Evidence of motive alone, without proof of participation, cannot sustain a murder charge; accordingly, a no-case-to-answer ruling must issue as a matter of law, not discretion — Court at Kabale rules.
- Waboga David

- 7 days ago
- 4 min read

FACTS
The accused, Mwesigwa Rashid (A1), was jointly charged with two co-accused, A2 and A3, for the offence of murder contrary to Sections 171 and 172 of the Penal Code Act, Cap 120. It was alleged that in January 2025, the accused persons, with malice aforethought, caused the death of Kahwite Africano.
The deceased and A1 had a longstanding land dispute, as corroborated by two neighbours (PW1 and PW2). Evidence also indicated that A2 and A3, sons of A1, had previously threatened the deceased. The police canine led investigators from the crime scene to the home of A1, entering directly into the room of A2 and A3.
At the close of the prosecution case, the court was invited to determine whether a prima facie case had been established against A1.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against A1 (Mwesigwa Rashid), warranting him to be put on his defence under Section 74(1) of the Trial on Indictments Act.
LEGAL REPRESENTATION
For the Prosecution, Mr. Isaac Onyango, State Attorney, Kabale (for the Director of Public Prosecutions)
For the Defence, Ms. Alice Namara, on state brief (for the accused)
SUBMISSIONS
Prosecution Submissions
The prosecution submitted that the elements of murder had been met, namely:
Death of the deceased;
The death was unlawfully caused;
The act was done with malice aforethought; and
The accused participated in the killing.
Mr. Onyango relied on Waihi and Another v Uganda (1968) EA 278, arguing that evidence of prior threats by A1 toward the deceased was admissible as proof of intent. He maintained that A1’s prior threats and land dispute with the deceased provided circumstantial evidence of motive.
Defence Submissions
Defence counsel Ms. Namara submitted that the prosecution evidence was manifestly unreliable and insufficient to sustain a charge of murder against A1. She argued that no witness placed A1 at the scene of the crime, and that all material evidence, particularly from PW2, PW3, and PW5, failed to link him to the act of killing.
COURT’S ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Justice Ssemogerere began by citing Section 74(1) of the Trial on Indictments Act, which mandates a finding of “not guilty” where no sufficient evidence exists that the accused committed the offence. The court emphasized the test from Rananlal T. Bhatt v R. [1957] EA 332, which states:
“A prima facie case is established when the evidence adduced is such that a reasonable tribunal, properly directing its mind on the law and evidence, would convict the accused if no explanation is set up by the defence.”
Upon evaluating the prosecution’s evidence, the Court made the following key findings:
Existence of Motive
There was credible evidence of a land dispute between A1 and the deceased, corroborated by PW1 and PW2.
Lack of Evidence of Participation
The canine evidence (PW3) led to the room of A2 and A3, bypassing A1. PW2’s testimony described an altercation involving A2 and A3 only, not A1.
A1’s Physical Disability
The court took judicial notice that A1 had previously lost a leg and used crutches, casting doubt on his physical ability to participate in the killing.
Absence of Direct or Circumstantial Evidence
There was no direct evidence or sufficiently proximate circumstantial evidence linking A1 to the murder. The prior threats, while admissible, were remote and uncorroborated.
Justice Ssemogerere observed that:
“No direct evidence points to A1’s participation in the crime... At this stage, the only evidence is that of motive, but all corroborated evidence of participation in the murder of the deceased points to A2 and A3.”
He further cited Uganda v Bwambale Nathan & 2 Others (HCT-25-CR-SC-0017-2024) and reaffirmed the Bhatt principle that a prima facie case cannot rest on “a mere scintilla of evidence.”
HOLDING
The Court held that no sufficient evidence had been presented to establish that A1 (Mwesigwa Rashid) participated in the murder. The court accordingly found him not guilty and acquitted him under Section 74(1) of the Trial on Indictments Act.
“I therefore accordingly find A1, not guilty of the offence of murder and accordingly acquit him. A1, Rashid Mwesigwa is discharged unless held on other lawful charges.”
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Prima Facie Case Standard
The prosecution must present evidence that, if unchallenged, could lead to a conviction. Mere suspicion or motive does not suffice.
Motive ≠ Participation
Evidence of motive alone, without proof of participation, cannot sustain a murder charge.
Evidential Weight of Canine Tracking
The Court recognized canine evidence as probative but limited its scope—especially where the dog’s trail bypassed one accused and led directly to others.
Judicial Sensitivity to Physical Capacity
The accused’s physical disability (use of crutches) was a relevant factor in evaluating the plausibility of participation.
Reliance on Established Precedent
The ruling reaffirms Bhatt v R [1957] EA 332 and Uganda v Bwambale Nathan & 2 Others, reinforcing that “worthless or discredited evidence” cannot establish a prima facie case.
CONCLUSION
The High Court of Uganda at Kabale has reaffirmed the strict evidentiary threshold required to sustain a charge of murder at the close of the prosecution case. Where no evidence of participation exists, a no case to answer ruling must issue as a matter of law, not discretion.
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