Evidence is the backbone of justice, guiding courts to uncover the truth and uphold fairness. Whether you're a seasoned lawyer, a budding law student, or simply curious about the inner workings of Uganda’s legal system, understanding the rules of evidence is essential.

In this segment, An Overview of Evidence II, I look into the foundational principles governing documentary evidence, judicial notice, estoppel, witnesses, and the burden of proof. These concepts shape the way facts are presented, admitted, and weighed in court. This guide will not only deepen your grasp of evidence law but also sharpen your analytical skills for addressing real-life legal challenges.

NB By the time I compiled these notes the Evidence Act was not yet revised, readers are encouraged to replace the correct citation as Evidence Act Cap. 8

1. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

S.2 - Documentary evidence is defined as all documents produced for inspection of the court

S.2 - defines a document to mean and include any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters , figures or marks or by more than one of those means intended to be used or which may be used for purposes of recording that matter

A document also means any substance on which writing figures or symbols are marked Salua Dean v R- The documentary evidence presented in the case consisted of the tape recordings

Maksudi Ali v R is a legal case from 1962 in the High Court of Tanzania, in which the admissibility of tape recordings as documentary evidence was discussed. The case involved a dispute over a contract for the sale of a motor vehicle, in which the plaintiff, Maksudi Ali, claimed that the defendant, R, had failed to pay the full price for the vehicle.

During the trial, the plaintiff presented several tape recordings of conversations between himself and the defendant, which he argued supported his claim. The defendant objected to the admissibility of the tape recordings on the grounds that they were not properly authenticated and that they had been tampered with.

The court ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiff, stating that tape recordings could be admitted as documentary evidence in certain circumstances. The court held that the admissibility of tape recordings depended on whether they were relevant to the issues in the case, whether they had been properly authenticated, and whether they had been made in the course of a normal business transaction.

The court also discussed the importance of ensuring the authenticity of tape recordings, and held that the party seeking to introduce the recordings had the burden of proving their authenticity. The court noted that this could be done through testimony from the person who made the recordings or from other witnesses who could attest to their authenticity.

Overall, the case of Maksudi Ali v R established an important precedent regarding the admissibility of tape recordings as documentary evidence, and set out clear guidelines for their use in legal proceedings.

S.2 - Oral evidence is defined as all statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnessing relevance of matters of facts under inquiry

S.58 - All facts , except the contents of a document may be proved by Oral evidence. Therefore Oral Evidence is trustworthy , is sufficient without documentary evidence to prove a fact

It’s a cardinal rule that were written documents exist they must be produced as evidence of their contents ie Produced in court

CLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

1. Primary and Secondary documents

S.60 of the evidence act provides that the contents of documents may be proved by primary and secondary evidence

S.61 - Primary evidence is defined as a document produced for inspection in court these include counterparts of a document, where documents are made in a uniform process eg through printing, Lithography or photography

In the case of *DIRECTOR PUBLIC PROSECUTION OF TANZANIA v. AKBER RASHID NATHANI [1966] EA 13,

Facts:

Nathan had been accused and convicted of fraud. He had a licence to sell air tickets to the East African Airways in Zanzibar. He was alleged to have forged air tickets in mainland Tanzania where he had no licence to sell them. The appellant challenged the administration of this loose leaf cyclostyled volume claiming that it was secondary evidence and that no circumstances had been shown, which warranted its admission.

Held: The official agency list was *primary evidence since it was one of a number of documents made by one uniform process, capable of producing many others.

S.62 of the same act, lay down under certain circumstances, be given in place of primary evidence, and includes: ie Secondary evidence

(a) certified copies given under the provisions hereafter contained;

(b) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with those copies;

(d) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;

(e) Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself or herself seen it.

Public and Private documents

Public Documents - S.73 - includes documents forming the Acts or records of a soveriegn authoity , of official bodies ,tribunals and of public officers in the legislature,judiciary and extensive orgarns of government .

S.73 b - They also include public records in uganda of Private Documents eg Articles of association, Memorandum of Articles , URSB documents ,birth and death certificates

Private Documents - S.74 , - are all documents other than public documents

S.75- Right of Inspection of Certified Public Documents

S.76 - Certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents

S.77- this section provides for other means of proving documents

S.77 (1) a (i) - Acts ,orders or notifications of government may be proved by

PRESUMPTIONS OF DOCUMENTS

A presumption is an inference or assumption that the law requires a court to make based on a certain set of facts. It is a legal fiction that assumes that a certain fact exists based on the existence of another fact.

S.78 - Presumption as to genuineness of certified copies

Section 78 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides for a presumption as to the genuineness of certified copies of public documents. It states that certified copies of public documents shall be presumed to be genuine, and any person producing such copies as evidence in court shall not be required to prove the authenticity of the copies.

This means that if a certified copy of a public document is produced in court as evidence, it is presumed to be genuine, and the party producing the copy does not need to prove its authenticity.

In Kananura John Bosco v Electoral Commision (Election Pettion No.8 of 2016) ,

the court held that once the chairperson of EC certifies any electoral documents they are genuine

Section 79 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides for the presumption as to documents produced as a record of evidence. It states that when any document is produced as a record of evidence, the court may presume that the document was authentic, accurate, and regularly kept in the course of business or public duty, without any further proof of these facts.

This means that if a document is produced as evidence and it can be shown that it was kept in the ordinary course of business or public duty, the court can presume that the document is authentic and accurate, without any need for further evidence to establish these facts.

Section 80 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides for a presumption as to Gazettes and newspapers. It states that any document purporting to be a copy of an official Gazette or newspaper shall be presumed to be authentic, and can be admitted as evidence in court without further proof of its authenticity.

This means that if a document is presented in court as a copy of an official Gazette or newspaper, it is presumed to be authentic and can be accepted as evidence without requiring further proof of its authenticity.

The presumption under Section 80 has been affirmed by Ugandan courts.

Section 81 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides that certain documents originating from the United Kingdom are presumed to be authentic and admissible in Uganda without further proof.

Specifically, under S.81, documents such as judgments, decrees, orders, and other legal proceedings issued by any court in the United Kingdom, along with certified copies of public documents from the United Kingdom, are presumed to be genuine and admissible in Uganda without the need for further proof.

