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“Capitalisation of Accrued Interest Under a Shareholder Loan Constitutes “Payment” Within Ss 47(2) & 2(xx) of the ITA; Withholding Tax Arises at the Point of Capitalisation, Not Upon Cash Remittance”.

“Capitalisation of Accrued Interest Under a Shareholder Loan Constitutes “Payment” Within Sections 47(2) and 2(xx) of the Income Tax Act; Withholding Tax Arises at the Point of Capitalisation, Not Upon Cash Remittance.” Court of Appeal Rules


Coram

Luswata, Byaruhanga-Rugyema, Alibateese, JJA (unanimous)

Legislation

Income Tax Act, Cap. 340/338 – Sections 2(xx), 47(1), 47(2); Netherlands-Uganda Tax Treaty

Subject Matter

Whether capitalisation of interest under a shareholder loan agreement constitutes 'payment' triggering withholding tax under Section 47(2) of the Income Tax Act

Overview

The Court of Appeal has unanimously dismissed the appeal in ATC Uganda Limited v Uganda Revenue Authority, holding that the capitalisation of accrued deferred interest under a shareholder loan agreement constitutes a "payment" within the meaning of Section 47(2) read together with Section 2(xx) of the Income Tax Act, Cap. 340. Accordingly, withholding tax obligations crystallise at the point of capitalisation and not at the point of actual cash remittance. This decision has significant implications for companies that have structured related-party loans with interest capitalisation mechanics.


Let's look at the decision.

Facts

In June 2012, ATC Uganda Limited, the"Appellant" obtained a seven-year shareholder loan of USD 124,536,227.35 from its parent company, Uganda Tower Interco B.V. ("UTI B.V."), a company incorporated in the Netherlands. The loan was advanced at 6.56% per annum to finance the acquisition of a communications tower business from MTN Uganda.


The material terms of the Shareholder Loan Agreement were as follows, Clause 3.3 – Initial Period (first 30 months from 29 June 2012), Interest accruing during each interest period would automatically be capitalised and added to the principal loan outstanding at the end of each interest period. No cash payment of interest was required during the initial period. Clause 3.4 Subsequent Period of the accrued interest would be payable in arrears on the last day of each interest period. However, where cash flow was insufficient to pay the entire accrued interest, the full accrued amount would automatically be capitalised and added to the principal loan.


In practice, ATC capitalised all interest accruing between 2012 and 2017 and added it to the outstanding principal. No withholding tax was remitted on the capitalised interest during this period. From February 2018 onwards, ATC began remitting cash to UTI B.V. in discharge of its interest obligation and paid withholding tax on those remittances.


Following an audit, Uganda Revenue Authority, the "Respondent" issued an assessment of UGX 24,232,558,369 against ATC as withholding tax on the capitalised accrued interest for the period 2012 to 2017, on the basis that the obligation to withhold tax arose at the time of capitalisation, not at the time of subsequent cash remittance.


Issues Before the Court

The Court of Appeal, as a second appellate court limited to questions of law under Section 29(2) of the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, Cap. 341, was called upon to determine the following questions of law;

  1. Whether the learned High Court Judge erroneously construed Section 47(2) of the Income Tax Act as an accrual provision and thereby wrongly concluded that capitalisation of interest constitutes a "payment" within the meaning of that section.

  2. Whether the learned High Court Judge erroneously relied on English case law, in disregard of the unique statutory context of the Income Tax Act, and consequently misconstrued the purpose and effect of Section 47(2) of the Income Tax Act.

  3. Whether the learned High Court Judge erred in law in holding that UTI B.V.'s books of account in the Netherlands could be relied upon as a basis to assess withholding tax under Uganda's Income Tax Act.


A preliminary point of law was also raised by URA, contending that Grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal raised mixed questions of law and fact, thereby falling outside the Court's second appellate jurisdiction.


Submissions

Appellant (ATC Uganda Limited)

Represented by Counsel Festus Akunobera and Counsel Stephen Kabuye of ABMAK Associates, Advocates & Legal Consultants.


On Grounds 1 & 2 regarding the Statutory Interpretation and Case Law

Counsel argued that the High Court misread the Paton case (Paton (Fenton's Trustee) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1938] ALL ER 786). Lord Atkin's judgment was the lead judgment of the House of Lords, not a dissenting judgment as the learned Judge had characterised it, and it held that capitalisation of interest did not constitute payment under the UK Income Tax Act.


Counsel submitted that the High Court's reliance on earlier English cases of Reddie v Williamson [1863] and IRC v Holder [1932], was also erroneous, as those cases had been distinguished and displaced by Paton.


Counsel submitted that Section 47(1) of the Income Tax Act embodies the accrual principle, while Section 47(2) is an express exception based on the cash basis principle that the obligation to withhold arises only when the interest is actually "paid". Interpreting both subsections as accrual provisions would render Section 47(2) redundant, contrary to the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be read as inoperative or surplusage.


Furthermore, Counsel submitted that the phrase "when paid" necessarily requires an actual discharge of the interest obligation through the movement of cash.


