1957] EA 332 for the proposition that a prima facie case cannot be established on a mere scintilla of evidence or discredited prosecution testimony.

Defence (A4) submitted

Counsel attacked the evidence generally as weak and full of contradictions. Counsel noted the absence of relevant direct evidence and the failure of any alleged murder weapon to incriminate A4.

Counsel referenced Uganda v Mulwo Amanathan, Criminal Case No. 103 of 2008 for the principle that a prima facie case does not mean a case proved beyond reasonable doubt.

COURT FINDINGS

The court applied the principle in Rananlal T. Bhatt v R [1957] EA 332, which defines a prima facie case as one where a reasonable tribunal, properly directing its mind to the law and the evidence, could convict if no explanation is offered by the defence. However, if the evidence is manifestly unreliable or discredited, it is insufficient to require the accused to defend themselves.

The court reaffirmed the constitutional presumption of innocence under Article 28 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, which provides that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

It further emphasized that under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, Cap 8, the burden of proof lies entirely on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. This principle was also highlighted in DPP v Woolmington, where the court held that the burden of proof remains on the prosecution.

Section 74 of the Trial on Indictments Act mandates acquittal if, at the close of the prosecution’s case, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction.

The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence. The court noted that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient, it must be such that it excludes all other reasonable hypotheses consistent with the innocence of the accused.

The court found that the prosecution failed to place the eight accused at the scene of the crime. None of the witnesses could positively identify Monday Ezra (A1) or the others as the assailants.

Citing Uganda v Dr. Aggrey Kiyingi and 2 Others (2006), the court held that where the evidence is manifestly unreliable or discredited, it is insufficient to put the accused on their defence.

Regarding the mobile phone (described as the prosecution’s “smoking gun”), the court analyzed it in light of Section 101 of the Evidence Act and the doctrine of recent possession. It held that a gap of several weeks for a highly portable and tradable item like a phone does not create an inescapable inference of guilt. Additionally, under Section 8 of the Electronic Transactions Act, a broken chain of custody rendered the exhibit unreliable.

On joinder of accused persons, the court referred to Section 22 of the Trial on Indictments Act, which allows persons to be charged and tried together only if they are accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction, or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction. To join eight people in one trial for murder and aggravated robbery, the prosecution must prove a community of purpose linking all eight to the specific criminal event.

The court observed that the evidence against each accused was disparate and unrelated. For example, Monday Ezra was linked via a phone recovered weeks later, while others were linked only through vague “last seen” sightings. Citing Nassolo v Uganda, the court held that where there is no evidence of a common plan, trying multiple suspects together constitutes a misjoinder that can lead to quashing of a conviction.

The court held that joining all eight persons without a clear evidentiary link created “legal noise”, making it difficult for each accused to defend their specific role. As established in Anyangu and Others v Republic [1968] EA 239, a misjoinder that embarrasses the accused in their defence results in a miscarriage of justice, which is a fatal irregularity.

These resolutions formed the legal basis for the court’s finding of no sufficient evidence and the subsequent acquittal of all accused persons under Section 74(1) of the Trial on Indictments Act.

Read the full decision below

Uganda v Monday Ezra and 7 others 31-3-2026.rtf

Download RTF • 1.87MB

Key takeaways

①

Proof of participation by each accused person is an indispensable ingredient and must be independently established on the evidence, not inferred solely from motive or animosity.

②

Where the prosecution's own witnesses (medical officer and investigating officer) question whether the deceased died at the scene, the doctrine of last seen cannot carry the evidentiary burden on its own.

③

When determining matters of aggravated Robbery, the Courts will require evidence that the stolen item was on the victim at the material time, that it was taken by force, and that each accused was connected to that act of force, not mere subsequent possession.

④

This case reaffirms the principle of the doctrine of recent possession as per Mbazira Siragi v Uganda (SCCA No. 7 of 2004), a credible explanation of innocent possession rebuts the presumption, particularly where there is no other evidence linking the possessor to the crime.

⑤

The court flagged that joining accused persons who have no nexus to a particular count causes a miscarriage of justice, highlighting the prosecution's duty to charge only those with a demonstrable common intention.

⑥

Poor Forensic evidence undermines the prosecution case, in this case the colour mismatch between the exhibited coat and the description on PF-17A was treated as discrediting prosecution evidence, underscoring the importance of accurate exhibit documentation throughout the chain of custody.

⑦

Voice identification is permissible but must be corroborated.

While Sabwe Abdu v Uganda (SCCA No. 10 of 2007) permits voice identification, standing alone it was insufficient here to meet the threshold of sufficient evidence, particularly where the witness's own prior statement contained contradictions.

BY:

NAME; MUHINDO SIMON BUYINGO

Email: simonmuhindo74@gmail.com

Legal scholar at Kampala International University