This presumption has been upheld by the Ugandan courts in several cases, such as in the case of

Section 82 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides a presumption that maps or plans made by the government or a public officer are authentic and accurate, and can be relied upon as evidence of the facts they purport to represent.

In simpler terms, this means that maps or plans produced by the government or a public officer are presumed to be correct and reliable evidence of the facts they depict, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

For example, if a government agency produces a map of a particular area, and the map is introduced as evidence in court, the court will presume that the map is accurate and can be relied upon to show the boundaries and features of the area depicted in the map, unless there is evidence to show that the map is inaccurate or unreliable.

Section 83 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 - creates a legal presumption regarding the collection of laws and reports of public documents. The section states that official printed books and documents that are published by the government or any department or office thereof, are presumed to be accurate and genuine. This means that if a book or document is published by the government or a government department, it is presumed to be true and accurate unless there is evidence to the contrary.

In simpler terms, Section 83 creates a presumption of accuracy and genuineness for official government documents and reports. This presumption means that if a party wants to challenge the accuracy or genuineness of a government document, they must provide evidence to the contrary.

Section 84 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides for a presumption as to the genuineness of private documents that are executed outside Uganda.

In simple terms, this means that if a private document is executed outside Uganda and is produced in a Ugandan court, there is a presumption that the document is genuine, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Therefore, under Section 84 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6, there is a legal presumption that private documents executed outside Uganda are genuine, which can be rebutted by contrary evidence.

Section 85 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 - creates a legal presumption regarding the powers of attorney. Specifically, it provides that when a document appears to be a power of attorney, and it is executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, the court shall presume that the person granting the power had the legal capacity to do so.

In simpler terms, if a document appears to be a power of attorney and is executed properly, the court will presume that the person granting the power had the legal capacity to do so unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Section 86 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides a presumption that certified copies of foreign judicial records are authentic and accurate.

This means that if a party presents a certified copy of a foreign judicial record, the court will presume that the document is genuine and accurate unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Section 87 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 creates a legal presumption that books, maps, and charts are admissible as evidence if they are produced from proper custody and appear to be genuine.

This means that if a party wants to produce a book, map, or chart as evidence in court, and the document appears to be genuine and is produced from proper custody, the court will presume that the document is authentic and admissible as evidence.

In summary, Section 87 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 creates a legal presumption that books, maps, and charts are admissible as evidence if they are produced from proper custody and appear to be genuine. This presumption has been upheld by Ugandan courts in various cases.

This presumption is based on the idea that if a party had a document that would help their case and they failed to produce it, it is reasonable to assume that the document would have been harmful to their case. Therefore, the law presumes that the document was properly executed in the manner required by law.

Section 88 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap provides for a presumption as to telegraphic messages. This means that in certain circumstances, the law presumes that a telegraphic message was received by the intended recipient, even if there is no direct evidence to prove it.

In simple terms, if a person sends a telegraphic message to another person, and there is no evidence to suggest that the message was not received, then the law presumes that the message was in fact received by the recipient.

This presumption is based on the principle that telegraphic messages are sent with the expectation that they will be received, and it would be unfair to require the sender to prove that the message was actually received.

Section 89 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides for a presumption as to the due execution of documents that are not produced in court. This means that if a party fails to produce a document in court, the law presumes that the document was executed in the manner required by law.

In simple terms, if a party is required to produce a document in court but fails to do so, the law presumes that the document was properly executed in accordance with the law.

Section 90 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides for a presumption as to the genuineness of a document that is 30 years old or more. This means that if a document is 30 years old or more, the law presumes that it is genuine unless there is evidence to the contrary.

In simple terms, if a document is 30 years old or more, the law assumes that it is authentic and was executed in the manner required by law unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise.

This presumption is based on the belief that over time, documents tend to become more reliable and trustworthy as they are less likely to be forged or tampered with. Therefore, the law presumes that a document that has been in existence for 30 years or more is genuine, unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise.

PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE

The Parole Evidence Rule is a legal principle that prohibits the admission of extrinsic evidence to contradict, vary, or add to the terms of a written agreement. The rule is enshrined in the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6, specifically in sections 91 to 99.

Section 91 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 defines the Parol Evidence Rule as follows:

"When the terms of any such contract, grant, or disposition of property have been reduced to writing, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant, or disposition of property, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions of this Act."

This means that if parties to a contract have reduced the terms of their agreement to writing, no evidence outside of the written document will be admissible in court to vary or contradict the written terms of the contract.

However, there are certain exceptions to the Parole Evidence Rule.

Section 92 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides that evidence may be given to explain or clarify the terms of a written agreement if the written agreement is ambiguous, incomplete, or there is a latent ambiguity in the agreement.

Section 93 of the Act provides that evidence may also be given to show that the written agreement was obtained by fraud, coercion, mistake, or undue influence. In such cases, the court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the true intention of the parties and to ensure that justice is done.

Section 94 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 - allows evidence of subsequent conduct of the parties to be admitted in order to show the true intention of the parties at the time of making the contract. This means that if the parties have acted in a particular way after entering into the contract, such conduct may be admissible to show that the terms of the contract were not what they appeared to be on the face of the written document.

Section 95 of the Act provides that evidence of custom or usage may be admitted to explain the meaning of a particular term in the contract if the term is unclear or ambiguous. The custom or usage must be shown to be applicable to the particular trade or business in question.

Section 96 of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 that evidence may be given to show that a written provides agreement was not intended to be a complete and final statement of the terms of the contract. This means that if the parties intended to make further agreements or modifications to the original contract, evidence of such intention may be admissible.

The rationale behind the parole evidence rule is to promote certainty and finality in contractual relationships. This is achieved by ensuring that the written contract represents the entire agreement between the parties and that the parties cannot later rely on extrinsic evidence to alter or add to the terms of the contract. The rule also serves to prevent fraud and deception by making it difficult for parties to rely on undocumented agreements or promises.

Several cases in Uganda have addressed the parole evidence rule and its application. For instance, in ABSA Bank v Mubuke Jude, the court applied the rule and held that oral evidence could not be used to vary or contradict the written terms of a loan agreement.

Similarly, in Shine Pay (U) Ltd v Sarah Kagoro

& Little Sisters Co. Ltd, the court held that extrinsic evidence could not be used to vary the terms of a written agreement.