On Ground 3 regarding the use of Foreign Books of Account

Relying on Article 152(1) of the Constitution, Counsel submitted that tax can only be imposed by an Act of Parliament, and tax liability cannot arise simply because a foreign entity has recorded an obligation in its books under foreign law. The financial statements of UTI B.V., prepared under Dutch law, were irrelevant to whether a withholding tax obligation arose under Uganda's Income Tax Act.


Respondent (Uganda Revenue Authority)

Represented by Mr. Tonny Kalungi (Manager, Appeals) and Mr. Rodney Amanya Mishambi (Supervisor, Legal Services and Board Affairs).


Raised a Preliminary Objection

Counsel submitted that Grounds 1 and 2 raised mixed questions of law and fact, not pure questions of law, and should therefore be struck out. The grounds did not expressly assert an "error in law" as required. Counsel relied on Lubanga v Ddumba (Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2011).


On Grounds 1 & 2 regarding the Meaning of "Payment" 

Counsel submitted that Section 2(xx) of the Income Tax Act provides an inclusive and broad definition of "payment", which encompasses "any other means of conferring value or benefit on a person." The capitalisation of interest discharges the borrower's obligation at the end of each interest period and confers a benefit on the lender. The Paton case was decided under different legislation that lacked this broad definition and was therefore distinguishable. Reliance on dissenting or persuasive authority from a foreign jurisdiction is permissible.


On Ground 3 regarding the Books of Account

The respondent's use of UTI B.V.'s books of account was proper referencing Article 11 of the Netherlands-Uganda Double Taxation Treaty permits Uganda to tax interest arising in Uganda; further referencing Article 26 of the Treaty provides for information exchange; that URA has authority to use the best judgment available under the Income Tax Act; and lastly as associated entities under transfer pricing rules, ATC was obliged to maintain documentation, including the lender's records.


Court's Findings

On the Preliminary Objection

The Court (per Alibateese JA and Byaruhanga-Rugyema JA) overruled URA's preliminary objection, holding that Grounds 1 and 2 raise pure questions of law. The Court held that

Questions of law entail determination of the scope of legal provisions including statutes and case law and how these are employed to specific facts in a case. An appeal on a point of law arises when the Court, whose decision is being appealed against, made a finding on the case before it, but got the relevant law wrong or applied it wrongly in arriving at that finding. in the lead judgement of Alibateese JA, citing Lubanga v Ddumba (CA No. 10 of 2011)

The court observed that the substance of the grounds, proper interpretation of Section 47(2), and the correct application of the Paton case are clearly legal issues. It is not necessary to use the express phrase "erred in law" for a ground to qualify as a point of law.

 

Grounds 1 & 2 regarding the Interpretation of Section 47(2) and Reliance on English Case Law

The Court agreed with ATC that the High Court mischaracterised Lord Atkin's judgment in Paton as a dissenting opinion (it was the lead judgment) and that the Paton case in fact held that capitalisation of interest did not constitute payment under UK Income Tax law. The Court also agreed that Reddie v Williamson had been displaced by Paton. However, the Court held that these errors were not fundamental because the High Court's decision was primarily based on written Ugandan law, not English case law.


The Court then applied Section 47(1) and (2) and Section 2(xx) of the Income Tax Act (ITA) and found that Section 47(1) of the ITA provides for accrual-based treatment of deferred interest generally. Section 47(2) carves out a specific rule for interest subject to withholding tax, stipulating that such interest is "taken to be derived or incurred when paid."


The Court also found that Section 2(xx) of the Income Tax Act defines "payment" to include not merely cash or in-kind transfers but also "any other means of conferring value or benefit on a person." This is a deliberately broad and inclusive statutory definition.


The Court found that the UK Income Tax provision considered in Paton (s.36 of the Income Tax Act 1918) was not in pari materia with Section 47(2) and Section 2(xx) of Uganda's Income Tax Act. The Paton case is therefore inapplicable.


It was also established that by capitalising accrued deferred interest and adding it to the principal, ATC conferred a measurable financial benefit and value on UTI B.V. The lender's recoverable principal base increased; UTI B.V. became entitled to compound interest on the enlarged sum; and the lender's accrued entitlements were preserved without waiver.


Lastly, the Court observed that once capitalised, the interest ceased to be characterised as interest and became part of the principal loan, on which the lender was entitled to further interest. UTI B.V. recognised interest income in its books of account for 2012–2017 and paid tax on those amounts in the Netherlands.

 

The lead judgment (Alibateese JA) concluded that;

It is my considered view that even without actual cash flow, any tax payer is deemed to have paid the interest for tax purposes at capitalisation thus triggering withholding tax at that stage, regardless of physical remittance.

 

Concurring

Byaruhanga-Rugyema JA elaborated that capitalisation confers the following specific financial benefits on the lender;

  1. Increased lender's recoverable principal base, the borrower becomes liable for interest on an enlarged principal, increasing the total amount owed.

  2. The lender earns compound interest on the original principal plus capitalised amounts, increasing total return over time.

  3. Avoidance of loss of accrued interest, capitalisation allows the lender's entitlements to be preserved where the borrower cannot immediately pay.

