THE OCCUPATION OF GOMA AND ATTACK ON UGANDA’S EMBASSY: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE

1.      INTRODUCTION

In late 2024, tensions in Africa's Great Lakes region surged again, bringing the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) into the spotlight. Rebels from the March 23 Movement (M23),[1] a group with alleged ties to Rwanda, launched an aggressive offensive on Goma, a strategically crucial city in eastern DRC.

By January 29, 2025, the rebels had seized most of the city, marking a significant turning point in the conflict. The siege left a devastating toll: the United Nations reported that more than 900 people were killed,[2] with incidents of summary executions, widespread sexual and gender-based violence, and the destruction of camps for displaced persons.

Simultaneously, in an unrelated yet deeply concerning development, Uganda’s embassy in Kinshasa was attacked amid protests, adding a diplomatic dimension to an already volatile situation. These events raise complex questions under international law, focusing on territorial occupation, state sovereignty, the protection of civilians during armed conflict, and the inviolability of diplomatic missions.

This article unpacks these incidents from the perspective of international law, assessing the legal frameworks involved and exploring the broader implications for regional stability.

2.      OCCUPATION OF GOMA: A VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY?

2.1              M23’s Offensive and Goma’s Fall

M23, a rebel group first formed in 2012 by former Congolese army officers, is rooted in the dissatisfaction of its members with the government’s implementation of peace agreements aimed at integrating the group’s forces into the Congolese military.[3] After being militarily defeated in 2013 following international pressure and the signing of the Nairobi Declarations, M23 resurged in late 2021, citing unresolved grievances. The group resumed fighting after confidential negotiations with the Congolese government collapsed, and by January 2025, M23 had launched a new offensive, capturing key towns such as Minova and Sake before ultimately taking control of Goma.[4]

The capture of Goma by M23 in 2025 marked a catastrophic failure of the Congolese government and its armed forces (FARDC) to maintain control over one of the most economically and strategically important cities in the region. The city’s fall sent shockwaves across the international community, recalling the group’s initial capture of Goma in 2012, which had ended in a global outcry.[5] Once again, M23’s occupation of Goma ignited serious concerns about state sovereignty and territorial integrity under international law.

2.2              Defining Occupation Under International Law

Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, which applies pursuant to Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and customary law, provides, under the headline “Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State,”

“[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions (common Article 2) adds that “[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”

The issue of determining whether an area is subject to the laws of occupation or the laws governing armed conflict is complex and often context-specific, as seen in the ongoing situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the case of M23’s control over Goma, the question arises: does M23’s capture of Goma signify the transition from active hostilities to a state of occupation? This distinction is critical, as it dictates which body of international law applies—whether it is the law of armed conflict or the law of occupation.

Similar questions have been posed in the context of other occupied territories, notably in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the Wall Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court clarified that despite not being internationally recognised as belonging to another state, the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel fall under common Article 2, para. 1 of the Geneva Conventions.

The Court determined that because these territories were occupied in the wake of an armed conflict between High Contracting Parties (Israel and its neighbors),[6] occupation law applies. This clarification highlighted that even in situations where there is ambiguity about the territorial status, the law of occupation can still govern. However, the situation in Gaza presented a more complicated scenario, where the extent of control over airspace and borders was debated in terms of whether it was sufficient to establish authority under the Hague Regulations.

Alexander Orakelashvili has stated:

“[t]he law of occupation applies to the areas over which the occupying power exercises effective control. It does not apply to situations where the adversary’s army is still capable of fighting, thereby precluding the exclusive control of the would-be occupying power. Therefore, the situation in Palestine cannot be subjected to the law applicable to hostilities if it is governed by the law of belligerent occupation, because no territory can legally be the occupied territory and area of hostilities at the same time.”[7]

With M23 rebels having established control over Goma by the end of January 2025, the situation shifts from one of active conflict to one that potentially falls under the legal regime governing occupation. As noted earlier, effective control is the key criterion for determining whether a territory is occupied under international law. Given that M23 successfully overran the Congolese army’s positions, capturing the strategic city and several surrounding towns, it is clear that they now exercise substantial control over Goma.

In this case, the situation in Goma moves away from being governed by the law on the conduct of hostilities—which applies to active, ongoing armed conflict—and into the realm of belligerent occupation. According to the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions (1949), an occupying force, like M23 in Goma, is bound by specific obligations to maintain public order, protect civilians, and refrain from exploiting the territory’s resources for its own benefit. These laws apply even if M23 is a non-state actor, particularly because of the allegations that Rwanda is providing direct support, which could implicate Rwanda in M23’s obligations as well.