In Gold view Inn (U) Limited v Barclays Bank(U) Limited, the court held that the parole evidence rule only applies to evidence that contradicts or modifies the terms of a written contract. Evidence that explains or clarifies the terms of the contract is admissible. The court further stated that the rule only applies to contracts that are wholly in writing.

In Future Stars Investment (U) Ltd v Nasuru, the court held that the parole evidence rule does not apply to collateral contracts. Collateral contracts are separate agreements that are made in conjunction with the main contract, and they may be oral or written.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Section 55 of the Ugandan Evidence Act cap 6 provides that certain facts do not require proof and the court may take judicial notice of them. The general rule is that no fact of which the court will take judicial notice needs to be proved.

Judicial notice is the acceptance by a court of certain facts without requiring proof. The purpose of judicial notice is to save time and resources that would have been expended in proving facts that are commonly known or easily verifiable. The courts take judicial notice of facts that are notorious or generally accepted.- Arim Felix v Stanbic Bank

S.56(1) highlights court will take judicial notice of Legal Matters - S.56 (1) a & b - In Saleh v R court held that it could take judicial notice of ordinances and regulations in kenya In Mifumi v AG , Judicial was taken by court on a bye law passed in Torroro on Bride price

Geographical Divisions in the world

In Saleh v R , it was stated were place is material for prosecution case prosecution must produce evidence of place as it is of essence to it as sugar was found in a prohibited area

Constitutional Matters - S.56 (1) c, d , e f g In Uganda v Commisioner of Prisoners Exparte Matovu - court took judicial notice of the fact that a revolution restored a new order and under the constitution there was a new government firmly established accorded recognition by all countries

Customary Matters

Kimani v Gikanga, Customary law as a matter of judicial practice must be proved by calling experts adducing evidence on custom

Bruno Kiwuwa v Julliet Namazzi

Court took judicial notice of customary law and stopped a marriage btn clan mates from taking place

Mifumi v Attorney General - Court took judicial notice of custom of bride price

Section 56(1)(a) of the Ugandan Evidence Act, Cap 6 provides that judicial notice may be taken of "all Acts of Parliament and statutory instruments enacted or made by the Parliament of Uganda or by any of its predecessors in title, and all orders, rules and regulations made under any such Acts or statutory instruments."

This means that the courts may take judicial notice of the existence and contents of any Act of Parliament or statutory instrument that has been enacted or made by the Parliament of Uganda or its predecessors, as well as any orders, rules or regulations made under such Acts or statutory instruments. Judicial notice allows the court to accept certain facts without requiring proof or evidence to be presented in court.

Section 56(1)(b) of the Ugandan Evidence Act provides that judicial notice may be taken of "all laws in force in Uganda." This means that courts are permitted to recognize and accept the existence and content of such laws without requiring proof of their existence or content. This is because laws in force in Uganda are considered to be common knowledge, and therefore do not require evidence to be admitted.

In addition to laws in force in Uganda, judicial notice may also be taken of orders in council, statutory instruments, and subsidiary instruments. Orders in council are formal orders issued by the monarch or by a cabinet minister on behalf of the monarch. Statutory instruments are regulations made by government ministers or other authorities under the authority of an Act of Parliament. Subsidiary instruments are similar to statutory instruments but are made by a person or body other than a government minister.

Section 56(1)(c) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 allows for judicial notice to be taken of "the course of proceedings in Parliament and of Councils and Hansards." This means that courts can take official notice of the records and proceedings of parliamentary and council sessions, as well as the official reports of such proceedings known as Hansards.

The purpose of this provision is to enable courts to recognize and rely on authoritative sources of information related to the legislative process. It allows courts to rely on the official records and reports of parliamentary and council proceedings to ascertain the intent and meaning of legislation, or to interpret statutes when the language is ambiguous or unclear.

Thus, section 56(1)(c) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 is an important tool for courts to interpret legislation and understand the intent of the lawmakers who passed it. It allows for the recognition of authoritative sources of information related to the legislative process, which is essential for ensuring the proper application of the law.

Section 56(1)(d) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 Provides that a court may take judicial notice of any fact which it deems necessary or convenient to be known in order to determine any issue in a case. Essentially, this means that a court can accept a fact as true without requiring it to be formally proven through evidence.

In the case of Accession and Sign Manual of Heads of the Commonwealth, the court may take judicial notice of the fact that the manual exists and that it is a document that sets out the rules and procedures for accession to the Commonwealth. This would be relevant, for example, if a dispute arose over whether a particular country had properly followed the procedures set out in the manual in order to become a member of the Commonwealth.

Taking judicial notice of such a fact means that the court can rely on the existence and contents of the manual without requiring it to be formally proven through evidence. This can be useful in cases where a fact is so well-known or self-evident that it would be a waste of time and resources to require formal proof of it.

In general, the principle of judicial notice is designed to streamline legal proceedings and help ensure that justice is delivered in a timely and efficient manner. By allowing courts to take judicial notice of certain facts, they can avoid unnecessary delays and focus on the issues that are truly in dispute in a particular case.

Section 56(1)(e) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 states that judicial notice may be taken of "the seals of all the courts of Uganda and of the signatures and official marks usually attached to documents issued by public officers in Uganda."

This provision means that courts are entitled to accept as evidence the seals of all courts in Uganda, and the signatures and official marks that are typically attached to documents issued by public officers in Uganda, without requiring proof of their authenticity or validity.

In summary, Section 56(1)(e) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 allows courts to take judicial notice of the seals of all courts in Uganda and official marks attached to documents issued by public officers in Uganda without requiring proof of their authenticity or validity. The provision simplifies the process of presenting and proving the validity of official documents in court.

Section 56(1)(f) of the Ugandan Evidence Act provides for the doctrine of judicial notice, which allows courts to accept certain facts without requiring formal proof. Specifically, this provision allows courts to take judicial notice of "all appointments to public offices and the dates of the appointments."

In practice, this means that when a person's appointment to a public office is in question, the court can take judicial notice of the relevant official records to establish the date of the appointment. This can help expedite proceedings and reduce the burden of proof on parties.