 

The Court further held, relying on Kenya Revenue Authority v Republic (Exparte Fintel Ltd) [2019] KECA 1066 (KLR) that;

A statute ought to be looked at in the context of its enactment and as a whole as opposed to picking and choosing words in isolation. The Income Tax Act has given the word 'paid' a technical as opposed to an ordinary definition. In the context of the Income Tax Act, payment is deemed to have been made even when no money has passed over.

 

Ground 3 regarding the Reliance on UTI B.V.'s Books of Account

The Court rejected ATC's argument that reliance on UTI B.V.'s books of account was unlawful and found that Article 11 of the Netherlands-Uganda Double Taxation Treaty (The Hague, 31 August 2004) provides that interest arising in Uganda may be taxed in Uganda, conferring authority on URA to levy withholding tax.


The Court further found that Article 26 of the Treaty expressly provides for the exchange of information between the two states necessary for the administration of their domestic tax laws, thereby authorising reliance on UTI B.V.'s records.


Moreover, the court established that under transfer pricing documentation requirements (Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations, SI No. 30 of 2011), ATC, as an associated entity of UTI B.V. engaged in controlled transactions, was itself obliged to maintain the lender's financial records.


Moreover, the Court held that URA is entitled to use the best information available in making assessments. Reliance on the lender's books was the only practicable means of verifying the transactions given that this was a related-party shareholder loan referencing the position in Tembo Steels Ltd v URA, CA No. 77 of 2011; Standard Chartered Bank Uganda Ltd v Commissioner General URA, HCCS No. 810 of 2015).


The Court found that tt would be preposterous to require URA to disregard transactions recorded in the books of two closely related companies sharing the same directors.

 

Holding

Appeal dismissed with costs to the Respondent

The Court of Appeal upheld the decisions of both the Tax Appeals Tribunal and the High Court holding as follows;

  1. The capitalisation of accrued deferred interest and its addition to the principal loan outstanding constitutes a "payment" within the meaning of Sections 47(2) and 2(xx) of the Income Tax Act, Cap. 340 (now Cap. 338).

  2. The withholding tax obligation under Section 47(2) crystallises at the time of capitalisation, not at the time of subsequent cash remittance to the lender.

  3. URA's reliance on UTI B.V.'s books of account was lawful and consistent with the Netherlands-Uganda Double Taxation Treaty and Ugandan transfer pricing regulations.

  4. English case law (including Paton) is not binding and is only persuasive where Ugandan written law is silent or unclear. The UK provision considered in Paton is not in pari materia with Section 47(2) read with Section 2(xx) of Uganda's Income Tax Act and is therefore inapplicable.

  5. UGX 24,232,558,369 withholding tax assessment (plus penalty) confirmed against ATC Uganda Limited.


Read the full case below


 


Key Takeaways

1. Capitalisation of Interest, "Payment" for Withholding Tax Purposes

Under Ugandan tax law, the capitalisation of accrued interest and its addition to the principal loan is a taxable event. Withholding tax obligations arise at the point of capitalisation, not at the point of subsequent cash remittance.

 

2. Section 2(xx) regarding Broad Statutory Definition of "Payment"

The definition of "payment" in Section 2(xx) of the Income Tax Act is deliberately broad and extends beyond physical cash transfers to encompass any means of conferring value or benefit on a person. This is a fundamentally different and wider statutory footprint than the UK provision considered in Paton. Any argument predicated on "no cash moved, no withholding" is untenable under Ugandan law.

 

3. Paton Case Not Applicable to Uganda

The House of Lords' decision in Paton (Fenton's Trustee) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1938] ALL ER 786, which held that capitalisation of interest does not constitute payment under UK income tax law, is inapplicable in Uganda. The UK statutory provision (s.36 of the Income Tax Act 1918) is not in pari materia with Uganda's Sections 47(2) and 2(xx). Practitioners should not rely on Paton as an authority for withholding tax planning in Uganda.

 

4. Written Ugandan Law Takes Precedence Over Foreign Precedent

The Court found that where Uganda has express written law governing the matter, foreign case law, however persuasive, cannot override the statute. The hierarchy therefore is (1) written law; (2) subject to written law, common law and equity.

 

5. URA May Use Foreign Books of Account in Assessments

The Court confirmed that URA may, in exercising its best-judgment assessment power, rely on the financial records and books of account of a foreign related party. In the context of associated entities and shareholder loans, this is particularly significant that the borrower cannot insulate itself from the lender's income recognition records, especially where both entities share directors and the information is accessible under treaty-based information exchange.

 

6. Transfer Pricing Documentation, A Double-Edged Sword

Companies with related-party loan arrangements are required under Uganda's Transfer Pricing Regulations (SI No. 30 of 2011) to maintain documentation including the lender's books of account. The Court noted that ATC was in any event obliged to have UTI B.V.'s financial records in its possession. Such documentation, while required for compliance, may itself be used by URA as evidence to support assessments.

 

DISCLAIMER

This legal brief is prepared for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal or tax advice. Readers should seek independent professional advice tailored to their specific circumstances before taking any action in reliance on the contents of this alert.

 


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