As Alexander Orakhelashvili rightly emphasises, the law of occupation is triggered when the occupying power exercises exclusive control over a territory, precluding significant armed resistance. In Goma, the group’s dominance by late January suggests that Goma is effectively under occupation. This means that the laws governing occupation now apply, and M23—and potentially Rwanda, if their support is proven—must ensure that civilians are protected, public order is maintained, and the rights of the population are respected.

Furthermore, as Orakhelashvili points out, a territory cannot simultaneously be classified as both an area of hostilities and an occupied territory. Therefore, with M23 firmly in control, Goma should no longer be considered an active battlefield but rather an occupied area, which subjects the rebels to the law of belligerent occupation.

Under IHL, an occupying power cannot just do as it wishes but it is obligated to maintain public order and safety, protect civilians, and refrain from exploiting the resources of the occupied territory for its own benefit.

Human rights law may also play an important role in delimiting the occupying power’s rights and duties. Indeed, this body of law is widely recognised as applicable in situations of occupation, at least as regards certain types of activity. Consequently, human rights law may impose formal obligations relevant to the occupant; it is also widely regarded as a potential basis for altering existing local laws.

Recently, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed the importance and relevance of human rights law in times of occupation and the occupant’s legal obligation to take it into account while taking action and while developing policies in the occupied territory.[8]

Witnesses in Goma have asserted that the M23’s intelligence branch is searching for former Congolese soldiers and criminals but some people are misidentified. They asserted that 11 young people were killed on Sunday while waiting for a weightlifting class in the city after being misidentified as thieves.[9] 

Furthermore, there are reports that journalists, human rights defenders, and members of civil society organisations have been threatened, and forced to leave the area. Others are still stuck in Bukavu and Goma, and expressed fear for their safety, due to their active engagement for human rights, and their denunciation of violations and abuses committed by Rwanda and M23 in various territories of eastern DRC.[10] Such reports indicate that these obligations are being flagrantly violated.

Violations such as the reported killings of people, and destruction of displaced persons camps are clear breaches of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law governing occupation.

2.3              Rwanda’s Alleged Role: State Responsibility and the Use of Force

Rwanda's alleged involvement in the M23 offensive raises questions about state responsibility. M23 would never have managed to realize such an impressive territorial expansion[11] without the support from Rwanda.[12] The UN Group of Experts documented in several reports how the Rwandan army is providing military equipment and training for M23. They even reported the presence of 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan soldiers in North Kivu, fighting alongside M23, which was only a conservative estimate[13] according to some observers.

The DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner reported that additional Rwandan troops had crossed the border in the run-up to the siege of Goma, and some reports now mention there may be up to 5,000 Rwandan soldiers in the province.[14] The UN Group of Experts also reported that operations in North Kivu are being coordinated by President Kagame’s adviser, General James Kabarebe.[15] The latter was already involved in M23’s chain of command in 2012,[16] when he was Minister of Defense in Rwanda.

If Rwanda's backing of the M23 can be proven, it would implicate Rwanda in violating the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits states from violating the territorial integrity of other nations just as in Nicaragua v. USA where the court held that the United States had violated the obligations imposed by customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State, not to use force against another State, not to infringe the sovereignty of another State.[17] 

Moreover, the principle of non-intervention, which prohibits states from interfering in the internal affairs of other states, is also at play. The DRC’s sovereignty has been undermined not only by the actions of the M23 but also by the broader context of Rwanda’s involvement in destabilising the region. Rwanda’s actions may also breach the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility, specifically the prohibition against aiding and abetting forces that violate international law.

2.4 The Fear of Balkanization and Long-Term Impact on DRC’s Territorial Integrity

The occupation of Goma has rekindled fears of "balkanization" in the DRC—a belief that external forces, particularly Rwanda, aim to divide and permanently weaken the DRC. If the M23 continues to expand its territorial control, there is a real concern that the DRC’s territorial integrity will be compromised, in direct violation of international law principles that protect state sovereignty. The UN Charter firmly upholds the principle of territorial integrity, which could be further eroded if Rwanda’s long-term objectives include a buffer zone or regime change in Kinshasa.

3.0  Attack On Uganda’s Embassy: Breaching Diplomatic Immunity

3.1  Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961): A Pillar of International Law

While the occupation of Goma brings to the fore issues of territorial sovereignty, the attack on Uganda’s embassy in the DRC introduces a different but equally important aspect of international law: the protection of diplomatic missions. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), which codifies the rights and responsibilities of diplomatic missions, is central to this analysis.