Overall, S.56(1)(f) of the Ugandan Evidence Act is an important provision that allows courts to streamline proceedings and reduce the burden of proof in cases involving appointments to public offices

Section 56(1)(h) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides that the court shall take judicial notice of "all divisions of time, including year, months, weeks and days, and also public holidays notified in the Gazette." This means that the court is bound to accept as fact certain matters that are generally known or capable of being easily verified, without requiring formal proof by a party.

Section 56(1)(h) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 is therefore important in ensuring that the court can efficiently and accurately determine matters that are within the common knowledge of society.

Section 56(1)(i) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides that the court shall take judicial notice of all territories which for the time being form part of the Commonwealth.

This means that the court is not required to receive evidence to prove the existence or status of a Commonwealth territory. Instead, the court can take notice of such territories without the need for any further evidence. This is because the existence and status of Commonwealth territories are matters of common knowledge and public record.

Section 56(1)(j) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides that the court shall take judicial notice of "the commencement, continuance, and termination of hostilities between Uganda and any other state."

This means that the court is not required to receive evidence to prove the occurrence and duration of hostilities between Uganda and any other state. Instead, the court can take judicial notice of such hostilities without the need for any further evidence. This is because the commencement, continuance, and termination of hostilities are matters of public knowledge and record.

Section 56(1)(k) of the Ugandan Evidence Act Cap 6 provides that the court shall take judicial notice of the names and signatures of the judges and officers of the courts of Uganda and of all advocates entitled to appear before it.

This means that the court is not required to receive evidence to prove the names and signatures of judges, court officers, and advocates entitled to appear before it. Instead, the court can take notice of such information without the need for any further evidence.

ESTOPPEL

Estoppel is an evidential rule which in consequence of some previous act or statement to which a person is a party /privy is precluded from denying the particular existance of facts

S.114 Evidence Act The principle upon which the rule of estoppel is based is that it would be most equitable and unjust if one person by representation /conduct has induced another to act as he would otherwise have done to allow that person who made the representation to deny / repudiate it later to the person who acted upon it

In Pickards v Sears it was held to be an equitable principle The rationale for this rule is to provide certain means by which a man may be concluded, not from saying the truth, but from saying that that which, b the intervention of himself or his representatives or privies has once become accredited for truth, is false.

The doctrine of estoppel is dealt with in the Evidence Act under ss. 114-115 and was also defined in the case of:

Nurdin Bandali v Lombank

Held: It is a primary rule of evidence whereby a part to litigation in certain circumstances is prevented from denying something which he had previously asserted to be true.

Estoppel has sometimes been said to be almost similar to an irrebuttable presumption of law since it prevents a party from rebutting facts alleged by the other party. Indeed, sometimes, it is referred to as a conclusive admission, the difference from the latter being that an estoppel may be waived by the party who would otherwise benefit from it.

Characteristics of estoppel

1. It must be reciprocal and mutual, i.e. must bind both parties to the litigation;

2. It must be certain. This is especially so with regard to estoppel by conduct which must be clear, precise and unambiguous;

3. It cannot be used to circumvent the law, i.e. to evade statutory and legal provisions.

In Leslie v Sheill It was Held: The contractual capacity of a minor cannot be evaded by any estoppel against him preventing him from asserting his infancy even though he has obtained a loan through a false representation that he was an adult.

Likewise, the statutory rights of an individual cannot be lost through an estoppel, e.g. if a tenant fails to raise a defence that his rent is in excess of the standard rent prescribed by statute, he is not estopped from making a subsequent application to determine the lawful rent. This was considered in the case of Griffith v Davis [1943] KB 118 Conflicting estoppels cancel each other found an action on estoppel, or rather, estoppel cannot be a cause of action, but a defense.

Dawson Bank Ltd. v Japan Trading Cotton Co. [1935] AIRPC 79

Held: Estoppel is not a cause of action, however, it may assist a plaintiff in enforcing a cause of action by preventing the defendant from denying the existence of some fact which is essential to establish the cause of action or by preventing the defendant from asserting the existence of some fact, the existence of which, if proved, would destroy the cause of action.

Mbarara Coffee Curing Works v Grindlays Bank Ltd.

Issue: Whether estoppel is a sword or defence?

The Equitable Doctrine Of Estoppel Should Only Be Invoked As A Shield And Not A Sword

Akkermans Industries Enginering V A.G Civil Appeal No. 88 Of 2009 [2019] Ugca 2019 In The Court Of Appeal Of Uganda

The Justices of the Court of Appeal; Hon. Justice Hellen Obura, Elizabeth Musoke & Egonda Ntende in their judgment delivered on the 19th September, 2019 discuss the equitable doctrine of estoppel.

This was a first Appeal from the Judgment of Hon. Justice Kiryabwire delivered on the 19th of January 2009 in the High Court of Uganda in a case where the Appellants entered into a contract with the government of Uganda to provide consultancy services and install machines at Makerere University and Kyambogo University accordingly. Under the contract, the Respondent was responsible for buying the equipment to be installed. The contract was to run for three months however, due to delay on the part of the Respondent to buy the equipment, the contract had to take more months than earlier planned. The issue in contention in this case was whether this amounts to an extension of the contract. The trial judge held that in interpretation of the initial contract, this did not amount to an extension of the contract since it lacked consent from the funders and held that the Appellant was entitled to ten (10%) of the handling fees. The Appellant appealed against this decision.

The justices of the Court of Appeal in dismissing this Appeal unanimously held that the equitable doctrine of estoppel should only be invoked as a shield and not a sword and therefore, it was not applicable under these circumstances. The Justices further held that quantum meruit as amount of recovery means as much as deserved and measures recovery under implied contracts to pay compensation as a reasonable value of services rendered. They further stated that in computing the amount to be deemed as reasonable compensation for services rendered, Court ought to take into consideration the communication between the parties showing their intention and therefore under this case, the Appellant is entitled to a handling fee of 10% of the amount paid for the services rendered to the Respondent as reasonable.

6) Estoppel only arises on a matter of fact, not of law, i.e. every person is presumedto

know the law therefore no misrepresentation can be claimed on a question of law.

Allgar v Middlesex T.C

Held: Humphreys J,

“One realizes, of course, that in dealing with the doctrine of estoppel, one must always be careful to see that the court is not saying that a man is stopped from that. If all that happened was that a certain view of the law was taken by the defendants and they made a mistake in what after all, on the part of anybody, even a judge, can only be an expression of opinion as to what the law is if all that happened, was that somebody said, well, in my view of the law, this result follows, then no law of estoppel can prevent him from asserting what the law is.”

It should be noted, however, that sometimes, questions of fact arise out of questions of law, i.e. a question of law may be involved, but the representation is essentially one of fact.

Categories of estoppel

There are three recognized categories of estoppel:

1. Estoppel by conduct;

2. Estoppel by deed;

3. Estoppel by judgment/ record.

Sometimes, however, estoppels are created by law, e.g. ss.115 and 116 Evidence Act.

Estoppel by Deed:

Section 114 of the Uganda Evidence Act provides for estoppel by deed. This type of estoppel arises when a person, by their own deed or conveyance, makes a representation or assertion that is inconsistent with a later claim. The person making the later claim is estopped from denying the truth of the earlier representation or assertion.

In the case of Jenabia Sachoo v Shamise and Anor.(1957 ) EA 227 - Venji was estoped from deenying the existance of a mortagage upon signing a mortgage deed

Arnvid Patel and Anor v Kabujume Civil suit No. 398 /2012 Unereported ULLI , Court held that since the plaintiff and deffendants had signed a deed of setlement of the loan sum the deffendants were estoped from denying existance of loan

Scorpion Holdings Ltd v Lion Assuarance Co.Ltd (Civil Suit 221 of 2013 )- The facts of the case are as follows: Scorpion Holdings Ltd had leased a property to Lion Assurance Co. Ltd. The lease agreement contained a clause that required Lion Assurance Co. Ltd to obtain fire insurance for the property and to provide proof of insurance to Scorpion Holdings Ltd. Lion Assurance Co. Ltd obtained fire insurance from a third party insurer and provided proof of insurance to Scorpion Holdings Ltd.

Later, the property was damaged by fire, and Scorpion Holdings Ltd made a claim against Lion Assurance Co. Ltd for the damage. However, Lion Assurance Co. Ltd declined to pay the claim, arguing that the insurance policy did not cover the damage. Scorpion Holdings Ltd then sued Lion Assurance Co. Ltd for breach of contract.

During the trial, Lion Assurance Co. Ltd raised the defense of estoppel by deed. The company argued that Scorpion Holdings Ltd was estopped from claiming that the insurance policy provided by Lion Assurance Co. Ltd did not cover the damage because Scorpion Holdings Ltd had accepted proof of insurance from Lion Assurance Co. Ltd and had not objected to the policy at the time.

The court considered the evidence and held that the doctrine of estoppel by deed applied in this case. The court held that Scorpion Holdings Ltd was estopped from denying that the insurance policy provided by Lion Assurance Co. Ltd covered the damage. The court reasoned that Scorpion Holdings Ltd had accepted the proof of insurance provided by Lion Assurance Co. Ltd without objection and had relied on the insurance policy to its detriment by not obtaining its own insurance.

As a result, the court ruled in favor of Lion Assurance Co. Ltd and dismissed the claim by Scorpion Holdings Ltd. The case highlights the importance of carefully reviewing and objecting to terms in a contract before accepting them, as failure to do so may result in being estopped from later challenging them.

Estoppel by Judgment:

Section 115 of the Uganda Evidence Act provides for estoppel by judgment. This type of estoppel arises when a judgment or decision in a previous case is relied upon as a basis for a claim or defense in a later case. The person relying on the judgment is estopped from denying the truth of the facts or issues decided in the earlier case.

In the case of Kamunye and Ors v The Pioneer General Assurance Society Ltd (1971)

EA 263 , Court dissmised an appeal on Resjudicata, the test for resjudicata is that the same suit is brought before the same court in another way ,another form , a new cause of action that has alredy been heard before a court of competent jurisdiction

Posiano Semakula v Sussane Magala (1993) KALR 213 - COA held that under resjudicata there must be an end to litigation this is expresed in the latin maxim “ nemo debit bis vexari pro una et eada causa” (No one should be vexed twice for the same case )

Estoppel by Conduct:

Section 116 of the Uganda Evidence Act provides for estoppel by conduct. This type of estoppel arises when a person, by their own conduct, makes a representation or assertion that is inconsistent with a later claim. The person making the later claim is estopped from denying the truth of the earlier representation or assertion.

In Pickard v Seers and are restated in s. 113.

For one to rely on this kind of estoppel, he must prove the following:

a)	That there was conduct in question,
	which led or caused him to believe
	something to be true;
b)	That he acted on such belief by
	doing or omitting to do something and
	thereby altered his position to his
	detriment;
c)	That as a result, denying the

representation would be prejudicial to him.

Estoppel by conduct may arise in a number of ways – by representation or by negligence. In many cases, representation is based on an agreement:

In Pan Africa Insuarance Co.Ltd v International Air Transport - the plaintiff by his conduct was estopped from recovering $45,000 that had been paid out to the defendant basing on the principle that , where a party has by declaration ,act,ommision intentionally caused the other to believe a thing to be true and to act upon belief ,he cannot be allowed to deny truthfulness of that thing

John Bakiza v. National Drug Authority -John Bakiza was estoped from denying the existance of representing Kabyesiza & Co. Advocates as he acted as a senior patner

Abdulahi Jiwani & Co. Prop Ltd v Pandya (1958) EA 521 -that to operate as an estoppel ,the representation must be clear and unambiguios mere silence doesn’t constitute a representation

Estopell by representation

Nurdin Bandali v Lombank Tanganyika , In the case of estopell ,if the representation by word /conduct of the respodent were such as to induce the appealant to alter his position in the belief that the respodent may be estopped from asserting his rights even though he never inteded to give them up

Estopell by Negligance

London Joint Stock Bank v Milligan (1918) AC 77 is a leading case on the principle of estoppel by negligence. The case involves a bank customer who authorized a company to transfer a large sum of money from his account to another account, but the transfer was made to the wrong account due to the company's mistake. The bank received the money in the wrong account, but failed to notice the error and allowed the account holder to withdraw the funds.

The customer sued the bank to recover the money, arguing that the bank was negligent in failing to notice the error and allowing the account holder to withdraw the funds. The bank argued that the customer was estopped from denying the validity of the payment, as he had authorized the transfer and had given the company his account details.