Article 22 of the Vienna Convention stipulates that the premises of a diplomatic mission are inviolable. The receiving state, in this case, the DRC, has a legal obligation to protect the embassy from any form of attack or interference. Uganda’s Embassy in Kinshasa, DRC was looted and a section was set ablaze. The attack on the Embassy came after the M23 captured Goma, the largest city in Eastern DR Congo.[18] The protesters accused Uganda of supporting the M23 rebel group. The embassies of France, the United States, Rwanda, and Kenya were also targeted by the protesters.[19]

The attack on Uganda’s embassy, therefore, represents a clear breach of this principle. Diplomatic missions serve as crucial instruments of international relations, and any harm to them threatens not only bilateral relations but the broader framework of diplomatic immunity that underpins international diplomacy.

3.2  State Responsibility for the Protection of Diplomats

Under international law, the host state is responsible for ensuring foreign diplomats' safety and security. The attack on Uganda’s embassy exposes the DRC’s failure to uphold this responsibility. Under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention, diplomatic agents must be protected from any attack or harm, and the state is obligated to take all appropriate steps to prevent such incidents. Ugandan diplomats were forced to go into hiding after the attack on the Ugandan embassy.[20]

Given the nature of the attack, the Ugandan Parliament has called on the Executive to present a formal statement regarding the attack on Uganda’s Embassy in Kinshasa. Alternatively, Uganda could pursue diplomatic protection, using bilateral channels to seek compensation for damages and ensure that such attacks are not repeated in the future.

4.0  LEGAL RECOURSE AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

4.1  War Crimes and International Criminal Law

In the broader context of the occupation of Goma, there are potential war crimes that could be prosecuted under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The pillaging of natural resources, the targeting of civilians, and the forced displacement of populations are all grave breaches of international law.

4.2         Diplomatic Immunity Violations and the Role of the ICJ

The attack on Uganda’s embassy could lead to legal proceedings before the ICJ, particularly if Uganda opts to hold the DRC accountable for failing to protect its mission. Diplomatic immunity is one of the most sacrosanct principles in international law, and any breach of this principle could have serious consequences for the DRC’s international standing.

Calvin Stewart Obita*

REFERENCES

*           Fourth Year Law Student at Makerere University, and Editor-in-Chief at Lawpointuganda.

[1]           Democratic Republic of the Congo: Briefing, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/01/democratic-republic-of-congo-briefing.php> > [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[2]           OCHA notes escalation of violence in North Kivu province (report), <https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/02/04/actualite/securite/ocha-note-lintensification-des-violences-dans-la-province-du-nord-kivu>

[3]           The (new) M23 offensive on Goma: Why this long-lasting conflict is not only about minerals and what are its implications? – Q&A, <https://ipisresearch.be/publication/the-new-m23-offensive-on-goma-why-this-long-lasting-conflict-is-not-only-about-minerals-and-what-are-its-implications-qa/>  [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[4]           BBC, Rwanda-backed rebels capture key eastern DR Congo town, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cz9e57wln45o> [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[5]              Ibid (n3).

[6]           Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Adv. Op., ICJ Rep. 2004, pp. 144-177, paras 95-101.

[7]           A. Orakhelashvili, “The Interaction between human rights and humanitarian law: Fragmentation, conflict, parallelism, or convergence?” European Journal of International Law, 19 (2008), pp. 161-164

[8]           (ICJ), Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, para. 102; ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), decision of 19 December 2005, para. 178.

[9]           More pressure on Rwanda as Congo says rebel uprising has killed over 7,000 people this year, https://apnews.com/article/congo-rebels-death-roll-rwanda-goma-

[10]         OHCHR, Serious human rights concerns as situation in eastern DRC deteriorates further. Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/02/serious-human-rights-concerns-situation-eastern-drc-deteriorates> [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[11]         Ken Matthysen, Shifting frontlines: Visualizing the evolution of the M23’s territorial influence in early 2024, <https://ipisresearch.be/publication/shifting-frontlines-visualizing-the-evolution-of-the-m23s-territorial-influence-in-early-2024/>  [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[12]         <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1533/panel-of-experts/expert-reports> [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[13]         Can Diplomacy Stop Rwandan-backed Rebels in the Eastern DRC? <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo-rwanda/can-diplomacy-stop-rwandan-backed-rebels>

[14]         African Confidential, <https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/15337/after-seizing-goma%2c-kigali%27s-rebels-head-south>  [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[15]             <https://docs.un.org/s/2023/431>  [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[16]             <https://docs.un.org/S/2012/843>  [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[17]         Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) Merits Judgment Of 27 June 1986. Para. 251.

[18]         The Independent, Uganda’s embassy in DRC attacked, <https://www.independent.co.ug/ugandas-embassy-in-drc-attacked/> [Accessed on 20th February 2025]

[19]             Ibid.

[20]         Ugandan diplomats in hiding after Kinshasa embassy attack. Available at <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/ugandan-diplomats-in-hiding-after-kinshasa-embassy-attack-story> [Accessed on 20th February 2025]