The House of Lords held that the bank was estopped from relying on the defense of estoppel, as it had been negligent in failing to notice the error and allowing the account holder to withdraw the funds. The court held that the bank had a duty of care to the customer and had breached that duty by failing to exercise reasonable care and skill in handling the transaction.

The case established the principle of estoppel by negligence, which holds that a person can be estopped from relying on a defense of estoppel if they have been negligent in their actions. The case also highlights the importance of banks and other financial institutions to exercise reasonable care and skill in handling their customers' transactions, and to promptly identify and rectify any errors that may occur

Promissory Estopell -

Central London Properties Trust v High trees House Ltd -

Central London Property Trust v High Trees House is a landmark case in English contract law that established the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The case involved a lease agreement between the two parties during World War II, where the plaintiff agreed to accept a reduced rent for a block of flats due to financial difficulties faced by the defendant. When the war ended, the plaintiff sought to collect the full rent, but the defendant argued that the plaintiff was estopped from doing so.

The court held that the plaintiff was estopped from collecting the full rent due to their promise to accept a reduced rent during the war. The court reasoned that the defendant had relied on the plaintiff's promise to their detriment and that it would be unconscionable to allow the plaintiff to go back on their promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was thus established, which prevents a party from going back on their promise if the other party has relied on it to their detriment. However, the doctrine only applies if certain conditions are met, such as the promise being clear and unequivocal and the reliance being reasonable.

In conclusion, estoppel is an important legal doctrine that prevents a person from denying or asserting something that is contrary to what they have previously stated or done. Under the Uganda Evidence Act, there are several types of estoppel, including estoppel by deed, judgment, and conduct. Each type of estoppel has its own requirements and is applied in different situations, as demonstrated by the cases discussed above.

BURDEN AND STANDARD OFPROOF Burden of Proof

These are rules prescribed to help establish liability or otherwise of parties. The general rule is facts must be proved unless admitted. Evidence law prescribes the burden of proof which is;

1. How facts may be proved

2. Who must prove them

3. The procedure of proving facts.This denotes;

The obligation to prove certain facts (evidential or provisional burden) for example duty to adduce evidence at a certain stage of proceedings.
Duty to prove a case or thelegal burden of the duty to establish a case against the other side or finally prove the case. always on plaintiff.

The General Principles Governing Burden of Proof

S. 101 Provides for a burden of proof. (1) Stating that whoever desires court to give a judgement basing on facts asserted must prove them. (2) no. 1 means the burden of proof is on them. I.e the legal burden.

Woolmington v. DPP where through an involuntary act a man shot his wife dead and was charged with murder. He pleaded accident. He was convicted because he had failed to prove the killing was innocent. The House of Lords quashed this conviction reasoning that in criminal cases it is always the duty of the prosecution to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, that where a man rises the defence of accident, he has already cast doubts on the prosecution case, therefore prosecution has a duty to clear that doubt.

This however has exceptions, most of them statutory although most derived from common law. I.e the defence of insanity and intoxication where the accused is required to prove the defence.

The offences can also be of strict liability requiring the accused to prove they did not commit them. S.105, the mining Act, Children's Act & Art 28 provides a constitutional presumption of innocence.

S. 102 the burden of proof lies on him who would fail if no evidence at all on either side were given.

S. 103 the burden lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.

S. 104 the burden of proofing any fact necessary to be proved to enable a person to give evidence of another fact is on he who wishes to give that evidence.

S. 105 (1) a section with exceptions to the general rule. the burden to prove the accused's case is within exceptions and facts is especially within knowledge. Is upon him or her (a) deemed discharged if the court satisfied by evidence given by the prosecution, whether in cross examination or otherwise those circumstances or facts exist. (b) the person accused shall be entitled to be acquitted of the offence with which charged if the court is satisfied the evidence given creates reasonable doubt as to guilt of the accused person in respect of that offence.

(2) this section however does not; (a) prejudice or diminish in any respect the obligation to establish by evidence according to law, any acts, omissions or intentions which are legally necessary to constitute the offence with which the accused is charged. (b) impose on the prosecution the burden of proving circumstances or facts described in (1) do not exist or (c) affect the burden placed upon the accused to prove defence of intoxication or insanity.

S. 106 In civil proceedings when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon that person

In civil cases the burden is on the plaintiff.

In S. 102 the evidential burden is seen to be on that person who makes the allegations. Through the use of the word, asserting/ affirming as was considered in the case of

Joseph Constantine Ltd. v. Imperial stated that the burden lies on that person who affirms and not who denies but term affirmation is wide enough to include every allegation, whether positive or negative.

Wakling v London & South Western Railways a womans husband died next to a railway line and because of this the woman alleged that he died because of the negligence of the company. She did not have any other evidence. It was held she could not succeed without further evidence.

Income Tax cases, it is the tax payer under the duty to prove that the assessment against him was excessive. S. 103 Income Tax Act.

Standard of Proof/ degree of persuasion

Once a legal burden is imposed on a particular person the law prescribes a certain degree to which he must aspire and until attained the burden is not discharged. Under Common law, 2 basic standards have been identified for criminal and civil actions. In civil cases, the general standard is on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of doubt/ evidence . in criminal, the duty is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Miller v. Minister of Pensions, Denning MR distinguished proof beyond reasonable doubt from conclusive proof. He said proof beyond all shadow of doubt but rather beyond doubt leaving reasonable consideration.

The standard in matrimonial causes appears to be one for argument. This is because the allegations tend to be quazi criminal, for example, adultery, cruelty, bigamy etc. the question is whether criminal standards should be employed. S. 9 of the Divorce Act provides court granting a divorce if satisfied the grounds exist.

Stjerholm v Stjerholm it was laid down that the word satisfy meant a high degree of satisfaction and hence standard is beyond reasonable doubt.

It is also argued that the word merely means that it need be proved, and that the burden is on the petitioner to prove but the balance is still on a balance of probabilities.

In Uganda it is viewed that the standard should be in between criminal and civil level since the offences are themselves in between. See Patel v. Patel.

COMPETENCE AND COMPELLABILITY OF WITNESSES

This is the capacity of a person to give evidence. Not all people have the capacity. I.e. old people, insane, children etc.

Compellability is whether one can be subject to compulsory inducement by court to testify, (summoned). Not all witnesses can be compelled. Ie the President Article 95?

Competence of Witnesses

S. 117 states the general rule that all persons are competent unless they suffer disability. Also unless they understand the questions put before the, or don't give rational answers because of tender years or extreme age, disease of mind or body or any other cause of the same kind. A lunatic is competent unless prevented by lunacy from understanding the question rational answers thereto.

Category of Witnesses

Children of tender years according to s. 117 are competent. They may not be however if by reasons of age they cannot understand questions put to them or cannot answer rationally . there is no agreed statutory definition of children of tender years however in case law; Kibagenyi v. R the appellant appealed against a conviction for murder. The main evidence was given by his 2 sons of 12- 14 years and 9- 10 years. He challenged admissibility of their evidence on grounds of being of tender years and hence incompetent. It was held that tender years is any child of the average of 14 years. Whether or not they are of tender years

Depends on the good sense of court.

Court when with a child witness is expected to voire dire it was set out in the Ug. V Oloya [1977]HCB 4 (where these test questions were recited and it was said that should court not carry out this test then it is a ground for appeal and quashing such evidence) case as an attempt to determine if the child;

1.understands the nature of an oath,

2. has sufficient capacity or intelligence to give reliable evidence

3.Knows the duty of telling the truth-distinguish right from wrong and know consequences.

Should a child give unsworn evidence, it must be corroborated. In practice, all evidence given by children must be corroborated to ensure reliability.

S. 118 a dumb witness may give evidence in another intelligible manner, i.e. writing or signs, but the writing must be written and signs in open court. Such evidence shall be deemed oral evidence. Hamisi s/o Balum v R a def mute witness who could make some noises was called as a witness and the magistrate allows it. It was translated by his sister who said she understood the noises (she was sworn as interpreter). On appeal because of the form of evidence it was held that such witness was competent but not in this case because interpretation was so crude and the sister should have been biased. An expert should be called for interpretation.

S. 119 only a special order of a court to which judge or magistrate is subordinate to can compel them (judge or magistrate)to answer any questions as to own conduct in court or other matter that came to them in their role. They may be examined in other matters which occurred in presence while he or she was so acting. Hence immune to peer our subordinate courts.

S. 120 Spouses in criminal proceedings. A spouse shall be a competent but not compellable witness for prosecution without the consent of the accused [which used to mean one wife one husband (R v. Amkeyo) but Alai v. Ug. Changed this and led into the provision of S. 120 (b) that provides for marriage under custom] and; spouse shall be competent and compellable witness for the defence whether the accused is charged alone or jointly with another

R v Lockworth [1931] 1 kb 117 it was held that where a husband is indicted for inflicting harm on the wife, she is a compellable witness for both the defence and prosecution. if she refuses continuously she is incompetent in court.

S. 121 states general competency of parties to a case (to give evidence), spouses at civil proceedings (spouses are here competent and compellable).

S. 122 Evidence of affairs of state no one is permitted to give such derived from unpublished official records except with permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned who shall give or withhold permission as he sees fit.

In Duncan v. Cammel-Laird where a British sub-marine was sunk during WW2 killing 99 men. The defendants of the deceased persons sued for damages due to negligence, applying for discovery of certain documents relating to the incident. Government refused to disclose, contending that their production would injure public security. The plaintiffs counter-argued that the claim for privilege should not be final but should be investigated by the court to avoid injustice. It was held that the court should accept the claim for privilege on the face value and not inquire into the reason for not disclosing the documents.

In Conway v. Rimmer the plaintiff was a former police constable. He sued the department for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, applying for discovery of certain documents in the possession of the defendants who claimed privilege. Court laid down principles;

i. documents should be provided for inspection in court and if court finds that disclosure will not be prejudicial to public intrest or that any possibility of such prejudice was insufficient to justify its being withheld then disclosure should be ordered.

ii. In all cases, the court should balance the two conflicting public interests that no home is done t the state against the public interest and that justice is not denied by not providing all relevant evidence.

S. 123 a public officer shall not be compelled to make official communications made to him as course of his duty when they are considered of public interest and public would suffer by disclosure. Article 41 (1).

S. 124 information to commission of offences. No magistrate or officer shall be compelled to say where he or she got information s to commission of an offence and no revenue officer shall be compelled to state where information as to offences against public revenue was derived.

S. 125 no advocate shall be compelled to disclose communication with client or on behalf of, in the course or for the purpose of that employment by the client unless expressly allowed to.

However disclosure of (a) such communication made in furtherance of illegal purpose and (b) any fact observed by an advocate in the course of his or her employment showing any crime of fraud has been committed since the commencement of employment shall not beprotected. Omari v R [1956] 22 EACA it was restated that the provisions of s. 125 that it is professional misconduct for an advocate to disclose any communication made to him by his client, unless the latter consented, that the only exception is when the client has consented or when the communication as for an illegal purpose.

The section also states that the obligation not to disclose remains even after the employment relationship ceases.

S. 126 extends the duty and noncompellability to servants, interpreters and clerks employed by the advocate..

Compellability of Witnesses

It means whether a particular witness can be subject to the compulsory process of court to induce him to testify.

The general rule is that all ordinary witnesses are compellable to testify on matters asked of them during proceedings.

S. 131 provides for witnessing not being excused from answering questions that would incriminate them directly or indirectly. But no such answer a witness may be compelled to give shall subject them to arrest or prosecution or be proved against them in subsequent criminal proceedings, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by that answer.

Some witnesses are not compellable for example an accused (who has the constitutional right to silence) However, under S 131 where the accused gives sworn evidence, they are compellable to answer questions.

S. 132 An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, hence a conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Questions:

1. What happens when awitness gives evidence different from that stated by the Police?

2. What about those who refuse to give evidence in court yet are called as witnesses? They are called refractory witnesses and can be charged with contempt of court for 7 days until they give evidence before the court.

A hostile witness is on the accuseds side but when giving evidence starts giving evidence against the accused, in favour of the prosecution. In order to deal with them counsel applies to court to declare such witnesses hostile then can ask court to allow a cross examination of the witness in this manner.

a) Examination-in-chief an encouragement of the witness to tell their story, where they are treated calmly and gently without fear of intimidation. If found hostile at this point court may be indulged to declare him thus.

b) Cross examination done by the other side to destroy or impeach the credit of the witness by showing their evidence should be taken with less weight and not believes. Once court rules that the evidence is unreliable on side can use him, if this step of cross examination is skipped, court will still consider the evidence adduced.

c) Re-examination where remaining words of the witness is heard, although the court has the final say. The party who called the witness tries to repair the damage caused before and re-present the evidence. New evidence cannot be introduced unless it is clear any damage that has been caused. If found that the witness has told lies they may be persecuted for perjury. S.131

Exceptions to the General Rule as to the Compellability of Witnesses

Most of these are based on the privileges granted by law, e.g public privilege, professional privilege and private privilege. They are based on public policy. Already seen.

Private Privilege

E.g. husband and wife S? that binds them even after divorce.

Professional Privilege

I.e doctors, lawyers and clients etc. seen

Public Privilege

Which protects government secrets from proceedings, and deals with diplomatic and presidential immunity.

CORROBORATION

Corroborative is evidence which tends to support or confirm other evidence already given in court. It has to be from an independent source. Evidence which is itself corroborative cannot corroborate other evidence because both need to be supported. It was defined in

R v. Baskerville where B had been charged with acts of gross indecency with 2 boys. The only direct evidence of the act was the evidence of the 3 boys but at the trial the two boys were accomplices to the act. It was held, their evidence had to be corroborated and court defined corroborative as evidence which in some material particular tends to show the accused committed the crime charged.

R v Manilal [1949] 9 EACA 58 supported this case and here it was held that corroboration, which should be looked for is some additional evidence rendering it probable that the evidence of the witness is true and reasonably safe to act upon showing that the act was committed and accused committed it.

Corroborative must hence be

1. Independent testimony. R v Baskerville.

2. It should connect the accused to the commission of the offence

3. It needn't corroborate the whole story R v. Manilal

The Rationale for Corroboration

a)To ensure reliability of the evidence given. In certain situations some of the witnesses may be interested parties; e.g. accomplices and the co-accused.

b)Some offences don't usually have direct witnesses apart from the complainant e.g. in sexual offences, the only witness is usually the complainant and at trial its their word against the accused's. court may need to test reliability of that evidence. Ie. R v Baskerville.

General Rule: S. 133 states that subject to the provisions of any other law in force, no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. However, it is subject to any other law in force.

- the requirement for corroboration is an exception to the general rule because it permits more than 1 witness.

Situations Where Corroboration is required

Statutory. In these situations, court must always get corroboration to convict.

a) Penal Code Act. Offences such as Treason, Sedition,

Perjury, procuring defilement of women by threats, need to be corroborated.

b) The Traffic & Road Safety Act, e.g. Over speeding

c) The Children's Act; a petition for the declaration of parentage. Unsworn evidence of a child of tender years must be corroborated. S. 12 Oaths Act which requires all evidence in court to be sworn. MCA and TIA have exceptions, but in judicial practice whether or not evidence is sworn it must be corroborated.

Judicial Practice.

Court may not convict on uncorroborated evidence, but it has the discretion to decide if the evidence is reliable- of course cautioning itself on the requirements for corroboration.

Categories

a) Accomplice evidence. S. 132, an accomplice shall be competent a witness against an accused person. Conviction is not illegal based on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But it is the worst kind of evidence that must be corroborated R. v Baskerville.

The rationale is in the Handbook for Magistrates;

i. Accomplices are usually interested parties and likely to tell lies to shift guilt from himself or play down own part.

ii.As a partner in crime with the accused, an accused is not likely to value his oath;

iii. They usually give evidence in hope of pardon or promise or lenience by the prosecution

b)Sexual offences. The evidence of the complainant must be corroborated as a rule of judicial practice. Chila v. R [1967] it was held, the judge should warn assessors and self of the danger of uncorroborated evidence of the complainant. He may not convict in the absence of corroboration if he satisfied no failure of justice., the rationale for requiring corroboration in sexual offences. This is that sexual offenses are subject to deliberate false charges from sexual neurosis, fantasy, jealousy, spite or shame.

Corroboration in sexual offences consists of medical reports, or any other evidence, ie. The state of the complainant, distressed condition, e.g torn clothes, beaten body etc. if the complainant reported the assault it can be a part of the corroboration. The best is medical as to whether there was defilement or rape etc.

Ngobi v. R [1953] 20 EACA 56 a small girl was defiled and in the course infected with an STD. the accused denied any knowledge of the child. A medical exam was done and he had the same STD. the medical evidence was held to be good corroboration.

In Ntambala v Uganda, Justice Lillian Tibatemwa held that the requirement for corroboration of evidence in sexual offense cases does not apply in all cases, and that it is not a legal requirement for a conviction.

Justice Tibatemwa noted that the requirement for corroboration of evidence in sexual offense cases arose from the common law tradition, which required that a conviction could not be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant. However, she also noted that the common law tradition had been overtaken by statutory provisions, such as the Evidence Act of Uganda, which did not require corroboration in sexual offense cases.

Justice Tibatemwa held that the requirement for corroboration was not an absolute requirement, and that it was dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. She noted that there may be cases where the complainant's evidence is so compelling and consistent that it may be sufficient on its own to support a conviction. On the other hand, there may be cases where the complainant's evidence is weak or inconsistent, in which case the prosecution may need to rely on other evidence to support a conviction.

Overall, Justice Tibatemwa held that the requirement for corroboration in sexual offense cases should not be treated as an inflexible rule, but rather as a guiding principle that is subject to the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

Dying Declarations;

There must be declaration as a matter of judicial prudence.

Confessions against the co-accused; retracted and repudiated confessions read back in summary

Identification. In all casescourt requires corroboration especially at night.. read back read Abdulla bin Wendo v. R as locus classicus.

Child under tender years, corroboration is required.

Oloo v R [1960] EA .87 it was held,the judge relied on a 12 year old to convict the appellant for murder, he did not warn himself on the need for corroboration.Court of appeal held it to be erroneous. This is more so if the child is a prosecution witness. The rationale for this is that children can easily be coached. They are impressionable and susceptible, easily fooled and slowly learn the duty to tell the truth. Their observation and reasoning is far below that of an adult and therefore their evidence must be approached with great care.

Compiled and Written by

Byaruhanga Joshua Morris

Email - joshmorris728@gmail.com

Contact - 0782574416

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Byaruhanga Joshua Morris Summaries LLB3 Uganda Christian University